In a recent post at Accursed Share, Joshua poses Levinas’ critique of Heidegger as rooted in the limitations of comprehension, even the extended notion of comprehension to be found in Heidegger’s work. His post is based on a reading of Levinas’ essay “Is ontology fundamental?” (Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings: pp1-32 – henceforth BPW). He is clear and concise is his account but, as needs must in a blog post, has to summarise and pose things quite starkly. This, I think, is a major benefit of ‘blog philosophy’, this need to summarise and contrast in a quick and somewhat schematic way, more akin to verbal exchanges than essay work since schema is intended to prompt comments and discussion rather than pretend at an over-arching knowledge. Such ‘simplification’ enables the difference of one way of thinking to another to be posed sharply, though I often find myself doing something rather different in my own posts.
Heidegger and Levinas are counter-posed and to do so a fulcrum point is needed. For Joshua this fulcrum rests on the concept of knowledge, which Heidegger is still beholden to and which Levinas argues necessarily subsumes the individual and difference (particular) in the general and same (universal). For Levinas ontology cannot be fundamental since it is still a logy, a knowing, and the reality or truth or essence or soul of the individual – named as the Other with a big O in Levinas – is lost in any form of knowledge relation. Presumably we would want to say something like, either there is a relation with the Other and thus ontology is not fundamental or else all is lost. There is a relation with the Other in the encounter (not knowledge) with the face and thus ontology is not fundamental.
razorsmile :: philosophy//magic //revolution 