Author: Razorsmile

  • Rhizomatic threads for a friend #1

    curious face on the wall_34183397

    Adam Curtis, who is one of the most interesting film-makers in/from the UK at the moment, produces these fascinating documentary/filmic essays where he trawls the archives and retells histories that lie just under our consciousness.  His BBC blog is over here http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/adamcurtis/ and some of his films seem to be available via this blog (http://adamcurtisfilms.blogspot.co.uk/) and over here (http://thoughtmaybe.com/by/adam-curtis/).

    ‘It felt like a kiss’ and ‘The century of the self’ are both great.  On his blog there was also this fascinating essay on the interface between ghost stories and the tv – http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/adamcurtis/posts/the_ghosts_in_the_living_room

    There is an amusing criticism (‘he’s all style over substance’) over here (http://youtu.be/x1bX3F7uTrg) which is witty (if a little light on content itself).

  • The ghosts of departed quantities

    The ghosts of departed quantities

    George Berkeley is famous for his attack on Newton’s mathematics. In the short essay entitled The analyst Berkeley criticises the centrepiece of Newton’s new mathematical understanding of the universe, the calculus. In particular Berkeley argues against the legitimacy of the concept of the infinitesimal. Berkeley claims that these infinitesimals are a metaphysical and logical nonsense1 and that any mathematics that relies upon treating infinitesimals as real is wrong. These infinitesimals are nothing more than the “ghosts of departed quantities”2 and as such are no more real than ghosts in general. The gist of the problem Berkeley raises is roughly as follows – if the calculus offers an explanation for how the Universe works, and yet it relies upon these ghostly entities called infinitesimals, then it is no more and no less metaphysical than an alternative explanation that relies upon an alternative ghostly entity, perhaps God for example. The fundamental aim of this critique is to undermine any anti-religious implications that might be drawn from Newtonian mathematics. If the Newtonians thought that their new method offered a non-metaphysical and scientific route to the truth about the Universe, Berkeley wants to claim, then they are simply wrong. The idea is that implicit in Newtonian science is a set of commitments to features of reality (infinitesimals) that is just as metaphysical as religions commitment to its own, particular, features of reality (supernatural entities such as God, angels, demons or spirit and soul).

    Berkeley is attacking what he takes to be the existential commitments involved in calculus. The route by which he does this is through charging the method with a duplicitous existential commitment. At one moment, he argues, the calculations define a variable as nothing and then at another point the same variable is defined as something. This logical duplicity covers up an existential impossibility, namely that something cannot be both something and nothing. The argument of The analyst illustrates this process quite clearly. In the first 8 sections the argument rests on the claim that infinitesimals are incapable of clear and distinct conception. From section 9, however, we find that the argument rests no longer on the conception of the infinitesimal but instead turns to the operation and definition of the rules of the calculations. The final move, grounded on the claim that “whether you argue in symbols or in words, the rules of right reason are the same” (Section XV), brings together the detailed analysis of the way the rules work with the problem of meaning. “Nothing is easier than to assign names, signs or expressions to these fluxions, and it is not difficult to compute and operate by means of such signs. But it will be found much more difficult, to omit the signs and yet retain in our minds the things, which we suppose to be signified by them” (Section XXXVII). Berkeley’s argument is in effect that the original formulations of the arguments at the heart of the calculus could not be correct because even if they could be codified into an operational set of rules they rest upon a foundation of contradictory meanings.

    This argument provokes a reaction within mathematics which is highly productive, part of the historical background to the development of numerous mathematical innovations during the nineteenth century which eventually result in a concept of calculus that is ‘purged’ of the infinitesimal. This purge attempts to remove latent existential commitments by replacing any formulation which contains such commitments with procedures. Clear rules enable a concept to be defined not in terms of meaning but in terms of how it works. The general history of calculus understands this ongoing process as one of moving from the mysticism (of meanings) to the rigor (of rules). In the process ‘calculus’ becomes renamed ‘analysis’.

    The shift from ‘meanings’ to ‘rigor’ involves an expunging of existential commitments in favour of a method of proving. A rigorous proof is one where the rules can be checked and followed and confirmation involves checking that the rules have been followed, nothing more. The concept of rigor is algorithmic in essence, enabling a step-by-step check of clear and distinct steps to be undertaken. It results, in modern mathematics, in proof-checking being carried out by mechanical computers who are capable of algorithmic calculation at a far greater rate and degree of accuracy than any human.

    This brief story now needs to be complicated. Unshakeable proofs enable epistemological authority. Yet clear explanations that make sense of observations also attract authority and in the case of Newton it is the latter that initially holds sway. The gravitational theories of Newton developed in the Principia are dependent on the calculus. Their authority rests, however, first and foremost on the observational testing that was enabled. Newton tells the story of the cosmos in a mechanical method that can be seen to be true. The authority of Newton rests upon the observation of the correctness of his mathematical calculation whilst yet hand Berkeley’s challenge undermines the foundations of these very same calculations. For a long time the problem of foundations is pushed aside and does not return for a century or so. The manner in which it returns, however, is illuminating. In 1784 the ‘prize problem’ of the Berlin Academy is the question of the foundations of the calculus. Judith Grabiner tells us some of the background of this story, involving the way in which the problem of foundations had developed gradually during the eighteenth century3. The posing of the Berlin Academy prize problem, in the same year that Kant responded to the philosophical problem of the Enlightenment, arises at a time in which the problem of foundations is not simply theoretical but has begun to become one of authority, specifically, of the authority of the teacher.

    Grabiner argues that in the late eighteenth century there is a shift in the social position in which mathematics is taught. From being a feature of the declining Royal Courts mathematics moves into the public realm, in places such as the Ecole Polytechnique, where courses on calculus were being taught to engineers. Teaching, claims Grabiner, “forces one’s attention to basic questions”4. The reasons for this might be thought of in two different ways. Teaching forces the need to explain ideas simply and from the beginning. In order to explain to a non-initiate the arguments and ideas of a subject one needs to return to that which has often been taken for granted by the teacher as they moved through their own educational development. However this ‘force’ is not simply one of a pure motive of clarity but is deeply embroiled in the need for the teacher to establish an authority in the face of questioning. If the subject being taught is one that supposedly rests on nothing but rational clarity – as is the case with mathematics – then that rational clarity better be there for all to see. There is nothing worse, in this situation, that having to rely upon a vague and curiously self-contradictory foundation. The problem of foundations becomes a problem of authority, a problem of the teacher being able to explain clearly and accurately exactly what they mean. For this reason, as Grabiner suggests, it is no coincidence that a whole series of mathematical developments occur as a response to the practical and qualitative relationship a practitioner has with students. In the case of the calculus the rigorous development of the concept of limits arises when Augustin-Louis Cauchy teaches at the Ecole Polytechnique. In 1821 Cauchy produces the Cours d’analyse, the book that is now taken to be the first real step to the modern rigorous calculus.

    The point of this story about the origins of the calculus, a subject that is replete with fascinating and complex problems regarding reality, is to suggest that reason is deeply embedded in the practice of real living. The basic claim is that to understand the course of rational knowledge it is useless to simply look at the internal consistency of that knowledge. Reason is not some holistic self-contained set of inferential relations that are gradually cleaned and polished as we proceed. Reason is an engaged, embedded, process. It is engaged and embedded in the practices of real living which involve social dynamics, individual affects and co-ordinations between these social dynamics, individual affects and material necessities. Berkeley challenges the internal consistency of a theoretical construct. This challenge is not accepted and its refusal begins to produce various unsatisfactory responses, unsatisfactory in the sense that they can not dismiss Berkeley’s problem. Yet Berkeley’s problem does not undermine the social dynamics that rest upon the observational efficacy of the Newtonian model. The model continues in spite of such rational challenges to produce a rational challenge to religious understandings. Only gradually, as the transmission of that rational challenge seeps its way into the practices of engineering classes, does the rational challenge to theoretical foundations become a problem that needs solving. In understanding our reason what we must be cautious of is not simple error or mistaken inference but the forgetting of the bodies of reasonable beings. The real ghosts of departed quantities are not the somethings taken for nothings that Berkeley points to but the actual bodies of the reasonable beings involved in the actual processes of knowledge.

    1See Blaszczyk, Katz and Sherry, Ten misconceptions from the history of analysis and their debunking, arXiv:1202.4153v1

    2Berkeley, The analyst, Section XXXV.

    3Judith Grabiner, Who Gave You the Epsilon? Cauchy and the Origins of Rigorous Calculus, in The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol.90, number 3, March 1983, pp185-194

    4Ibid, p191

  • Speak truth to power and let us think again

    Speak truth to power and let us think again

    speak truthIn the face of neo-liberal austerity there often appears little real hope that another world is possible.  Mainstream political parties form their new consensus around the orthodoxy of market capitalism.  This new consensus disempowers the alternative, which is its purpose, shifting the terms of the debate so thoroughly that any opposition appears to be little more than an unhelpful resistance to reality.  The mainstream politicians might even respond to protests against austerity with paternalistic sympathy – ‘we know it’s difficult but we all have to make sacrifices, hard times force hard decisions.  They might even believe this, arguing that the job of a good politician is to lead their electorate through the difficult times, enabling the decisions for the greater good to be implemented in the face of individual and local group opposition.  The anti-austerity campaigns, when they do seem to gather any degree of support, appear as local issues – a hospital closing here, a service cut there.  Opposition to austerity is local and as such over-ridden by the needs of the wider community that are supposedly articulated by the new consensus of the market economy.  The terms of the debate have already been set and whilst they exist all local opposition is little more than part of the process of implementation, grit in the wheels no doubt but those wheels of change keep turning, fundamentally driving in one direction.  Of course it is necessary to oppose actual local cuts in any opposition to austerity, as such local campaigns are crucial, but without producing a change in the terms of the debate then one local victory today will likely just postpone tomorrows loss.

    It is possible, theoretically, to conceive of politics outside of elections and politicians.  In the actual everyday world of politics, however, the terms of the debate are fundamentally determined by the options available at elections.  Those options have to, moreover, be more than theoretical – it is no option to have a candidate on a ballot paper who will always lose.  This was the key Blairite understanding with regard the Labour Party.  Blair was clear that if Labour was to be an option, in actual politics, then it had to be an option for power, it had to be ‘electable’.  He also began, of course, from the parallel assumption that the new consensus of the market economy was a dominant within the population.  Thatcher had done her work, which was fundamentally orientated towards the culture of the population.  She had established the power of the new consensus of the market economy, made it a viable option through forcing it into existence.  Thatcherism established a new common sense – that closed shops were negative, that unions were undemocratic, that people were individuals who succeeded or failed financially on their own efforts, that  the state was a blockage in people’s lives rather than an enabler.  The negative experience of the state under governments that identified as socialist or communist, a negative experience that was partly real and partly generated by the long term propaganda of the cold war, produced fertile ground for the new consensus on the market economy.  A radical, strong political faction – the Thatcherites –  who believed governing didn’t rely on consensus but understood, instead, that it rested on power enabled this fertile ground to be ploughed deep and the seeds for the future – our current reality – to be planted in almost ideal conditions.  The downfall of Thatcher, almost inevitably, came when she pushed the limits of her power to the point where another power appeared on the horizon.  The more sophisticated members of the new consensus understood that the appearance of alternatives was necessary but that it had to be appearance, not reality.  Power is fundamentally like a sorcerer’s illusion, wielded only as long as the illusion is maintained, as long as consent is obtained.  As soon as such consent slips, the power dissipates and so the purpose of the post-Thatcher Thatcherites (Blairites) was to maintain the illusion through maintaining consent.

    Consent is a curious concept and one that is easily misunderstood.  Consent is fundamentally passive, rather than active.  If power rests on consent, consent in the illusion of power, then passivity is vital.  Passivity can itself take a number of forms.  It can be simple passiveness, a not-doing-anything, for whatever reason, usually because there is no impetus, no need to bother.  It can also take a curiously active form, where the ‘lack of consent’, the opposition, becomes a form of acting out.  In this latter form the passivity arises from the impotence of the opposition.  The child may not consent to the imposition of the will of the adult, might even throw a tantrum, embarrass and anger the parent, but usually this stays at the level of impotence.  The child throwing a tantrum is impotent.  In part this impotence, this lack of actual challenge, is vital to the capacity to throw a tantrum.  There is a need to know, or feel, that the tantrum won’t actually destroy anything, won’t change anything fundamental.  In politics analogous complications also arise.  Passivity through impotence is comfortable.  The danger of comfortable opposition is perhaps the greatest threat to the destruction of consent and the possibility of actual change, the possibility of opening the doorway to another world.  The danger of comfortable opposition arises from the reactive, fixed, settled reality of the opposition.  To be able to oppose is to be able to be comfortable in opposing.  At the point at which opposition becomes a matter of life and death, then it becomes no longer possible to oppose – it becomes necessary.  Of course, the more that opposition is actually necessary, the less will be the numbers of those who choose to oppose.

    To oppose a policy, of austerity or cuts for example, is to remove consent from it and in doing so make oneself feel not responsible.  This lack of responsibility is gratifying and the righteous indignation of the left appears too often to be little more than a self-gratifying denial of responsibility for what is happening, a kind of emotional crutch to make things seem better – ‘at least I’m doing something, it’s not my fault if nothing changes’.  Now there is truth in the claim that the responsibility for what is happening rests with those in power.  That is not the issue.  The issue is, those in power have power through consent, consent is obtained through maintaining the passivity of those ruled and so the real question is to do with the increase or decrease in passivity.  Do my actions increase or decrease political passivity?  To increase political activity involves producing non-impotent alternatives and only then can the possibilities of other worlds begin to appear real, rather than ideal, actual rather than abstract.

    This is in some sense a pedagogic question, although that is something I’m likely to say no doubt, given that I’ve been in the field of education for a while now.  The task of an educator – at least an educator in philosophy, although I suspect this holds for a wider realm of subjects – is to produce an active student, one that engages with and thinks through the material that is being studied.  This ‘thinking through’ is complex.  For example, there is a need to develop familiarity with the terrain of a discipline, the landscape of the area, so that students of philosophy need to know some of the history of the subject, they need a rough sense of the lay of the land.  They also need familiarity with some specifics, some concrete arguments, problems and solutions.  This is a little like learning openings in chess – if you make this move, then that response can be made in return.  In the end, however, a student who could only ever reproduce a few key moves within a general description of historical contexts would never have actually got to the essence of the matter, the ‘thinking through’ the material.   They might be able to re-present the material but would never be able to present any ‘new’ thoughts.  So when teaching philosophy we seem to encounter at least two different types of students.  On the one hand, those who are ‘good students’, studious, learn the material, regurgitate it well and in doing so earn a good grade, easily passing but never quite getting beyond good functional essays.  They will pass, often quite well, occasionally even with a first but will never have said anything interesting in the whole time they are at University.  On the other hand there are students who are troubled by questions, trying to find answers and who often rave about new ideas or new arguments, whose passion takes them into the subject but who will gradually come to encounter the weakness of the vast majority of their ideas when faced with anyone who actually disagrees with them coherently.  In the case of the first type of student (studious student), the educators task is to try and find a way to get some piece of philosophy to bite them on the arse, to get some idea or thinker to say something that disrupts their studious, organised, disciplined life and which will then push them beyond simple functioning into the need to actually think.  In the case of the second type of student (troubled student) the educators task is to find a way to gently show the weakness in their current fascination, the closures it brings with it as well as the openings it seems to offer and to do this by offering a way into the resources provided by the history of philosophy.  In both cases the task is to increase the active aspect of the student, but in each case it is done quite differently – crudely speaking, on the one hand we might need to inject imagination, on the other hand we might need to inject humility.  These are, of course, crude outlines of a much more complex process.  The central point, however, is the primary directive: increase the active forces, the capacity to actually think for yourself, sometimes by speeding up, sometimes by slowing down.

    There is in this sense something similar needed in the opposition forces, those opposed to the new consensus.  The traditional left operates on little more than a continuous ‘forward, forward, quicker, quicker’ process, shouting at the top of their voices about the horrors, the terrible deprivations, the need to do more and do it more often.   Attend this demo, this meeting, this group, this next thing, tomorrow, today, yesterday, all-day, everyday.  This incessant ‘activism’ is the studious student, the one who is ‘doing the work’ but in doing so is little more than a functionary, literally, someone fulfilling a function.  The function of the vast majority of the left is, in reality and in spite of itself, to enable passive non-consent.  This is not the function they believe themselves to have and it is not the only function they can have but in effect, in objective terms, given an understanding of the role of passive non-consent within the maintenance of power, this is their role.  This is clearly a claim that will make few friends, not least amongst the radical left that I know and which I am/was part of.  To offer some further comments to try and back up this claim that the radical left functions to enable passive non-consent (in reality and in spite of itself) I would point to two factors that I think would be interesting to examine.

    The first is the ‘throughput problem’.  This can be thought in terms of a question – if we were to ask, how many people in the population have once been a member of a radical left or anarchist group, do you think that number would exceed the number currently involved?  Now, by a factor of what?  Are there twice as many ex-members as members?  Three times as many?  Four times as many?  Or is it, as I suspect, nearer a ten-fold factor, possibly larger.  Let’s be clear about what that might mean if it were true.  At present, let’s say, we might estimate there to be 10,000 people organised into the radical left and anarchist groups.  If the number who have passed through is a factor of ten greater than that then we are talking about 100,000 people.  That is a mass party, albeit still a small one, but a mass party by any reasonable standards.  That is not a ‘small sect’ or whatever else we might derogatarily call the radical groups.  There seems to be – and I stress this is impressionistic at this point – a far larger number of people who ‘have been members’ than ‘are actually members’.  Why is this?  Is it because most of those ex-members are now right wing, no longer part of the radical left?  In some, rare, cases yes but in most cases no.  It is, for whatever reason, primarily because the radical groups did not keep their members.  Let me emphasise this in case it passes by too quickly. The problem of throughput is the responsibility of the left groups – as opposed to the responsibility of the individuals leaving.  It is a failing of the culture and structures of those groups, one that is fundamentally problematic.  The great danger is in explaining away this failing, in assuming that ‘it’s not our fault, nothing could be done about it because of (X, Y, Z – insert your social, philosophical, economic analysis of choice here)’.  To explain things away is to make excuses,  to make make ourselves comfortable in face of a reality that challenges our ideas of who we are and what we think.

    The second factor I would suggest is what we can call the ‘intellectual problem’.  Why is it that the intellectual wing of the radical left is so weak?  In previous periods of time the intellectual wing of the Communist Parties could engage the intellectual wing of the wider community, there were key strategists and theorists who were plainly from within the radical left and who were engaged with in the wider intellectual community.  The last flowering of the radical left intellectual who seemed deeply connected to radical left parties was perhaps the eighties, and the effects of that in terms of Euro-communist thought were probably a part of the development of the new consensus.  Yet at the moment there are radical left intellectuals on the horizon again, from David Harvey to Daniel Graeber to Alain Badiou and Slavoj Zizek, but their connection to the radical left seems – again, this is impressionistic – weaker than in previous times.  Where there are connections these intellectuals seem to relate to the Occupy-type movements, the spontaneous resistance movements that arise, but very little to the wider radical left.  More importantly the radical left seems comfortable to simply dismiss these forces as some sort of class enemy, usually with trivial and rather amusingly stupid pieces on ‘post-modernism/structuralism/something or other’, with the cry that ‘they never have any class analysis so never know what they’re doing’, a cry that is so deeply confused as to be amusing in its ritual repetition.  Again, the thought here is simple, and it is that the radical left, if it were being successful, would be part of the on-going intellectual debate in the wider community rather than cut off from it like a isolated psychotic.  This is not a luxury but a necessity.  Why does it not happen?  Well, just as the majority of people who leave the radical left groups do not do so because they are now right wing, the majority of intellectuals do not engage with the radical left because the radical left is stupid and boring.  It is simply impossible to actually engage with someone who already knows that you are wrong, what’s the point?  Yet this is the way the radical left appears to think engagement should take place – ‘engagement with the intellectuals’ is simply a matter of pointing out how stupid and class-less they are in their analysis, that seems the general format for discussion.  It is unsuccessful for obvious reasons, which is that it precludes from the beginning the very discussion it purports to want to engage in.  To do so is to reveal that such a discussion is simply not wanted.

    These two factors – the way in which things are explained away rather than understood and the obvious unwillingness to engage with the intellectual – both point to a problem the left has with thinking, both in the sense of ‘doing it’ (I’m thinking about it now…) and in the sense of the existence of it (there is a thought about that over here …).  Thinking, including thinking politically, involves a continuous risk and a continuous engagement, it’s a balancing act between triviality taken to be knowledge and knowledge taken to be opinion.  To think is to act, to risk and to challenge but it is also to acknowledge, to accept and to agree.    The difficulty for all of us as students of political reality is to fully work out how to negotiate this strange, living reality of thinking rather than simply functioning.

    The current radical left, I would suggest, is partly like the studious student.  They are good at what they’re doing but they know not what they’re doing.  The studious student thinks they are learning philosophy when in fact they’re simply being processed through the educational factory.  The radical left thinks they are opposing power when in fact they’re simply being processed through the machine for manufacturing consent.  The other type of student, however, has their own problems.  The bubbling enthusiasm and passion soon finds itself running out when faced with insurmountable problems, with no change occurring in the world around them.  If the educator is not careful the troubled student, initially troubled in a positive sense by questions that forced them to think differently, becomes troubled in a social sense.  They find that there is something painful in not being able to answer questions and there seem to always be more questions the more they try to offer answers.  They find it difficult to maintain their enthusiasm as they find themselves unable to persuade and they drift off into isolation or at best into small social cliques.  If they find a few friends then they can usually survive, with some sense of their enthusiastic challenging thought left intact – but the smallest social division can bring their world tumbling down.  The clique survives if it is at on optimum size, not too small but small enough to form an identity, and if the sexual inter-relations within the clique don’t explode in acrimonious split-ups.  They grow, they develop, they feel radical but gradually find some other interest in the world, something other than simply thinking differently to engage them.  They settle into a kind of sub-cultural identity and a low level depression with the world around them, occasionally drifting into misanthropy.  They keep in touch with some of the studious students and might even regret the fact that they could have done better if they’d chosen to get stoned a little less often and spent a bit more time reading the set material and working on that essay.   The task of the educator is to show this student that concrete change can arise from their thinking differently, whether this be in their personal character – less possible in our current mass education industry – or in their social character, in the form of the ‘public success’ of good grades and good references, with economic opportunities as an end result.  The troubled student is probably closer to the non-party affiliated radical left, all those ex-members.  Their activity is now piecemeal at best, discontinuous and fragmentary or personal and practical social engagement.   They are no more active in their opposition than the radical left, in the sense of being part of a development of the active forces of opposition.  They do what they think is necessary and occasionally a bit more but the necessities that drive them are not the voluntaristic goals of the radical left parties but the individual necessities of challenges they face in life.

    At the moment it seems that the forces gathering around Left Unity in the UK are a mixture of the studious and the troubled students.  The two dynamics of discipline and enthusiasm need to be counter-pointed by imagination and humility.  Those with the worked out programmes and pre-existing answers need to realise that studiousness doesn’t create anything, it merely reproduces what already exists.  The existing left parties, the studious left, simply cannot create the imaginative possibilities of the new worlds that are needed, and as long as they insist that they can they form nothing more than a dead weight on the shoulders of the living.  On the other hand the troubled students, the enthusiastic ravers, simply cannot create enough time for things to change, they want it now and if it doesn’t happen immediately something is wrong.  On both sides of the dynamic (and I won’t use the term dialectic, I think it’s theoretically weak and covers up a myriad of bad thinking – but you can read it in that way if you want to) the weaknesses are familiar and should be obvious.  Yet they are not obvious to anyone involved, because just like the students, each side sees the world only from within its own world.  The role of the educator is often little more than to provide an outside source of authority, one that operates the illusion of knowledge so that we can trouble the certainties of self-conscious individuals.  The illusion of knowledge, like the illusion of power, does not mean we know nothing, just like it does not mean there is no such thing as power.  What it means is that its operation is not in the actual fact of knowledge but in the way it is encountered.  The student encounters the educator as someone they listen to, for the moment at least, someone outside them that has enough outside to let a little of it in.  The educator inoculates the individual with the outside world.  In doing so, in letting the outside into the student, we hopefully enable them to develop in a positive way.  In terms of the radical left the options for letting this outside in are more difficult.  The illusion of knowledge is not going to be a game we can play, there is going to be no ‘educator’ who can stand in that role, no ‘father figure’, no ‘great teacher’ – that route has been tried, Stalin and Mao understood it well, and it produced nothing more than another illusion of power.  Instead the radical left will need to become its own educator, its own door to the outside.  To do so it will need to first realise the position it is in and want to transform it, realise that it must change and take that risk, without losing itself.  To become its own educator the radical left will need to begin to let itself think again.   Only by developing the capacity to think again, in ourselves and in others, do we begin to develop the active forces that can herald the birth of another world.

    Then again, what do I know.

  • Learning necessities

    Learning necessities

    It seems a strange thing to want to do, to learn the necessities. It makes me think of learning very different types of thing. On the one hand, it seems like a positive axiom that would benefit everyone in their day to day life – ‘learn the necessities’. Work out how to do the basic functions that enable one day to follow another, one meal to follow another, in order to be able to do anything else. The trouble perhaps is that almost immediately I begin to hear a parental tone, ‘learn the necessities before you go gallivanting’. As the parental tone comes into mind, the obvious axiom becomes less clearly one to be simply accepted. An axiom in the parental tone has very different connotations from one emanating from an internal rational harmony with the axiom, which is how it’s tone is first heard.

    Part of the nature of the parental tone is that it inspires rejection – and rightly so. Unless the parental tone made the teenager feel like someone simply repeated the obvious endlessly the right tone hasn’t been achieved by the parent. Repetition of the obvious is the nature of parental advice, possibly the basis of much parental language as a whole if the truth be told. There’s no escaping the overwhelming presence of the role when in the role of being a parent. It’s not an open space of creativity. The parent is the drawdown on creativity in many, many ways and necessarily so. The parent who doesn’t fulfil the role of drawing down the dynamic of the creative teenager runs the risk of that abdication enabling failure at a catastrophic level. Isn’t this the lesson of Icarus?

    It seems all the more curious then to find Nietzsche, seemingly, advocating a kind of extreme drawing down of the creative chaos we now mostly encounter within teenager lives. It’s not a teenage chaos, of course, it simply happens that it’s teenagers who currently present this chaos in my own parental space. The chaos that my teenagers let me encounter can be found in many many more spaces, by far and away most of them being adult spaces, adult chaos, adult spaces in which what we realise is that the chaos is there because it can be anywhere and everywhere, because it’s an amorphous chaos.  It’s this amorphous chaos that Nietzsche seems to be trying to draw down when he declares his desire to ‘learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things’ (GS 276). This amorphous chaos, which might manifest in western teenage sociality might elsewhere manifest as war, or bureaucracy, or management practice. It’s a chaos of differential drives and entwined tensions. Moreoever it seemed at some points, as we read through Nietzsche, that he declared a love for this amorphous chaos, a love that was filial and affirmative. ‘Chaos sive natura’, as Lawrence Hatab notes (Hatab 14). This affirmation seems at odds with the need to learn the necessities, necessities of life. It is a tension that comes out in that curous antithetical axiom that Nieztsche offers us, Amor Fati.  ‘I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things: then I shall be one of those who make things beautiful.  Amor fati: let that be my love henceforth…’ (GS 276 in Hatab 20).

    The tension, between affirming the chaos and affirming the learning of the necessities, resolves, for Hatab, through a reading of the Nietzsche that foregrounds his ideas about the Greek tragic centrality of the agon.  Hatab offers us an ‘existential naturalism’ in his Nietzsche, a meaningful compromise of meaning and science.  This is a naturalism that seems to accept science yet with the caveat that this type of naturalism is ‘not a reductive naturalism in terms of scientific categories, but an embrace of the finite limit conditions of world existence as the new measure of thought’ (Hatab 7).  This type of caveat, however, is highly problematic.

    For Hatab the existential naturalism of Nietzsche will entail learning specific necessities, necessities that derive from an ontology of differential drives and entwined tensions that Nietzsche posits in his concept of the ‘will to power’.  At the heart of those entailments is a general axiom regarding infinity and the infinity of truth in particular. For Hatab’s Nietzsche appears to deny an atemporal essence of truth and in doing so also deny truth any temporal infinity.

    Hatab’s sketches what he calls a chronophobia, a condition diagnosed by Nietzsche with regard to the nature of Western thought.

    —————-

    Lawrence Hatab, Nietzsche’s Life Sentence: Coming to Terms with Eternal Recurrence, Routledge, 2005

  • Knower-known relations (alien and intimate knowledge)

    knower knownThe problem of access that is central to the critique of correlationism depends on the epistemological gap between knower and known. This gap, almost inherent to and therefore inevitably inextricable from the concept of knowledge itself, depends upon the sense of the known as a product alien from the producer. That which I know is known in so far as it does not depend on me. I own the known but as something outside myself that I have access to, in the form of property rights, in the same way I have – or can have – access to land. I have certain rights to the known, it seems, providing I can fulfill criteria of ownership. For example, it might be said that I can know something in so far as I possess a belief that is true about the world together with a justification for the belief. I can then have my belief checked, the justification validated and if my papers are in order I can demand recognition and communication rights so that this knowledge is acknowledged. Yet this whole concept of the known as a product outside myself that I own, which underpins the problems of access, is a wholly bizarre and curious concept of knowledge. It exists not as a concept of knowledge but as a means of justified exchange value. It exists to enable rights of recognition but the rights of recognition assume a lack of recognition as their basic starting point. The whole story of knowledge as a product is a story of dispossession, a story of enclosure. It represents a naturalisation of a shift in power from inalienable capacities to alienated products.

    (more…)

  • Concrete communism & the problem of the cell and the new organism

    Concrete communism & the problem of the cell and the new organism

    workeroftheworlduniteThere is an interesting article on the The Commune website about theorising and imagining a post-capitalist society – take a peek over here. I agree with the emphasis the author has on the problem of labour, abstract labour in particular.  At the end of the piece they point out the implication – “So one of the most fundamental tasks we face today, I believe, is to work out how to create the social conditions such that each hour of labor will really count as equal – beginning on the day after the revolution” and it does seem that this is a two-fold task.

    How exactly does a system of equal concrete labour value work. In this regard I think it is worth looking to some of the experiences of people living together and trying to forge models that work.  For example, this article about the Twin Oaks community in the US has some interesting hints at the concrete practical experiments done to create an equal labour model:

    http://www.salon.com/2013/02/10/i_worked_hard_for_no_pay_and_i_dug_it_partner/

    There’s no getting away from the fact that when talking about communism one of the first questions that arises, once you get beyond complete rejection, is ‘how will it work’ and often the responses seem unsatisfactory.  It’s interesting to note, of course, how the Twin Oaks model uses B.F.Skinner as a theoretical background.

    So on the one hand we might suggest that the commune is the space in which the problem of concrete labour will be solved.  Concrete labour needs to be a human relation, a direct relation to the people and needs that make up our lives. On the other hand it seems like you don’t or can’t simply abolish abstract labour. (more…)

  • Celibate machines and epiphenomenalism

    Celibate machines and epiphenomenalism

    Fotamecus+excerpt.mp4_5641474471465483442(Reading Anti-Oedipus again)

    The paranoic machine repulses, the miraculating machines attracts and then there is a kind of reconciliation in the celibate machine. This dialectic of desiring machines locates the subject as “a mere  residuum alongside the desiring-machines”, a situation where the subject “confuses himself with this third productive machine and with the residual reconciliation that it brings about” (AO: 19).
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  • Interview about Rhizomatic #1

    Interview about Rhizomatic #1

    rhizomatic#1I was recently interview via email about the film I made a decade or so ago about an anarchist arts-activist squat.  The documentary is available in various places, it was published in the Deleuzian online journal A/V from MMU (available here) and is also on YouTube (available here).

    Matt Lee interviewed by Edwin Coomasaru

    A Discussion of Rhizomatic #1 (2001)

    1) What were the intentions and aims behind Rhizomatic #1?

    I think the primary aim was the desire to show the action of the squat in a positive light, not in a simple propagandist way but more as part of the collective production that was the motivation behind the squat. We also simply wanted to make a film as we enjoyed making films and finally I found the ideas of SPOR, the use of notions of the rhizome that derived from Deleuze, whom I was very interested in at the time as I was studying his work for my doctoral project, a clear example of supposedly abstract ideas from philosophy having a direct and immediate resonance in the practical work of activists.

    (more…)