Author: Razorsmile

  • The iPod lecture circuit – Los Angeles Times

    The iPod lecture circuit – Los Angeles Times

    This is an interesting article about the new upsurge in podcasted lectures.  the Dreyfus lectures are really very interesting, though I have been listening more to his lectures on Heidegger than on Existentialism, perhaps because I am teaching existentialism so didn’t want to get too distracted…having said that, at least once in my own lectures I’ve commented on what Dreyfus was saying and directed my own students over there in order to get another take on the material.

    Dreyfus lectures on Existentialism

    Dreyfus lecture listings from Berkeley

    The iPod lecture circuit – Los Angeles Times

  • The individual is not anyone

    The individual is not anyone

    The discussion on Marx, Deleuze and desire continues…my own thoughts seep out of side…

    In Video Veritas responds to Larvalsubjects question ‘Where’s Marx?’ with the claim that he is a ghostlike omnipresence – “Marx is all over the academy, but in a fragmented, ’spectral’ fashion”.  IVV suggests that within disciplines like economics there is a kind of latent Marxism because “what could be more Marxist – in the base-superstructure sense – than a rigorous theory of economic interaction that purports to reduce individual agents to pseudorational little machines of desire and satisfaction?”  I think this is an interesting point, though I think it also may reveal something almost against itself.  In particular the word ‘individual’ here is what, for me, shows the a-Marxist nature of economics.

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  • Interest and desire

    Interest and desire

    DSC01950_33863964Larvalsubjects has an interesting post on Marx in the academy over here which has generated a lively discussion in which, perhaps unsurprisingly, the question of agency has risen to the fore again.  This is still something I find disturbing, something I’m not really able to get a grip on fully, since I tend to understand the problem of agency as responding to something like a desire to answer the question ‘what difference can I make?’.  “Where’s the agency“, someone might ask, “in these economic analyses of desire (D&G) or capital (Marx)?  Isn’t it all just a huge machine in which I am nothing?  And if it is a big machine, how did this machine produce it’s own auto-critique?  Isn’t it really the break, the rupture (of the subject), that we need to theorise?  Isn’t consciousness really the most important fact in reality since it is inexplicable by reality?   Me, I’m important, surely – doesn’t my analysis do anything, offer anything – don’t I have the answers, or at least the right to produce answers or the possibility of finding them?”  I’m inclined to dismiss these questions out of hand as the whining desire of a resentiment-filled petit-bourgeois who thinks they’re ‘in charge of their life’ in the first place  but have to recognise that at least some of the charge invested in this response is disproportionate and perhaps related to the other peculiar investments I find myself bound to (revolution, majik, sex).

    One of the things that I thin I agree with larval about is that the emphasis of thinkers such as Badiou, Laclau, Ranciere and Zizek seems to be inverse to that of Marx – “Don’t these positions [Badiou, Laclau, Ranciere, Zizek] postulate that change proceeds via consciousness, rather than consciousness, thought, emerging from modes of production?” larval asks.

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  • beware desyr: anti-oedipus reading notes

    beware desyr: anti-oedipus reading notes

    One of the re-occurring problems that Deleuze & Guattari address within Anti-Oedipus (AO) is that of the apparently self harming act.  This is perhaps most clearly indicated in the way in which they return to the ‘desire for fascism’ within the masses that Wilhelm Reich attempted to address in his book The mass psychology of fascism.  Reich, whom D&G declare  “the true founder of a materialist psychiatry” (AO: 129), was unsatisfied with any theoretical explanation of the rise of fascism that failed to account for its popular support.  They phrase this in terms of desire – “Desire can never be deceived.  Interests can be deceived, unrecognised, or betrayed, but not desire.  Whence Reich’s cry: no, the masses were not deceived, they desired fascism, and that is what has to be explained” (AO: 279).  The argument is a attempt to allow reality to speak, to let the facts back in, in particular the unpalatable fact that there was this support for fascism (this desire).  Such a fact, the argument presumably goes, means that we are faced with the options of (i) either those who voted and marched and applauded the fascists were somehow duped or else (ii) they willingly and knowingly wanted this state of things (which is taken to be a kind of contradictory situation since it is ‘against their own interests’ for the masses to desire fascism).  Unlike a simple despotism in which the autocrat installs themselves through violence, perhaps aided in some sense by passivity, the fascist regime came to power through a popular passion, through the desire of the masses.  This poses the problem of why people desire that which is against their own interests, why people desire that which oppresses them?

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  • The problem of the program

    The problem of the program

    stencil+girl_135387513Notes on revolutionary Marxism

    The central tenets.

    (beginning from the ‘Founding Statement’ of the Trotskyist group ‘Permanent Revolution’ to be found online at http://www.permanentrevolution.net/?view=entry&entry=779, accessed 15.11.07)

    1. Belief in communism, “using Karl Marx’s rough guide to communism – from each according to his (or her) ability, to each according to his (or her) need – as its starting point”.
    2. Belief in revolution – violent revolution – because (a) the state will defend its interests and (b) wholesale change is necessary (radical break) rather than reform.
    3. Belief in the working class as the ‘agent of change’ – the only revolutionary class.
    4. Belief in the need for a revolutionary, internationalist party.
    5. Lineage – tradition (Paris Commune; Marxist wing of 1st International; Left wing of 2nd International, the Bolsheviks and Rosa Luxembourg rather than the Mensheviks; 3rd International (first four congresses) before Stalinisation onset; 4th International – then debate.
    6. The need to continue to develop a program “in the light of experience, the supreme criterion of human reason”. (Empiricism) It is on the basis of this programmatic development that further distinctions are then made (i.e.; the decline or ‘degeneration’ of the 4th International – in the case of PR this involves classifying the ‘United Secretariat of the Fourth International’ (USFI) as having ‘collapsed into opportunism).

    This takes us up to point 6 of the ‘founding statement’, which consists of 14 points in all. The following 8 points all, to one degree or another, mark the analytical differences that then form the necessary conditions for the new move (the founding of a new group).

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  • That which is core being

    That which is core being

    At it’s most exciting and interesting existentialism brings to the fore the problem of the core of my very being and even if it may fall back on the model of the human in its own attempt to think through this problem, the fact that the problem is posed in large part derives from existentialist thought.  This ‘core’ sounds naive and simple, as though some ‘true me’ can be found if we look hard enough.  This implies something like a essence and the first crucial step that existentialism began to make explicit was was that this core is not some essence to be understood through the philosophical process of distinction and definition supported by argument.  Sartre’s crude formulation of this shift in existentialist thought found itself expressed in his famous slogan – ‘existence precedes essence’.  Kierkegaards’ investigation of the case of Abraham and his faith is also, however, reliant upon this kind of shift from essence to existence.

    A core, like the core of an apple, might be missed by being unthinkingly passed over, almost as though it were waste.  Custom and practice where I live is for the core of an apple to be thrown away after eating the flesh and pulp.  I’ve always found that strange, always eating my apple cores and once I had children often eating theirs too.  The core of an apple is crunchy, tasty and – more importantly – the very point of the apple.  It is the seed carrier, which all this flesh and pulp is there to sustain.  It contains a small forest within, an orchard of life.  My own, naive, magical, thinking has always taken the core of the apple to be that which is the most vital, life-containing element of the fruit.

    This core of my own being I also take to be that which is most vital, life-containing.  Assuming, as I do, that I am not a deterministic being this core is also something that doesn’t cause anything, including my being.  It is, instead, that which is within the eyes that see, not as a pre-existing soul but rather as the confluence of all those forces that have coalesced to form this moment of subjectivity in which I see or feel.  At times this core will be in one form, at times in another, though at each time it will present as an eternity.  At times, indeed, the core might might be in a ‘non-dual’ form, presenting itself not as my core but as the core of everything.

    How can such a shifting form in any sense be called a ‘core’?  Moreover, how could such a core be both continuously shifting and yet also ‘that which is most vital’?  Implicit in the notion of a variable core is something like a ‘variable object’.  Why is it difficult to imagine an object that has enormous variation?  It seems that at the point at which we allow the enormous variation the object is no longer identifiable.  We cannot recognise something as an object unless there is enough stability of identity, so it might be argued – and yet we seem entirely capable of handling the weather, of handling things which have enormous variability.  The lower intensity of the rate of change in many objects perhaps inoculates us from the pressure of handling the higher intensity objects.  It seems that if a core does exist, almost by definition this core must be that which is most vital – these two notions seem to co-define each other.  The difficulty is not, then, in recognising this core and this vitality but rather in handling an intense core, that intensity now being understood as a high degree of flux.

  • Anti-Oedipus reading group

    Anti-Oedipus reading group

    The Volcanic Lines – deleuzian research group, which I co-organise with Ed Willatt from Greenwich University, is beginning a new series of work next week.  Details have already gone out in various forms.  Reading for week 1 is Chapter 1 of AO (The Desiring Machines) and the reading group will last 6 weeks, each Wednesday night.  All welcome at any time, online or in flesh.  You can follow the online discussion with the session reports which will be posted at the dialogues page of Volcanic Lines and full details of how to register (it’s free) are at the main site for VL.

    volcaniclines_oct_2007

  • to survive da’ath

    to survive da’ath

    I gave a paper at the Manchester Metropolitan University conference on ‘Deleuze and the event’ that was held earlier this year and the organisers have videoed all the papers, a practice they have had for a while now as part of their online journal A/V (now defunct it seems).  A dvd came through the post this morning with copies of all the papers in video format, which is cool since I can now see those papers I missed on the day.  Here is my own paper (in mov format). These are ‘direct download’ links, so right click and save-as or do whatever it is you do on your system.  You can view a streaming versions here.  Comments of course welcome.

    The video is available on YouTube here. (Probably the best available version in terms of sound).

    A PDF copy of the unfinished paper – partially covered in handwritten notes – is available here.

     

  • Levinas, language and subsumption

    Levinas, language and subsumption

    In a recent post at Accursed Share,  Joshua poses Levinas’ critique of Heidegger as rooted in the limitations of comprehension, even the extended notion of comprehension to be found in Heidegger’s work.  His post is based on a reading of Levinas’ essay “Is ontology fundamental?” (Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings: pp1-32 – henceforth BPW).   He is clear and concise is his account but, as needs must in a blog post, has to summarise and pose things quite starkly.  This, I think, is a major benefit of ‘blog philosophy’, this need to summarise and contrast in a quick and somewhat schematic way, more akin to verbal exchanges than essay work since schema is intended to prompt comments and discussion rather than pretend at an over-arching knowledge.  Such ‘simplification’ enables the difference of one way of thinking to another to be posed sharply, though I often find myself doing something rather different in my own posts.

    Heidegger and Levinas are counter-posed and to do so a fulcrum point is needed.  For Joshua this fulcrum rests on the concept of knowledge, which Heidegger is still beholden to and which Levinas argues necessarily subsumes the individual and difference (particular) in the general and same (universal).  For Levinas ontology cannot be fundamental since it is still a logy, a knowing, and the reality or truth or essence or soul of the individual – named as the Other with a big O in Levinas – is lost in any form of knowledge relation.  Presumably we would want to say something like, either there is a relation with the Other and thus ontology is not fundamental or else all is lost.  There is a relation with the Other in the encounter (not knowledge) with the face and thus ontology is not fundamental.

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  • Movement and the Knights within ‘Fear and Trembling’

    Movement and the Knights within ‘Fear and Trembling’

    It is perhaps dangerous to be too assertive when giving an account of Kierkegaard. There’s a whole series of multiple meanings and possibly even the odd trap and foil for the unsuspecting, though less so than in Nietzsche. To think on from Kierkegaard, however, is to grant oneself a license to be wrong about what he said but still right in what is said. An exculpation, no doubt, but one that seems almost ‘truer’ to Kierkegaards’ thought than a slavishly accurate but effortless exegesis. Nonetheless this is an excuse even whilst it may be an exculpation.

    It is with these caveats covering my back that I approach the ‘Preamble from the heart’ [Fear and Trembling: Penguin 2006, henceforth FT]. It is, to locate the exculpation within Kierkegaards’ own words, in an attempt to do some of the work so that I may get my bread with justice that this approach is made. The ‘Preamble’ is the introduction in the drama that is FT of the Knight of Resignation and the Knight of Faith within FT. We are to meet these key conceptual personae – as Deleuze would call them – as Kierkegaard attempts to conceptualise and think the problem of movement. It is how things move that is crucial to the Preamble, what it is that makes something a movement. To tighten this some, it is what makes a specific kind of movement exemplary or vital to the very notion of movement itself.

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