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I am currently revising and editing this text for possible independent publication and welcome any comments and feedback – you can contact me via my website, http://notebookeleven.com
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INTRODUCTION

The secret passions of the philosopher.

In the book *Difference and Repetition* Gilles Deleuze presents us with an attempt to think the idea of ‘difference’ together with a critique of preceding metaphysics which rely upon ideas of identity and representation. He writes about ideas and says at one point that ‘it is as though every idea has two faces which are like love and anger; love in the search for fragments, the progressive determination and linking of the ideal adjoint fields; anger in the condensation of singularities which, by dint of ideal events, defines the concentration of a ‘revolutionary situation’ and causes the Idea to explode into the actual. It is in this sense that Lenin had Ideas’ (DR; 190). This intensely personal, almost romantic description of ideas stands for the complex thinking which pushes towards an intimacy with the world. It characterises philosophy at its best and thus as an ideal for a particular method of doing philosophy.

Deleuze’s description, after all, points towards a number of elements – the search, the condensation, the transition. The search is the hunt through the fragments of thought, both our own and others. The condensation is the attempt to explain or write out some small result of this search, the attempt to make sense of the fragments, to combine elements into a whole. The transition is the critical difficulty of moving something that can almost only be described as ‘in here’ to a place where it may take on a life of its own. The love and the anger of philosophical research and writing is pointed to very clearly in this quote from Deleuze and in it we see something else, something intimate about the method Deleuze uses in his work and which I will be taking up in an attempt to explore a number of issues which originated in an attempt to understand the *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* of Ludwig Wittgenstein. This intimacy is displayed by Deleuze in the very fact that he describes an idea through the experience of the passions.

The role of the passions is the underlying theme of my research but one which must remain unthematised within the work itself. It is for this reason that it needs to be pointed to within an introduction. The passion for philosophy is, like any other passion, an experience that can become stale, can slowly stabilise into a pedestrian stroll through exegesis and commentary. Philosophers, however, appear to harbour a secret passion, even beneath the apparently pedestrian. It is, after all, one of the longest lived subjects of human study and yet one that has often been accused of never coming up with the goods. It is a ‘queen of science’ and yet seemingly incapable of producing the enormous benefits and results of true science. It is an arrogant monster which secretly wishes for control of the world, whilst publicly aware of its rather poor and almost pathetic status in the eyes of the world. I suspect this is because philosophy can produce little result except in the the individual and yet produces this result through a method of depersonalisation. Philosophy must go against the merely individual idea and yet has no effect on anything other than the ideas of the individual. Every time philosophy begins to take hold, begins
to have an effect beyond the individual, it becomes something else. This too is indicated in the quote from Deleuze when he refers to the ideas of Lenin.

This secret passion is akin to a paradox at the heart of philosophy. The worst philosopher is the one who can repeat, ad nauseum, the arguments from the past yet never allow their own thought to be revealed perhaps for fear of betraying their own foolishness. They are joined, however, by the equal foolishness of the stupid thought, the phrase taken for a profundity that betrays nothing other than the often ‘misleading’ nature of our language, the ease with which it deceives us. It is thus a strange path to walk, trying to read and write philosophy. Yet it will always be accompanied by the secret passion for a result, for something to change as a result.

The path this essay takes combines a number of elements; an intuition about the word affect, a sense that thought had an affective or bodied or physical aspect; a fascination with the movement of the 7th proposition of the Tractatus; a frustration with Derrida’s writing which seemed to always end in paralysing aporia; and the libidinal writings of Deleuze. There was only ever a horizon of exploration and thus this essay is part of an exploratory movement, taking the form of a drift (dérive) through Deleuzian thought in an attempt to learn what that thought might offer. It is the result of a particular period of research and is written as a necessity end to this period, an end that must be enacted before any further work can continue.

Where, then, does the essay go? Beginning from an attempt to understand a sense of resistance within Deleuze’s work connected to the argument he makes that there is an ‘image of thought’ presupposed in philosophy (Chapter 1), I try to develop an understanding of how an ‘intimate’ philosophy might work. I try to emphasise the peculiar empiricist stance central to Deleuzian thought in a discussion of affect and sense and their relation to the Deleuzian event (Chapter 2). The notion of affect is given over for a more specific notion of character which is then connected to the way Deleuze uses ‘conceptual persona’ and a rhizomatic or mapping method (Chapter 3). After a brief discussion of the role of concept creation (Chapter 4) the relatively vague determinations of affect, character, resistance and event are then pursued through a discussion of force in Deleuze, yielding the idea of an ‘oceanic’ philosophy (Chapter 5) as a broad characterisation of Deleuzian thought.

Having tried to develop a characterisation of Deleuzian thought I the turn to explore what this thought does when faced with philosophical problems, how it might suggest we deal with such problems (Chapter 6). This leads to a discussion of thought and movement which then focuses on the way in which the transcendental move, inspired by Kant, is re-worked within Deleuzian thought (Chapter 7). The issue of learning is then addressed as it is a basic movement of thought presupposed by any engagement with a philosopher, philosophy or philosophical problem (Chapter 8) before a discussion of the showing/saying distinction in the _Tractatus_ completes the essay in an attempt to explore
further the concept of learning and the movement of counter-actualisation central to the Deleuzian style of thought (Chapter 9).
Chapter 1

From representation to production – the need to resist and renew philosophy

‘How else can one write but of those things which one doesn’t know, or knows badly? It is precisely there that we imagine having something to say. We write only at the frontiers of our knowledge, at the border which separates our knowledge from our ignorance and transforms the one into the other. Only in this manner are we resolved to write. To satisfy ignorance is to put off writing until tomorrow – or rather, to make it impossible. Perhaps writing has a relation to silence altogether more threatening than that which it is supposed to entertain with death’

- Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p.xxi

My intention in this chapter is to initiate the general dynamic of the following essay. As such I try to put forward a basic outline of the ‘Deleuzian stance’ that I will then try to articulate in more detail through the following chapters. Deleuze’s work is complex and yet to reach a level of reception where clear critical points of debate have emerged which can be focussed on in a research project that clarifies what is ‘Deleuzian’ in Deleuze’s philosophy. Deleuzian reception in the English speaking world is still forming itself within philosophy, having originated in other disciplines such as critical theory. Part of the intention of this thesis is to try to develop suggestions and clues as to the key points of ‘intervention’ that a Deleuzian philosophy offers in the broader world of philosophical disputes. In effect the clue, for me, is in the word ‘immanence’ and the reconfiguration of the transcendental move in philosophy. It is here, I feel, that Deleuze will have his most lasting impact philosophically. The difficulty is that a Deleuzian concept of immanence is one which understands immanence as a process immanent to itself. It is therefore impossible to simply stand outside and articulate a fixed and permanent concept of immanence faithful to Deleuze’s work since this concept will constantly shift depending of the terrain in which it is constructed. It is necessary to construct a ‘plane of immanence’ in order to construct a concept, even a concept of immanence and this involves a subtle and self-generating process. It involves, as it were, taking a stance towards the world and playing it out, seeing where it takes us, in a true experimentalism of thought. This involves beginning from a broad set of indicators before trying to tighten focus on specific details, just as an actor or writer might begin to develop a character or plot from broad specifics before connecting and fleshing out the body of the work. This in itself is a ‘Deleuzian stance’ in that it is a way of utilising, of putting into play, a broadly Deleuzian concept of immanence.

What is at stake in thinking immanence? Gilles Deleuze, the philosopher of difference, presents us with an attempt to think immanence and provides us with a wide-ranging experimentation with this concept. His final essay, Immanence; a life… (PI; 25-33), stands as a self-written epitaph to his work, bringing to a focus a theme that is increasingly becoming prominent in interpretation of his work. It is, however, only one
word amongst a number of key words that come to the fore in readings of Deleuze. Without being exhaustive I can list a number of these other terms around which interpretations orientate themselves; difference, univocity, multiplicity, transcendental empiricism, desire. Each of these terms plays a prominent role in the work of Deleuze and consequently in the work of interpreting Deleuze. Something is at stake in each of these terms and the way they are used. What is at stake in thinking immanence, however, can be said to be the very orientation in which these other concepts stand. What is at stake in thinking immanence is a basic – perhaps the most basic – orientation a thought can take. What is at stake in thinking immanence is thought itself.

Thought has, for Deleuze, an implicit presupposition that he names the ‘image of thought’. In chapter 3 of Difference and Repetition he defines this image as it exists for what might loosely be called ‘traditional thought’, which he names ‘conceptual philosophical thought’ (DR; 131). This image of thought, whilst undoubtedly complicated and partially challenged by many philosophers, underlies the activity of philosophy as a whole, bringing a pre-philosophical dogma into the heart of philosophical thinking. Deleuze argues, following Nietzsche explicitly (DR; 132), that it is an essentially moral presupposition that constitutes the image of thought. He goes on to outline 8 postulates that constitute the image of thought, arguing that the dogmatic and unspoken presuppositions ‘crush thought under an image which is that of the Same and the Similar’ (DR; 167). This thought subject to the image of thought is, then, what might be called ‘representational thinking’. It ‘profoundly betrays what it means to think and alienates the two powers of difference and repetition, of philosophical commencement and recommencement’ (ibid). The image of thought found in Chapter 3 of DR has been called the ‘locus classicus for his [Deleuze’s] antirepresentationalism’. Deleuze himself says that DR is ‘really about the nature of the postulates of the image of thought’. He goes on to say that ‘one might call this study of the images of thought ‘noology’ and see it as the prolegomena to philosophy’ (N; 149). The question that arises is what is the thought outside the image of thought? What sort of thinking is not trapped in the betrayal of the moralistic image of thought?

The first thing I want to do is clarify what Deleuze means by the ‘image of thought’. In effect it is a move to locate a systematic pre-supposition within philosophical practice, at first sight similar to the way in which it has been argued that Derrida might be said to locate a structural presupposition. It is expressed in terms which deal less with structural presuppositions, however, than with a sense of honesty or clarity that Deleuze sees as less than honest or clear. This can be seen, in part, in the way Deleuze presents the case for the image of thought not solely in terms of structures of presupposition but in terms of the way philosophers begin. Descartes, Hegel and Heidegger are all quickly accused of beginning with subjective or implicit presuppositions in a gesture that seems to take these three figures as indicative of the philosophic tradition. Each is argued to have had to

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1 John Mullarkey, Deleuze and materialism, in A Deleuzian century, ed. Ian Buchanan, Duke 1999; pp.59-83. Mullarkey’s comment can be found in fn11, p.79.

2 See Rodolphe Gasche, The tain of the mirror, Part 1 passim.
begin from some form or other of empirical content. The empirical content implicit in the three thinkers is claimed as being the site of the pre-ontological understanding in Heidegger, the site of the empirical self in Descartes and the site of empirical being in Hegel's determination of pure being. To overcome the problem of beginnings by invoking a hermeneutic circle, the impossibility of any true beginning and the subsequent 'evocation of the idea of philosophy as a circle' is, however, an escape route that for Deleuze is 'too simple', too easy (DR; 129). What he wants to avoid is precisely engaging in a form of argument that seeks to utilise any notion of a hermeneutic circle or a radical scepticism that constructs a model of implication which forces philosophy to either leap into thought or to see itself as already having begun. Deleuze wants instead to challenge something else within philosophies beginning and that is what he will call the 'image of thought'.

Deleuze wants to root out a pervasive influence on philosophy, or even of philosophy. At one point he declares that 'everything begins with misosophy' (DR; 139) and the pervasive presence against which Deleuze rails is the contingently universal 'form of representation' (DR; 130) that is maintained in the most innocent of phrasings epitomised by the rhetorical trope 'everyone knows, no-one can deny'. This, Deleuze declares, simply is the form of representation and the 'isolated and passionate' cries raised against the trope of the 'everyone knows, no-one can deny' are, he says, obviously isolated and passionate only from within such a form of representation. Against this trope it is 'a question of someone - if only one - with the necessary modesty, not managing to know what everybody knows, and modestly denying what everyone is supposed to recognise. Someone who neither allows himself to be represented nor wishes to represent anything.' (DR; 130) For a philosopher, Deleuze argues, the trope is not employed in the interest of recognising some particular this or that but is rather taken to the utmost abstraction with regard its matter. The matter of the tropic form of 'everyone knows' is, for philosophy, thought itself. Everyone knows thought as such and such, everyone thinks. The contraband is thought 'as a natural exercise ... endowed with the talent for truth or an affinity with the true' and all this under the 'double aspect of a good will on the part of the thinker and an upright nature on the part of the thought' (DR; 131). It is thought itself that is the unthought enemy of thinking.

It is fairly clear that Deleuze's interest in beginnings is less concerned with the paradox of beginnings than with a form of self-deceit more akin to that suggested by Nietzsche with regard to truth where truth has an underlying moral value. There seem to be at least two aspects to the argument here. The first is the notion of an innocent thought, the second perhaps a more ethical notion of refusal or resistance. It is the innocence of thought Deleuze indeed wants to challenge. 'The mistake of philosophy is to presuppose within us a benevolence of thought, a natural love of truth' (PS; 16). He wants to suggest, and indeed the suggestion itself is almost enough to warrant its thought, that the belief in the ability of thought to open itself to itself, such as we might find in the argument Heidegger makes with regard to investigating the being that is concerned with its own being, is itself
a guilty thought, guilty of the deceit of innocence. This is not to deny in any form the ability of thought to begin but rather to suggest that no beginning has occurred without the taint of a fundamental prejudice as to the suitability of the forum that is thought. ‘Not an individual endowed with good will and a natural capacity for thought but an individual full of ill will who does not manage to think, either naturally or conceptually. Only such an individual is without presuppositions’ (DR; 130).

The key here is ‘either naturally or conceptually’. The claim to a presupposition-less thought is a claim for an empty thought. This emptiness, however, is meant conceptually but relies upon a split between conceptual and natural thought. If this split is a conceptual split – say, the natural and the conceptual form two ‘types’ of thought – then this is a straight forward conceptual presupposition. If, however, we revert to a single homogenous thought in which the ‘conceptual’ is understood perhaps as a refinement of natural thought, then this too relies upon a notion of a ‘natural thought’. There is no point of transcendence, no Archimedean point, from which a ‘presupposition-less thought’ can be developed. The only option, if we want to hold onto the will to honesty contained in the drive to destroy presuppositions in thought, is to resist thought. This can only be done from within a general, already existing thought and thinking. Deleuze’s philosophy aims to inspire, motivate and arm such a resistance, just as at the heart of the general practice of philosophy there is a drive to resist bad thought in general. Deleuze’s resistant thought is one of the marks of his empiricism. It is the character of ‘The Resister’ to be found in many other philosophers besides Deleuze. Not a Rebel or even a full blown Revolutionary but that continual presence in the history of thought, the Resister.

One of the key features of the Resister is a refusal to be persuaded. Whilst they may engage in discussion, they have little interest in argument and if forced to concede an argument they are likely to do so only by conceding their error rather than their opponents’ correctness. This is in part a necessary ability, since to be persuaded too easily of the opponents’ arguments is a sign of a lack of independent thought. The implication is that refusal of even the best available arguments is not an error that is reduced to stupidity but is rather, as Nietzsche suggests, a necessary aspect of thought itself conceived as part of an embodied character, since the will to stupidity is precisely a sign of character. What is occurring here is essentially a challenge to the rule of the faculty of reason, to the role of logic or argument as the basis for belief and an articulation of thought that no longer forces belief under its dominion but rather suggests a struggle between the two that is perhaps intractable but which is no longer subsumed under one side or the other. For abstract reason to rule over belief, over feeling, over

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3 ‘To close your ears to even the best counter-argument once the decision has been taken; sign of a strong character. Thus an occasional will to stupidity.’ Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, #107. The issue is, like most issues within Nietzsche, not as simple as at first assumed from this single quote. For example a more negative characterisation of character can be found when Nietzsche distinguishes between the dramatist, as artist, and the philosopher in Section 4 of Human, All too Human, cf. remark number 160. The complexities of stupidity and character within Nietzsche’s work will need to be read in more detail in another paper. For now, the thought of resistance is the central theme as well as the sense of capacity.
every aspect of our existence as thinking things, is to assume little more than the Cartesian ontology that we are, at essence, thinking things and that every other aspect of our existence either falls under or is a diversion from this essence. Such a prejudice is clearly and provocatively challenged within Deleuze’s argument. Moreover this challenge opens the space for a refusal that is no longer de-legitimated by the court of reason but is as much capable of de-legitimating reason itself. What is needed is a resistance to the apparent power of thought to reflect on its own activity with a transparency which implicitly presumes thought to be honest and incapable of self-deceit. Put bluntly, any argument which assumes the capacity of thought to be, as it were, ‘identifiable’ already assumes too much.

Whilst all this may be to a certain extent a suitable reading of Deleuze’s starting point there is a more straightforward argument, though I use the term 'straightforward' with some sense of its inappropriateness, one which is informed by the figure of the Resister. This argument is one that identifies a certain contingently universal presupposition and rejects it. Deleuze argues that there is an implicit assumption inside thought and the thought of philosophy, this assumption going under the name the 'image of thought'. The philosophical image of thought is identified at first through the trope of the ‘everyone knows, no-one can deny’ and is associated with two factors assumed in thought, that is, a common sense and a good will, both of which are exemplified in the trope of the ‘everyone knows...’. This is the figure of the reasonable man, a figure we can recognise from the idea of a common sense that is used, of a having of common sense, having a certain degree of reasonably expected reason. ‘It is reasonable to assume or to expect’, for example, may be the way an argument could start. ‘It’s natural that modern philosophy, which has gone so far in criticising representation, should challenge any attempt at speaking in place of others. Whenever we hear the words ‘nobody can deny...’, ‘everybody would agree that …’, we know a lie or slogan is about to follow…’ (N; 87).

Deleuze argues that an appeal to common sense or reasonableness or the clear and distinct or even the a priori, though this latter may be more troublesome, relies to a large extent on something akin to this common assumption of a common sense and a good will. The question is constantly being begged here as to how we might avoid such a seemingly unavoidably necessary assumption, but avoid it we must. The route Deleuze takes is via a Nietzschean critique which posits the presuppositions of thought as moral presuppositions, as assuming an honesty in thought. Working from the basis that this image of thought rests on a certain type of morality Deleuze indicates the way he wishes to move beyond it. ‘As a result (that is, of the presuppositions of thought resting on moral presuppositions) the conditions of a philosophy which would be without any kind of presuppositions appear all the more clearly; instead of being supported by the moral Image of thought, it would take as its point of departure a radical critique of this Image and the ‘postulates' it implies. It would find its difference or its true beginning, not in an agreement with the pre-philosophical Image but in a rigorous struggle against this Image, which it would denounce as non-philosophical’ (DR; 132). The figure of the Resister can be seen now as the figure of the one who engages in just such a ‘rigorous struggle’. 
It is as though the presupposition of philosophy occurs because philosophers begin too quickly. This haste applies even to a philosopher that attempts to begin by locating a problem with beginnings. Plainly the intention of Deleuze is thus to suggest that even with the introduction of a hermeneutic of thought, the philosopher begins too quickly, begins with a image of an honest thought, one that is capable of self-seeing, of an intimacy with itself, that is unwarranted. Whilst this is an argument about presuppositions it does not assume that the presuppositions are structural or conceptual alone and that thereby the revealing of the presupposition will enable it to be overcome. The very attitude of thought and philosophers is something deeper than a conceptual presupposition, it is more like a way of thinking, a broader set of practices and assumptions than could reasonably be described under any one concept such as, for example, reflection.

The imageless thought, Deleuze suggests, is going to involve a revolution in thinking that is akin to the change from representational painting to abstraction (DR; 276). This change in painting involves a move from one sense of showing to another, from a ‘painting of’ to a ‘painting through’. Titian, for example, may be an indication of the earliest move from a ‘painting of’ when the emphasis on colour and stroke begins to take on a life of its own. At the point at which the medium and techniques are no longer subordinate to a presupposed object to which they should remain true, the medium and technique break from being a means to a transcendent end. In a sense this means they break from being a technique at all in that the question of the best technique for the task can no longer be the most important issue. What is important now is what a technique can do.

This shift to an immanent exploration of technique occurs in art as techniques are explored in a free way, divorced from a pre-determined end-goal of accuracy or realism. Rothko, for example, pushes colour from the role of representation into a vicious

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4 The main presupposition that Gasche outlines in his introduction to Derrida’s work, for example, is that of reflection. *Op.cit.*

5 The use of painting to suggest the model of change needed within philosophy sits curiously against some philosophical understandings of painting. Russell uses painting to establish the distinction between appearance and reality, setting philosophy against painting in its interest not in appearance but in reality, not how ‘things seem to be’ but ‘what they are’ – Bertrand Russell, *The problems of philosophy*; p.2. It seems unlikely that Russell would think it appropriate to take methodological lessons from a discipline with such a different purpose as that to which philosophy is tied. The fact that Deleuze calls it a revolution, however, is shown to be necessary in some ways by the very fact that such a deep divergence can be so easily come across. It is also worth noting that Deleuze suggests there are two routes away from representational figurative form in his later study of Francis Bacon where he suggests that there are ‘two possible ways of escaping the figurative: towards pure form, through abstraction; or towards the purely figural, through extraction or isolation’ – Gilles Deleuze, *The logic of sensation*; p.2. The common element in both these routes is not a abstract notion of ‘purity’ but the ability to break with narrative within the painting, something that representational work necessarily involves because of both the representation of the object and the contextualisation of the object represented amongst other objects which then tends to the construction of connections between objects which engenders the narrative reading of the painting. It is thus a break from narrativity that lies at the heart of the change in painting.
terroristic imposition of its own power\(^6\). He produces paintings which work only on the basis of the intensities they embody, their colour fields, capturing the viewer who is foolish enough to linger in front of them in a vertiginous pulsation of colour that explodes inside the retinal membrane, literally operating on the brain rather than the ‘eye’.

The specific examples, of course, may be interpreted in any number of ways other than the one I am suggesting but the ‘truth’ of these interpretations is not the point. The point is to put forward a claim, which is that the move from representational to abstract art involves a move from a reflective paradigm to a productive one. The art is no longer involved in the reflexive problems of representation or rather it is no longer simply involved in these problems but opens up a new event or perhaps brings to the fore an event that was previously backgrounded. This event is the event of production and in art this primarily involves the production of intensities of perception. This, at least, is the thesis, as it were; the move from representation to abstraction involves a move from the event of reflection to the event of production\(^7\). The action no longer involves the ‘eye’ in the sense that the eye sees the meaning, the what it is, of the artwork, but now involves the brain directly as a physiological, material and embodied perception.

What is at stake in the thinking of immanence is, then, the production of thought in itself. That, at least, is the thesis. This can be called the production of an affect of thought, that is, the production of a thought with a capacity. An affect is the capacity to affect and be affected and is distinguished from an effect by this bi-directionality of relation. The primary affect of thought that is of interest to me in this essay is the affect of sense, that is, the capacity of a thought to produce a sense. This is not the production of a sense reduced to the production of a meaning. It is not the production of a thought whose content can be abstracted into isolated propositions whose truth or falsity is at stake but the production of a thinking, of an event of thought. What exactly is such a production of sense?

Representational thinking does not fail at this task of producing an event of thought but rather betrays philosophy by preventing what Deleuze calls the two powers of difference

6 I refer principally to the Seagram Murals, the colour field paintings Rothko painted for the plush New York restaurant that now hang in the Tate Gallery. He is said to have described his intention as to create a ‘violent, even terrorist art, a savage aesthetic revenge’. See the essay by Jonathan Jones in The Guardian, December 7 2002 for an interesting account of the connection between Rothko’s Seagram Murals and the Laurentian Library of Michelangelo in Florence, where the windows are bricked up and from which Rothko is said to have gained the inspiration for the oppressive atmosphere of the Murals.

7 Bruce Baugh notes, in his review of the essay by Eugene Holland contained in Deleuze: a critical reader, how ‘Holland argues that Baudelaire’s modernism consisted in finding aesthetic value not in objects, but in artistic production itself (much as Adam Smith found economic value not in objects, but in the labour process), and this led to modern art’s valuing formal innovation for its own sake’ – Bruce Baugh, The usefulness of Deleuze for life in Theory and Event, 1:4, 1997. The shift to a productive paradigm that is part of Deleuze philosophical strategy would be susceptible to a ‘modernist’ reading, whereby formal innovation is valued in itself, only if the aesthetic and philosophical domains were assimilated. There is a definite sense of connection between the valuation of the artistic process and innovation in itself in Baudelaire and the valuation of thinking and the creation of concepts within Deleuze, but the more interesting question is where the difference lies.
and repetition. These two powers are, as already mentioned, connected to the capacity philosophy has to begin and to begin again. The charge, then, is that at its heart philosophy is sterilised by representation. What is at stake in the thinking of immanence is the reproductivity of philosophy. If philosophy were unable to begin and begin again because it was betrayed by representational thinking then it would become sterile, unable to carry out the vital necessity of reproduction understood not as a the production of a mere copy but as the reproductive power inherent in a living reality. Life flows through the instances by means of the power of reproduction. Each generation produces and reproduces itself as something more than the instance and if this power is betrayed then sterility and death follow. Philosophy without the power to begin and begin again, the power of reproduction, would become nothing other than the dead pretending to be alive, nothing other than a discourse that goes through the motions of a once alive thought, imitating life and the living thought of philosophy.

The stakes then are high in the thinking of immanence. Simply because of this importance we are forced to consider the future of philosophy but the question remains as to how we might begin to think immanence. The fact that the future of philosophy would be at stake, however, gives us a clue as to the nature of a number of Deleuze’s works. DR, for example, poses itself as a diagnostic text mixed with a methodology. It diagnoses philosophy as beset by an image of thought, by a confusion of difference itself with the concept of difference (DR; 288) and by a loss of the primary ontological reality of sensation. In this book Deleuze does not attempt to present a thinking of immanence, however, but rather attempts to show the blockages and problems in representational thinking, which he does not deny as existing and even being, in some sense, useful. The usefulness is at best that of everyday banality however. ‘On the one hand, it is apparent that acts of recognition exist and occupy a large part of our daily life; this is a table, this is an apple, this the piece of wax, Good Morning Theaetetus. But who can believe that the destiny of thought is at stake in these acts, and that when we recognise, we are thinking?’ (DR; 135). The destiny of thought might be called the agenda of DR and its form a plea for the revolution akin to the difference in forms of painting already alluded to. It is on this basis that we can understand why, in the Preface to DR Deleuze says that ‘the time is coming when it will hardly be possible to write a book of philosophy as it has been done for so long; ‘Ah! The old style...’ The search for new means of philosophical expression was begun by Nietzsche and must be pursued today in relation to the renewal of certain other arts, such as the theatre or cinema’ (DR; xxi).

It is not only that DR can be located in this arena of the future destiny of philosophy. The companion volume, The Logic of Sense, attempts to employ an experimental technique,

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8 ‘on the path which leads to that which is to be thought, all begins with sensibility. Between the intensive and thought, it is always by means of an intensity that thought comes to us. The privilege of sensibility as origin appears in the fact that, in an encounter, what forces sensation and that which can only be sensed are one and the same thing’ (DR; 144-145)

9 To call it the ‘companion volume’ is in part impressionistic and relates to the ‘going together’ of the two works more than to an explicit establishment of the relation of the two works as companions. DR and LOS are the first two books, produced in 1968 and 1969 respectively, in which Deleuze stops writing about other
utilising the writings of Lewis Carroll to springboard itself into an inquiry into sense.

What is philosophy? presents a radical manifesto of philosophical method that directly presents the role of immanence in the vital task of the creation of philosophical concepts and the two volume Capitalism and schizophrenia, comprising Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, can be read as both an attempt at a ‘pop’ philosophy (D; 8) as well as an attempt to articulate a thinking of immanence as a future for philosophy.

If we locate Deleuze’s work, together with that of his longtime collaborator Félix Guattari, as an attempt to think immanence as the necessity for renewing philosophy, then we can see that in one sense their work is directed towards the future of philosophy. The reason for noting this can be gathered by considering the nature of the way they address problems. The work of everyday philosophy is addressed to the examination and possible solution of conceptual problems. Posed in this way the result of a philosophical work would be the production of a theory that can then be tested by peers and evaluated. The work of Deleuze and Guattari, if read as addressed to the future of philosophy, is as much about the conditions for theorisation as it is the production of a theory. In fact the conditions for philosophical production that Deleuze and Guattari propose involve the dropping of the notion of a theory for that of a concept. By understanding that the productive process has been shifted within the vision of philosophy put forward by Deleuze and Guattari we can begin to catch a glimpse of what it means to ‘create concepts’. In a philosophy where theories are no longer the end result of thought, the place of the theory is taken by that of the concept. The emphasis on the concept is posed in a particular way, however, by the type of question asked about it. Deleuze shifts from asking questions deriving from problems of representation, such as ‘how does the concept represent?’ or ‘what is it the concept represents?’ He moves to emphasise questions of production; ‘how is a concept produced?’ ‘what is the production of a concept?’ Within the problems of production the issue of beginnings forms the question of ‘how do concepts begin?’ or ‘how do we begin to produce concepts?’. This question brings us clearly to the borders of the problem of the creation of concepts.

A clue to how we might begin to think immanence will be found in the very notion of conceptual creation. The idea of conceptual creation brings with it the danger of reducing philosophy to little more than a genre of writing. The necessity in any notion of conceptual creation is to retain the difference of philosophy from mere creation, to retain the difference that makes philosophy the act of concept creation and not simple literary creation. This debate crosses a number of terrains but one of the subjects to come centre stage is that of representation. As I have already suggested, the basic thrust of Deleuzian thought can be understood as one of resistance. This is a key word in understanding Deleuze and is not reducible to the simple and voluntaristic resistance of a subjective stance. The idea of a will to resist, drawing on the Nietzschean notion of a will to stupidity, brings with it a wider complex of concepts that can best be understood perhaps philosophers and begins to strike out on his own. It is for this reason primarily that I read them as companions even though the book on Spinoza and the concept of Expression was produced alongside DR and was submitted alongside DR as part of Deleuzes’ eligibility for a professorial chair within French academia, a point made by Martin Joughin in his introduction to EPS, p.10.
as a new stance or style of thought. Representation is one of the key battlegrounds for this struggle but is a subject too vast to deal with in a single essay. It is necessary then to try and tighten the focus of this essay in order to establish a strategy of limited gain. The object is to develop an understanding of conceptual creation, which will be intimately related to and simultaneously make clear the Deleuzian notion of immanence. What this will do is enable me to suggest that the way Deleuze reworks the structure of transcendental arguments is at the root of his work.

What strategy will I use then? Representation has one of its strongest cards in that it restricts the free and open creation of concepts by tying them to the represented object. Representations can be good or bad, more effective or less effective. There is a normative value derived from the ability of the representation to give an account of reality. The greater the account and its fit with reality the greater value the representation has. Of course this is a very quick and dirty notion of representation and as Deleuze notes, it is troubled in numerous ways by modern philosophy. To begin with it faces the problem of illusion and the sceptical move, which Descartes attempts to counter with the location of the subject as a centre point seemingly beyond doubt. No longer a representation but now a form of existential articulation, philosophy has to struggle with the split this existential articulation has created. It attempts to deepen the subjective centre through the transcendental move of Kant, whereby the subjective centre is transformed into a productive force. The connection of the subjective centre to perception in Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception operates as a fulcrum from which the problem of the gap between this subjective centre and the supposedly objective world can be addressed. The result is an intimate involvement of the subject and object in the restructuring of the principle site of their coming together, experience. Kant reworks the concept of experience showing how the transcendental move to the conditions of possible experience determines the possible structures of knowledge and consequently of the objects of experience. That which is outside this form is moved into the noumenal and rendered essentially irrelevant. Deleuze appears to build on the work of Salomon Maimon to pursue the difficulties in such a Kantian move and in so doing recasts the transcendental as a transcendental empiricism. This will rely upon a structure of passive synthesis and a virtual-actual process of actualisation as against a possible-real process of realisation (Chapter 7).

In order to approach this Deleuzian recasting of the transcendental it is necessary to understand the priority of the sensible within Deleuze. The recasting of the subjective centre first posed by Descartes and then deepened and transformed in the Kantian critical philosophy is approached by a recasting of the transcendental as a process of giving the subject, accessible through what Deleuze calls ‘counter-actualisation’. This relies upon an absolutely vital concept of difference as that which gives the different, on a radically contingent and non-universalisable ground. This contingency itself relies upon an empiricist priority of the sensible as a continuous, connected and open whole, what I will call an ‘oceanic’ model of philosophy. The first, broad, element of my strategy will be to give an account of this oceanic model of thought given by Deleuze.
This model, of course, has no necessary status. As such its force cannot be derived from a master argument of any kind. Despite the love of philosophy for quick, clear and distinct arguments that have wide-ranging implications, this is simply not an option in the Deleuzian structure. Instead a patient and continuous resistance is necessary to anything that takes us away from the real. A creation of accounts of reality that enable models and maps to be developed that are productive and that are true in virtue of their productivity is the Deleuzian alternative. In this sense, of course, Deleuze is a pragmatist but what is fascinating about his work is the way in which he tries to operate this pragmatism in tandem with a recasting of the transcendental. The weakness of pragmatism is a tendency to fall prey to a relativistic contingency which seems to destroy the strengths of philosophical argument in terms of its pursuit of truth, its unwillingness to submit to opinion and its call for argument and validity in claims about reality. The attack on the structure of the Kantian transcendental which doesn’t simply refuse the structure of transcendental arguments per se enables Deleuze to suggest a route through which a fundamentally pragmatist and empirical philosophy can deal with the problem of relativism. It does this by articulating how difference operates, difference which gives the different, the difference in itself which, for Deleuze, forms the very basis of any understanding of the transcendental. The transcendental is, in effect, rendered as the difference that gives the different. In crude terms this articulates a Kantian style account of how a model, form or structure of understanding gives the reality of the objects of experience but generalises this account as a fundamental process of understanding that is not universal but always particular. The transcendental difference is thus what breaks and shifts philosophical thought and understanding. Consciously articulated by Kant, it enables philosophy to bring into the foreground the activity of thinking as a process of immanent creation. Universalised by Kant, it is locked forever into an idealistic bias, forgetting the very giving of the transcendental givens by sensibility. The forms of understanding are always, for Deleuze, given through the passive and material syntheses of reality, which we approach through the ‘apprenticeship to signs’ he describes in the Proust book (PS; 4).

One of the key concepts that I attempt to articulate which bridges the material and oceanic model of reality with the world of sense and that enables a breaking down of the ‘idealistc’ model of sense is that of an ‘affect of sense’. Affects of sense have both a sensation and the meaning of the sensation. They form pre-cursors to sense just as the nonsense word is said by Deleuze to be the linguistic pre-cursor per se (DR; 291). The practice of concept creation is ultimately connected to the affect of sense as the capacity to produce sense. The notion of an affect of sense is not strictly speaking a Deleuzian notion in the sense that it can be found directly within the texts of either Deleuze or Guattari. It is a reconstruction or reading of Deleuze and Guattari, in an attempt to develop and combine the arguments they put forward which do touch on both the term ‘affect’ as well as ‘sense’. I have already used it to help identify, in a preliminary way, what occurs in the production of a thought, identifying the affect as the capacity of a thought, its potency or vitality. The affect of sense is identifiable as the capacity of
thought to produce sense, distinct from the reduction of thought to its propositional content. It is, as it were, the condition for the production of propositional content.

Affect of course refers to something that is predominantly understood as emotional. Given this common understanding there are two oppositions or dualisms which need to be adjusted in reading Deleuze. The first is an opposition between feeling and expressing, where affect falls on the side of the inexpressible or the not-yet-expressed. The second dualism is that of the subjects’ interiority, where affect falls ‘inside’ the subject. In both cases a Deleuzian reading displaces the traditional position of affect. In addition to the reworking of the concept of affect that will take it away from the traditional position it holds within the dualisms already mentioned, there is another more wide-ranging reason for exploring affect. As I have said, I locate Deleuze within a thinking of immanence and one of the main reasons for this is the emphasis within his work on sensation and the sensible. This emphasis can best be understood by naming Deleuze as what he is; that is, as an empiricist. This is not a simple naming, however, because Deleuze is engaged in a process of reinventing empiricism. DR and LOS are the two central books for understanding the shift Deleuze is attempting to inaugurate and both act to initiate the change that will then be implemented in the later work through the thinking of immanence.

What change is Deleuze inaugurating? It is to break from a model where sense and sensibilities lie in a homogenous line of existence that is vertical or hierarchical and in which sense or meaning are always foremost, the pinnacle to which thought aims. In this model the sensible is to be translated into sense, into language, into meaning, bringing with it the problem of translation. The Deleuzian change would involve the destruction of the problem of translation. He wants to restore the heterogeneous nature of sense production, refusing to accede to language the sole right to produce sense, a philosophical position that subscribes, either implicitly or explicitly, to what can be called a primacy of language. This primacy of language can be seen in particular in the idea, central to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, that thought, sense and language are bound together in an intimate relation, an intimacy that allows a seeing of the one through the other, be it sense through language or thought through sense. We see in the Tractatus, for example, a binding of thought to propositional form in order for it to be perceived (TLP; 3.1), a binding of sense to the syntax of language in the claim that ‘only facts can express a sense, a set of names cannot’ (TLP; 3.142) and a relationship between showing and saying that provides a theory of determinate sense that is incapable of being said, producing as a result a sort of nihilism of sense production (TLP; 7).

The problem of representation has been one of the dominant themes of twentieth century philosophy. One way in which this has been formulated has been through the difficulty with language which Gilbert Ryle called so evocatively the ‘systematically misleading’ nature of expression10. In his famous little essay we find him arguing for what might be called a method or perhaps an awareness of a reality that for him is obvious. This reality

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10 Gilbert Ryle, Systematically misleading expressions, pp 139-70
is that expressions record facts and can do so in a multitude of ways thus entailing the
drawing of distinctions between the better and worse expressions\textsuperscript{11}. The spur to the
argument that Ryle puts forward is the view that ‘paralogisms and antinomies are the
evidence that an expression is systematically misleading’\textsuperscript{12}. The production of what I
will be calling aporias is evidence, in Ryle's philosophy, of an error in the means of
representation and thus the job of philosophy is to clean the means of representation, as
far as possible, from errors inherent in that means. This is one form of the problem with
representation. Ryle’s approach to the problem is creative in the sense that he wants to
re-make or re-work familiar concepts. In an interview with Brian Magee during which
they talk about Ryle’s first book The concept of mind, Ryle can be seen explicitly
agreeing with Magee’s formulation of his practice as one of ‘rearranging the geography
of already familiar facts and familiar concepts’\textsuperscript{13}. The goal of such an approach might be
said to be negative - to reveal errors in our arrangements of facts and concepts. Generally
speaking this will go hand in hand with at least the proposal of a more positive suggestion
but this latter positive move is often couched in terms of future work, with the critical
work being the meat of the arguments. This approach might be said to take
representation as a limited faculty, prone to error but capable of correction up to a point.

Ryle’s approach is in many ways a solidly empirical practice for philosophy, involving
the identification and diagnosing of errors in our expressions. There is, however, a more
critical approach to the problem of representation and in this approach, to put it crudely,
representation is a limit faculty rather than a limited faculty. The limits of representation
are such that they clash with experience. It is not that representation is a contingently
faulty faculty – that it can be better or worse – but that representation is a horizon of
limitation. In this situation the limits of representation would situate themselves in the
realm of experience, in particular the experience of the unrepresentable. Philosophically
this problem can be located in numerous places, for example around the question of the
sublime within Kantian aesthetics. A critical moment within this distinction between a
limited and a limit faculty is, I will be arguing, around the concept of force.

If, for example, we view language as a means of expression and rest its force upon the
adequacy of its meaning we may well, like Ryle, argue that the pressing need for
philosophy is a clarification of this means of expression. The rule in this situation might
be, for example, that the greater the match between expression and object, the greater the
force of the meaning since we can see, show and feel the truth of the expressions. Truth
will have its meaning and force because of it being clear and distinct\textsuperscript{14}. Yet the force of a

\textsuperscript{11} ‘…while a fact or state of affairs can be recorded in an indefinite number of statements of widely
differing grammatical forms, it is stated better in some than in others. The ideal, which may never be
realised, is that it should be stated in a completely non-misleading form of words’ (G.Ryle, ibid)

\textsuperscript{12} ibid

\textsuperscript{13} Brian Magee, Modern British Philosophy, p. 133

\textsuperscript{14} Obviously this assimilates Ryle to a sort of epistemological Cartesianism, which is something he would
clearly turn in his grave over owing to the self-defined anti-Cartesianism of his project. Whilst Ryle indeed
challenges Cartesian dualism I would argue that he in effect relies upon an image of thought, as Deleuze
would call it, which is shared with Descartes.
clear and distinct idea relies upon a force that cannot be clear and distinct. ‘It is obvious’, for example, is a phrase that should hold nothing other than dread for a philosopher since there is nothing that is, in effect, obvious. Obviousness is used to cajole agreement but is itself the refusal to go any further in giving reasons. It is a declarative statement rather than a descriptive since if something were in fact ‘obvious’ this would obviate the need to mention it. Obviousness is the bringing in of a force, the recruitment of a force, into an argumentative array.

Force is outside of representation since the strength and validity of representation relies upon the mobilised and attendant force it brings with it. Force is the hidden inexpressible of expression, the grounds for measuring the better or worse yet incapable of being valued as better or worse. Force is blunt, unthinking and irrational – yet it is at the very centre of reasons practices. Representation, of necessity, cannot speak of its own force, only, at best, of the force of the other, the represented. This force, however, is never absent whilst never capable of being made present. The force of representation presents us with a situation whereby the representation itself seems capable of analysis and evaluation as a better or worse representation, yet the force of this ‘better’ or ‘worse’ is incapable of being represented. This is to put forward a claim, rather than an argument and that claim is the following: that force is the necessary presupposition of both reason and representation.

The claim I would make would be something like the following with regard the Kantian transcendental; that the transcendental arguments of Kant work ‘behind the back’ of thought, giving the grounds and limits of thought through re-working direct conceptual analysis by drawing attention to the capacities of thought. If we can show that something is simply not possible then any attempt to venture into the ground of this impossibility is faced with either ignoring the transcendental move or falling foul of transcendental moves to remove legitimacy from such attempts. It works by trying to clarify, in effect, what can be known. It relies upon an implicit presupposition that this is a useful and practical task. Such an implicit assumption itself rests on a need for answers, for solutions to problems. The scandal of philosophy, supposedly, is its failure to find solutions to questions but this notion of a failure itself relies upon a presupposed sense of the capacity of thought. This inherent sense of a capacity of thought brings with it a complex notion of thought as a tool. The effect of the transcendental philosophy is to make philosophy useful again, even if the sense of ‘use’ has changed. What can philosophy do? Well, it can’t answer the questions of whether God exists, or whether the Universe has a beginning in time or even approach the issue of the immortality of the soul but it can tell us why it can’t do this. It can tell us, so the Kantian would argue, what it is we can do with thought and what it is we cannot do. To then continue to pursue philosophical questions which lie in the area of ‘what we cannot do’ is foolish.

What can or cannot be done with thought is, it is true, something Deleuze is interested in but there is a subtle, strange and unsettling way in which he approaches this issue. First of all the problem is reconfigured. We are almost admonished to distrust thought and this
is because the problem has slid from what can be done with thought to what thought does. What is it that thought does and does not do? More importantly there is a sense in which something or someone else is doing something with thought, doing it both in and to us, as selves. ‘Something thinks in us’ and the problem becomes more horrific, more terrifying, the more we allow ourselves to suppose we aren’t our self. It is not that Kant is wrong but that the problem Kant opens and explores, the problem of the capacity of thought, opens at its limits onto the problem of the capacity of thought as an impersonal, pre-individual production. Take the transcendental unity of apperception as an example, the ‘I think’ that accompanies every representation. It provides a locus positivus. We can get a fix on a dizzying world of flux and doubt in a similar way to Descartes’ provision of a doubting/thinking identity. It seems so obvious that it provides us with a sense of solidity and the pleasure of Kant and Descartes (as opposed to Hegel, for example) lies in this sense of solidity that may be felt firmly at the heart of their philosophy. Deleuze tries to persuade us that this may be something it isn’t obvious should be trusted. He tries to suggest that if the self is produced, if thought itself is thrown up by forces which precede it, if in fact everything that is actual results from a process of actualisation, then another realm, just as real as the actual but radically different, may well lie behind our backs.

This is why the necessary and a priori are so vital to Kant. They provide a vital solidity that has never been produced, never come to be from something else. The necessary and a priori cannot be effects. They have no cause nor can they have. They are as eternal as the triangle or circle which has never ‘come into being’, never ‘not been’. These solid truths, these certainties, form a core image of philosophy, an ideal which rests as a horizon of possibility. We don’t even have to assume that they provide goals, ideals towards which thought should tend. Their very existence offers examples of the glory of what thought can achieve, they offer a horizon of capacity. They stand eternal guard over the domain of thought offering stalwart defence of its ramparts against doubt, an unbreachable keep which will never (a priori) be defeated since they have formed themselves from the immortal soil of thought itself. The nomadic thought of Deleuze offers up a simple problem. How is it possible that something can simply be? How is it possible that thoughts’ most solid centre could have an immortal status? Surely there must be something else going on when we come up against these immortals? Are they, perhaps, not immortal like the gods of Olympus but rather like the Vampires of literature and film and modern mythology?

If Kant provides us with arguments about what thought can do, Deleuze proposes things that we can do with thought. If Kant asks how it is we achieve necessity (the synthetic a priori), Deleuze questions what it is necessary to achieve. If Kant shows us how to avoid turning thought into foolishness, Deleuze shows us how to turn foolishness into thought. For Kant we need to find the true answers, for Deleuze we need to produce the truth in

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15 For an interesting essay on the role of pleasure with regard the critical system cf. Andrea Rehberg, *The joy of judgement*, Chapter 6 in *The matter of critique – readings in Kant’s philosophy*

16 This is the realm of the determinable, the transcendental instance (DR; 86).
problems. It is as though Deleuze couldn’t have happened without Kant and yet also wouldn’t have happened without Kant. Of course, this is a humorous picture, we might even title it ‘Deleuze as Kant’s evil twin’, but does it actually help understand more concrete philosophical problems. Is it a matter of simply developing a ‘Deleuzian’ model of philosophy as against a ‘Kantian’ (or whatever other proper name fits)? What do we then do with these models, these ‘ways of thought or thinking’? Is it even necessary to do anything with them, is it perhaps simply a case of assuming, along with Rorty, that the pursuit of a conversation is an end for itself, valid and self-sustaining?

We don’t have to assume one model or mixture of models is necessarily correct or better in order to engage in battle. We can reasonably assume battle to be an inevitable, perhaps even desirable, result of developing such models of thought. None of this, however, implies that these battles, if they do take place, have anything much at stake. They are plainly not real battles. No one slices off arms, bombs civilians nor acclimatises nations to holocausts when engaged in philosophical dispute. The artillery of letters, essays, article and books, combined with the foot-soldiering work of the teachers, never reaches anything other than a purely metaphorical relation to real battles, real artillery, real infantry field destructions. Even to suggest that there is an importance to philosophical battles because of the way they influence and effect social life, leading to the reasonable possibility that real wars might result, in part and at a distance, from conceptual battles, is to miss the very difference between death and words. For all this, however, and without assuming any importance to philosophical battles over and above what should reasonably be assumed, the reality of philosophical dispute is itself undisputable. Words, letters, utterances are no less real than death. Fiction isn’t ‘fictional’ any more than truth is ‘truthful’. What is real is what is, what has been and what will be and philosophical disputes are, have been and will be as real as their existence.

What do we do, then, if a philosopher refuses to argue, as Deleuze himself refuses (DR; 130)? Can a philosophy exist without it disputing with philosophy? The thought of another can be nothing other than a recapitulation in my own mind and yet if thought is always the other that thinks inside me how is it possible for me to think? For anyone? How is thought possible, what do we mean by thought, how can we understand ‘thought’ if it is to be my own and yet is always the other thinking in me? The only sure way is resistance. Resist thought, all thought, particularly ‘my own’ thought, in order to open a space for thought to come into being, to be produced. “Resist! Resist! Resist! Resistance or Death!”—this should be the motto of the philosopher, the lover of wisdom. We should take down from the lintel of the academy the injunction to ‘know thyself’ and spray paint across the walls of the lecture halls everywhere the motto ‘Resistance or Death’! We should refuse to accept we have learnt anything from a philosopher until we reject them. We should kill the gurus, despoil the lecturers, explode the universities and burn the books.

17 Cf. the epigrammatic paragraph that Deleuze places at the head of the book Negotiations.
Deleuze, as an empiricist, lays a particular emphasis on sensation. The traditional split, however, between an empiricist philosophy and its idealist counterpart, is one that has long since been actively held to. We can find numerous examples of an attempt to supercede this distinction, most of which owe much to the first major attempt at such an overcoming carried out by Kant. The crude model of empiricism derives from Locke and Hume consisting of the idea of knowledge being drawn from discrete sensations, from simple sense data such as the perceptions of red or the sensation of heat through touch. There are two distinct areas that can be distinguished in this empiricism; that of an empiricism of concepts and an empiricism of judgement. The empiricism of concepts will trace all concepts back to sense-experience, whereas the empiricism of judgements will hold to the contingency of any non-analytic judgement. These, in a sense, are nothing more than convenient place-holders and the issue is not one in which a clear-cut position that can be identified as empiricist is then put into debate with an alternative rationalist or idealist position. Of course, if we were attempting to develop a theory of knowledge or perception that focussed on the sources of these faculties then perhaps we would be forced to outline an ‘empiricist theory’ but as I have already suggested, Deleuze is not a theory constructor but a concept creator.

Empiricism, declares Deleuze, is neither a refusal or rejection of conceptual analysis nor an appeal to a ‘simple empiricism’ but instead ‘it undertakes the most insane creation of concepts ever seen or heard’ (DR; xx). Crucially this involves taking concepts as things in their ‘free and wild state’ (ibid) and moving beyond both the discrete atomic particulars of experience in ‘simple empiricism’ as well as beyond the conceptual or abstract universals of rationalism and idealism. It is on this basis that Deleuze declares himself to be in a process of constant and renewing concept creation which operates at the edges (DR; xxi). This edge is the edge of philosophy under the image of thought, expressing the inevitably oblique way in which Deleuze must approach a tradition he is trying to resist and renew.

One of the first things we can note in DR is that the call for renewing philosophy involves a new form of writing. The forms Deleuze cites explicitly are those of the detective story and science fiction. Taking the detective story for a moment, Deleuze

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18 The empiricism of Deleuze is something that has come to the fore in interpretations of his work. What that empiricism is, however, is another question. Debate focuses primarily on the nature of Deleuze’s ‘superior empiricism’ or ‘transcendental empiricism’. Cf John Appleby, Schizoanalysis and empiricism passim; John Rajchman’s Introduction to PI; Iain McKenzie, Creativity as criticism; the philosophical constructivism of Deleuze and Giudtari, p.7-18; Levi Bryant, The transcendental empiricism of Gilles Deleuze, passim

cites this as an example of how we should employ concepts. He argues that ‘concepts, with their zones of presence, should intervene to resolve local situations’ (DR; xx). The concepts, then, operate like the ‘theories’ the detective might hold, which differ radically form simple theories in being constructions of a problem through which a solution might be derived but which rely not on logical consistency or validity but on evidential compulsion. A simple theory might attempt to explain why but within the detective story the ‘why’ is little more than the motivation. The philosophical theory aims to tell a story within which the facts find a place but which relies on the concepts consistency whereas a detective story begins with the facts and may eventually construct a ‘theory’ that is in effect nothing more than a hermeneutic tool to connect the facts in a coherent, even if implausible, story. ‘What is’ takes precedence in the detective story, above ‘what might be possible’. If a crime looks impossible this does not prevent the crime from having taken place, whereas if the philosophical theory looks impossible it carries little immediate force. The detective story then can be said, by Deleuze, to utilise concepts rather than theories and I would suggest that by concept Deleuze intends a form of connection. The concepts of a detective story intervene to resolve ‘local situations’, that is, to connect specifics in some way. Theories, unlike these concepts, attempt to hold generally whereas the Deleuzian concept is specifically identified as localised in effect. The first distinction which I would draw then, in identifying the Deleuzian concept, is between the local and the general application of concepts. Deleuzian concepts are local applications of thought to resolve specific situations.

What this suggests in terms of the new form of writing that Deleuze advocates for philosophy is that local situations come to the fore. One way of thinking this is to think of philosophy as oriented towards cases and in this sense I would agree with Alain Badiou who rightly describes Deleuze’s method as being one where the starting point ‘is always a concrete case’20. In this sense I would call Deleuze and the philosophical method he advocates and develops a philosophy of cases. Badiou argues that the necessity to begin from cases is vital for Deleuze because unless he begins from the particular case of a concept then it will be impossible to maintain a thinking of immanence. ‘If you do not first start with a particular case, you are claiming to go from the concept to the variety that it subsumes. In this way you re-establish the Platonic transcendence of the Idea, and you show yourself to be unfaithful to the Nietzschean program that, constantly evoked by Deleuze, designates the ‘overcoming of Platonism’ as the contemporary philosophical task. Immanence requires that you place yourself where thought has already started, as close as possible to a singular case and to the movement of thought. Thinking happens ‘behind your back’ and you are impelled and constrained by it. And the virtue of the case consists in this.’21

Badiou criticises Deleuze by arguing that there is an implicit Platonism of the One-All within Deleuze’s work and in relation to the role of the case he argues that the seeming priority of the case is subsumed to this over-arching concern with the One-All, whereby

20 Alain Badiou, The clamour of being; p.14
21 ibid.
each case is said to express a ‘monotonous’ conceptual creation\(^\text{22}\). The gist of Badiou’s argument is that in effect the cases are subsumed under a more general concept which they continuously produce, this being the concept of the One-All. Badiou ascribes a basic conceptual production to Deleuze’s work but this is the production of the One-All. To subsume the particular cases would be to make the cases in each case a particular expression of the One-All. This immediately brings to the fore the inherent paradox in Badiou’s reading since he reads the conceptual structure of the One-All as a general form under which particulars are subsumed. If this were the case however, then the particular would lose its particularity under the subsumption into the general concept. Deleuze would then have to be found putting an argument for the All to be subsumed into the One. This argument cannot be found because the concept of univocity is developed in relation to the concept of expression (EPS; 48-49). Within this concept of expression there is no possibility of the expressed being divorced from the expression or from what expresses itself but each of these elements in the triadic concept of expression is irreducible.

Badiou’s argument that there is a monotonous conceptual production of the One-All which subsumes the particular cases raises a hierarchy of concepts that precisely avoids the intricacies that Deleuze wants to motivate, in part through the concept of expression. Badiou implicitly recognises this problem when he tries to replace the notion of the particular subsumed into the general with a notion of ‘\textit{quasi-organic consistency}\(^\text{23}\). This, in effect, simply hedges the problem since Badiou’s argument rests on the fact that either Deleuze’s cases are cases of the One-All, as an over-arching concept, or they are not. If the idea of a quasi-organic consistency is instead taken seriously it undermines the very possibility of a single concept as the over-arching genus because the ‘quasi-organic’ status of the consistency indicates, precisely, a vagueness and indeterminacy not capable of being subsumed under a single concept. If, instead, we look at the idea of the detective story again we can find the activity of the detective to be easily describable as a quasi-organic consistency, indicating a space for forensic method, for intuition and hunch, for deduction and all manner of other specific techniques necessary to deal with the multiplicity of cases of evidence, all of which form a consistent practice called investigation. The other way of reading Deleuze’s production from cases, then, is as a gathering of information and evidence, as an almost observational practice that builds up a weight of concepts which push in a general direction and have a dynamic or tendency but which at no point are subsumed into a telos, an end point or conceptual high-point.

If the concept is intended to resolve a local dispute then it does so through establishing connections. These connections are not governed by an over-arching framework for possible connectivity but develop from the case through a creative process. From this we might think of argument not simply as valid connection between concepts but as a matter of developing \textit{compelling connection}. This conception is made stranger, however, by the fact that alongside the way Deleuze envisages an empiricism of concepts he also

\(^{22}\) ibid, p.15
\(^{23}\) ibid, p.17
develops an empiricism of judgement such that the compelling connection is not something that will be submitted to a court for judgement but which furthers the investigation of the cases. It is, after all, obvious that unlike the detective story there has been no crime committed within philosophy. To thus write philosophy as a detective story is to write a detective story without a crime. There is no necessity for an over-arching case for which the facts are being assembled to answer. There are simply events that are connected, forming cases, but in which the connections are unclear. The job of the concept is to resolve the cases without ever being addressed to an over-arching case. It aims, in each case, to connect events as particularities into partial wholes.

In one sense, of course, there is an over-arching case that is being pursued through Difference and Repetition, that of the image of thought. This is the case of the presupposition of philosophy. As I have suggested, however, this attack on the presuppositions of philosophy is not a simple attack on a conceptual ground upon which philosophy rests which is claimed to be inadequate or causal with regard to specific philosophical problems. It involves the very attitude to thought, beyond the eight postulates of the image of thought. This is the attitude of thought’s intimacy with itself, something Deleuze is plainly dubious of. The image of thought cannot be taken as the central case under which the arguments of DR can be subsumed. It is not the central case for which Deleuze is providing evidence, but another case of something less distinct, less immediately classifiable, than a simple error or crime, though it may be those things too. In the LOS we see, even more than in DR, a series of cases none of which are divorced from or unconnected to each other but none of which can be subsumed under a simple over-arching case. In philosophical terms, we can say that the thematics of Deleuze’s work are multiple and inter-connected, constituting a weaving together of concepts rather than a structural assembling of an over-arching case which is how Badiou reads Deleuze’s project. This might also explain why the works of Deleuze rarely pursue a simple thread and often diverge from themselves in a kind of ‘drift’ through thought. It also suggests an important difficulty in re-articulating the concepts Deleuze uses in that there is no simple line of argument that can then be reconstructed because there are always various and varying arguments. There is no simple over-arching case that Deleuze is putting but rather a philosophy of cases and this means that re-articulating the concepts of Deleuze can only be done by working with specific cases. Local difficulties, resolved by specific concepts, form a tendency or drift to Deleuze’s thought that can only be developed and re-articulated by exploring the cases themselves. To even begin to ascertain the more general – if not generalisable – drift of his work will necessarily have to bring out this drift through cases.

At this point it is worth indicating one point of conflict with Wittgenstein’s Tractatus that will be explored later in this essay. As is well known, the TLP begins with the famous statement that ‘the world is all that is the case’ (TLP; 1) and cases are rapidly assimilated to facts which are then assimilated to language. As Max Black says, this is one of the principal innovations of the TLP since it shifts the basic understanding of the world, the
core ontology, from being a world of things to being a world of facts. If the Deleuzian philosophy can be described as a philosophy of cases then one distinction that needs to be made between the Deleuzian and the Tractarian notion of a case is its relation to the concept of fact. We will find within Deleuze particular cases, both of problems in thought but also of problems that derive explicitly from art but which are still philosophical, which still form something ‘that is the case’ and that is philosophically interesting and productive. This implies an awareness of what constitutes a case for philosophy. In Wittgenstein’s TLP it is as though there is a presupposed notion of ‘cases as facts’ but the whole notion of ‘case itself’ is in effect left unexplored.

Two things in particular can be derived from the idea of a philosophy of cases; firstly, the relation of the cases to each other and to the idea of an over-arching case, which is the problem of the relation of particular to generals or universals; secondly, the role of fiction in the construction of cases, pointing towards the priority of the sensible in the creation of concepts, which is close to the problem of the origin or source of concepts that I have suggested makes up the simple empiricism of the concept. It is in relation to this priority of the sensible that the role of the affect of sense comes to the fore.

Deleuze tries to open up philosophy to what he calls ‘elementary novelistic methods’. Jean-Jacques Lecercle has noted that one of the key features of Deleuze is that he has a conception of philosophy which reconfigures the relation of philosophy to fiction. For Lecercle there are three features to Deleuze’s conception of philosophy. Firstly that philosophy is not a linear development; ‘philosophical analysis must always go back and reread the whole tradition in a new light’. Secondly, a change occurs after what might be seen as Deleuze’s ‘first period’ of writing the history of philosophy and the novelist is endowed with as much power as the philosopher, hence the reason that the Logic of Sense draws so heavily on the work of Lewis Carroll. ‘Philosophy is not dispensed in an unholy mixture of fiction and theory, but it loses its conventional limits, it is seen appearing on unexpected ground’. The third feature that Lecercle points to is a consequence of the second and this is that the field of philosophy is enlarged to include ‘unwitting philosophers (unlikely ones too, like F. Scott Fitzgerald).’

The argument here is not, then, that philosophy can be reduced to fictions, stories told in the narrative format, distinct from the scientific. This rather crude reduction of philosophy to ‘nothing more than’ fiction no doubt derives in part from a very simple reading of the two-fold distinction of narrative formats given by Lyotard within The Postmodern Condition. The suggestion by Lecercle is that, instead, philosophy has its

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24 Max Black, A companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus; p.27
25 cf DR or Dialogues etc.
26 Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Philosophy through the looking glass; p.92
27 ibid; p.93
28 ibid; p.94
29 Jean Francois Lyotard, The post-modern condition; in particular I am thinking of the way in which Lyotard poses the problem of narrative together with that of legitimacy, as in section 7, pp.23-27, positing an unequal relationship between language games rather than a mere reduction of one to another.
own format and that it can be extended into the realm of fiction through an appropriation. On this account some fictional characters will be either identical with or very close to what Deleuze calls conceptual personae. That is, the character of the fictional work will not just motivate a ‘human character’ but will articulate and embody a conceptual difference and distinction. This may well be at times a partial articulation or an intuitive feeling towards some vague thought or feeling on the author’s part, whilst at other times it may be an explicit formulation by the author of an essentially philosophical concept through other means than dry philosophical prose. On this reading it is easy to see how Nietzsche becomes so troubling since he rests almost precisely on this border line between the fictional articulation of philosophical concepts and the philosophical articulation of concepts of fiction. This is why Zarathustra plays such a key role within the Nietzschean corpus and makes it impossible to read him truthfully without reading this strange narrative mythology as a mythology, which then by its nature has a ‘mythological truth’ rather than one located in a literal/metaphorical landscape.

If Deleuze’s approach to fiction is to appropriate its resources rather than subsume philosophy into a generalised fictional practice, then how can fiction help in the construction of cases? Let me give an example to begin with.

‘It was very hot, about ninety in the shade. The burning air had become listless, inert; a long cobweb stretching down to the ground from the chestnut hung limp and motionless.’

This evocation of the heat of the Caucasus, where the story is set, is part of an atmosphere that is not peripheral to the story but central to the dynamic of the plot and emotional force of the piece, acting as a character in its own right, or rather as a force within the story that has a character all of it own that is vital to the story. The description is just one amongst many but illustrates the way in which an intensity, a pure intensity such as temperature, takes on a quality, an affect, not yet providing a sense but pre-figuring the formation of a sense or providing what Deleuze would call a ‘plane of immanence’ or a field of individuation (DR; 276). The key here is that the air has become listless, inert. This is the emotional affect of lethargy described not as a human emotion but as a pre-individual non-human intensity. It is not simply an intensity of heat but an intensity of heat with a particular character. Simply saying it was very hot does not have the same effect nor produce the same movement of forces within the story.

We can perhaps think of this through asking the counter-factual question or rather asking after the specific individuation of the intensity of heat that is being given here. Why this description? What would happen if another description were given that could perhaps be a description of a heat equivalent in measurable temperature? Why this description? The answer is that no other description would initiate the same forces. The story would not be the same, quite obviously, if another description was given but this does not mean the

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30 This is a paragraph from the short story by Anton Chekhov called The duel, contained in The duel and other stories; p.40.
plot-line would necessarily have to change. One of the curious facts about watching stories being re-told, more commonly found now within the cinema perhaps, is that the relevance of the particular elements of the work stand forward as vital\textsuperscript{31}. The particular forces evoked by the piece of fiction that Chekhov wrote are specific if not isolated and the affect of sense is this specificity of the work as the particular collection of forces. It is prior to any interpretative work of investigating the meaning of a piece since the investigation or interpretation of the meaning necessarily relies upon the specific affects of sense that the work assembles. The specific assemblage is what I have so far been calling ‘the case’. More specifically I can venture a tentative definition; a case is an assemblage of forces which necessarily has a particular affect of sense.

The role of fiction is that it exemplifies, in some respects, the ability of the writer to construct and create the assemblage of forces that will have a particular affect of sense. Does any assemblage then have an affect? To a large degree the answer is yes. Even a disorganisation will produce an affect, as can be seen within certain surrealist or Dadaist works. Moreover, writers have pursued various strategies to produce work, indeed almost any strategy can be used, from the erasure of the authors own work by the author (Ron Sukenick) to the use of algorithmic methods of construction (Oulipo). Any assemblage can have an affect, then, but in fact only those that work produce affects of sense which are worth noticing. An affect of sense, if converted into a formula for the production of work rather than the goal of the creation of a new work, becomes nothing other than a recipe of forces to include in a particular piece. The tediously repetitive nature of much fiction and much cinema occurs, no doubt, because production through formula is so much easier than the creation of a new work. This also suggests why fiction that has a strong affect of sense, a strong creation of forces, a new assemblage, is so important – formulaic repetition is a trap or hole into which the writer can fall through a natural propensity to take the route of least resistance. The route of least resistance is, in some sense, the way we deal with pre-ordered assemblages of forces, assemblages that do not carry as much force as original creations since they have been found suitable homes within society, comfortably domesticated like household pets\textsuperscript{32}. The same process of domestication occurs with respect to concepts, which helps explain why, as I already mentioned, Deleuze calls for the creation of concepts in their ‘free and wild state’ (DR; xx).

\textsuperscript{31}Cf. The remake of the film Solaris, based upon a novel by Stanislav Lem, originally filmed by Andrei Tarkovsky (1972) and remade by Steven Soderbergh (2002). The core of the film story focuses on the relationship of a scientist to a simulacra of his dead wife whilst aboard the space station Solaris. In Tarkovsky’s original film version the role of the ‘aliens’ as simulacra is what is central; despite the difference they have rights (and I love her). In the second version by Soderbergh the focus is more on the love affair between the scientist and his wife; because I love her we cannot kill her. The whole problematic can be completely reconfigured, with radically different implications being drawn and suggested, simply by emphasising certain points through placing them in a causal or implicative sequence. Tarkovsky’s version draws strong political and philosophical implications whereas Soderbergh’s version concentrates on the scenario as a love affair problem of loss, memory and second chances.

\textsuperscript{32}We can find the notion of domestication in a discussion of the differences forces at work in varying media, where Deleuze describes the situation as one of an opposition between creative forces and domesticating forces – cf. N; 131.
To come back, then, to the question of the sort of empiricism that Deleuze is developing, a few key features can begin to be extracted. Firstly there is the importance of the creation of concepts. This is a declared functional practice of empiricism, the ‘most insane creation of concepts’ philosophy has produced. This notion of creation is also vital to overcoming the problem of the domestication of concepts. Secondly, concepts have what I have called an ‘affect of sense’, that is, they are assemblages of forces that constitute a case. This still vague notion will be further explored through the use of the concept of character. That is, if the assemblage of forces which constitutes a case is in part constituted as a case through it having an affect of sense, then this affect of sense can be understood as the character of the concept. Fiction provides not an example of how to create concepts but an example of the process of creating affects of sense, through the assemblage of forces into a character. In this sense fictional creation and philosophical concept creation share a basic problematic of how to create sense. Thirdly, then, is the notion of concepts intervening in local disputes and having a localised rather than a universal function. This involves a changed relationship of the part to the whole which is exemplified by the notion of immanence.

How to develop these sketchy notions of Deleuze’s approach to concepts? As already suggested, I will begin to explore further by taking a clue from the idea of character but before I move to that the question of immanence remains fundamentally undeveloped. To begin to move forward in understanding the thinking of immanence it is necessary at this point to bring in the Deleuzian concept of an event and its relation to sense.

In the opening chapters, or series, of LOS we find Deleuze setting up his concept of sense, deriving it from the problematic that is constructed around the notion of paradox. In particular the paradox that initiates the work, as it were, is the paradox of becoming. This is drawn from Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland and LOS constitutes, on one level, a philosophical reading of this classic text of English nonsense literature.

‘Alice becomes larger’ opens this primary paradox of pure becoming. It divides into a doubled sense constituted by the implications of the statement. These are that she becomes (i) larger than she was and at the same time (ii) smaller than one becomes. Yet, as Deleuze says, ‘certainly, she is not bigger and smaller at the same time’ (LOS; 1). This example relies upon comparative relations and the suffix ‘-er’ doing the work of adverbial transformation. Alice is not big but bigger and this relies upon the movement described in the sentence ‘Alice becomes larger’.

Two routes are available to us when faced with such comparative relations. We can investigate the complexity of the relations through semantic analysis, using paraphrase and logical structure to show how this or that relation is in fact capable of being transformed into a nominalised description. This, however, assumes that thing that Deleuze calls ‘good sense’. This ‘good sense’ is the presupposition of a determinable

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[33] Cf J. Hyman, -ings and -ers
sense or direction (sens)’ (ibid). In contrast to good sense Deleuze develops a model of paradox where things go in both directions at once. Good sense has a single direction whereas paradox ‘is the affirmation of both senses or directions at once’ (ibid).

Now why would we want to affirm such a thing as paradox? What is the point of a double direction in sense? The distinction relies upon sense not being equated with good sense. Good sense is precisely a sort of sense but sense itself, as we will see, is something other than subsumable into good sense. The distinction thus opens up the possibility of developing a concept of sense other than that of good sense. It is slightly hypothetical in its initial status but it offers in return a model of paradox that does not assume paradox to somehow be a failure or error. This enables us to move forward from a position in which paradox is an error of sense that constitutes a lack of real sense (‘it only appears to have sense’), which itself is paradoxical since it would then be impossible for paradox to have any sense. To deny paradox sense, through suggesting for example that it only appears to have sense, involves us in a whole conceptual rigmarole of appearance and reality as a presupposition before we even get anywhere near the paradox itself. It is a blinkered approach and nothing less than conceptually prejudicial. Plainly, paradoxes contain much sense. The question is not whether the paradox has sense but what is the sense of the paradox. Deleuze enables us to allow paradoxes a full sense, removes the necessity of a presupposed concept of reality and appearance and opens a route to investigate the particular nature of this sense of the paradox.

One of the reasons for the role paradox plays, however, is because of logical argument and in particular the reductio ad absurdum. One of the examples Deleuze gives when he cites the comparative relationals of larger/smaller or younger/older is the Platonic text Parmenides. This is a text riddled with constant paradox and begins with an argument between Zeno and Socrates centred on Zeno’s paradox. Zeno is reading his text to the young Greeks, a text that operates as a defence of Parmenides theses that ‘the All is One’ (ει εστί). As R.E.Allen states in his commentary to the Parmenides, Zeno’s defence uses the strategy of the reductio ad absurdum as its central tool.

Whilst Allen is clear that this strategy existed before Zeno and was used both by Parmenides as well as being a ‘pervasive method of Greek mathematics’, it is not commented on that this strategy is both directed against a specific target (becoming) as well as resting on a particular method of strict determination, what Deleuze calls the presupposition of determinable sense (good sense). Becoming, by its very concept, cannot be reduced to strict determination however. It is far too subtle or else far too absurd to fall under such determinations and the denial of becoming rests more often than not on arguments that fall perilously close to Parmenidean thoughts, which remove change from the real. It is part of a two-fold denial, however; the primary target of Zeno, for example, is plurality and becoming falls victim to an attack on this notion even whilst remaining conceptually distinct. This is why later philosophers developed the strategies of separating reality into

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34 Plato, Plato’s Parmenides; p.79 the relevant passage of the Parmenides is at 128d.  
35 ibid, p.80  
36 The central thesis discussed in the Parmenides is that ‘Unity is’.
ontological levels whereby change is taken to be an aspect of the compounding of elements, which in themselves are unchangeable. Allen argues that the Platonic Ideas are also a response to the Parmenidean notion, in effect initiating an ‘ontological levels’ argument whereby the Forms present the route to the unchangeable One\textsuperscript{37}.

What is at stake in the attack on plurality and becoming is knowledge of the world\textsuperscript{38}. This knowledge, presupposed to be determinate, needs to fix itself, secure itself against transience. Knowledge attempts to resist time. The peculiar thing is that the Parmenides presents an image of philosophy as both conceptual analysis, something quite reasonable if complex, and as governed by a valuable methodological tool, logical analysis. In practice, however, it careers through a series of contrasting arguments, often verging on the unintelligible and sounding at times perilously close to mysticism. In fact Allen puts the matter very well in describing the strategy of Zeno. ‘The vividness of sense-perception must yield to the putative requirements of logic. So it was that, if Parmenides’ result seemed absurd, Zeno undertook to reduce its critics to greater absurdity’\textsuperscript{39}.

Is this, then, the result of Logic? This would seem itself absurd. Logic is a powerful tool for assessing the validity of arguments. It is, however, dubious to then allow a tool for assessment to push conceptual analysis into a denial of sense-perception but it is not the fault of the tool if it is employed incorrectly or without a means to which it is directed. A tool is, after all, determined by the job which it is best suited for. On what grounds does the philosopher use logic to make conclusions about sense-perception itself? To do this would involve converting, surreptitiously, sense-perception into the concept of sense-perception. It involves reducing the thing to the concept of the thing. Phenomenology’s power might be said to lie in the rediscovery of the things themselves and a break from this reduction of the thing to the concept of the thing\textsuperscript{40}. Deleuze is also pushing at the same problem when he claims that difference has been reduced to conceptual difference (DR; 288).

This brings us close to the core of Deleuzian thought. Whilst it is no doubt true that Deleuze is a philosopher of becoming and of difference, meaning in some sense that he is a champion of these thoughts, a defender and expander of these thoughts, the motivation

\textsuperscript{37} ibid, p.81
\textsuperscript{38} The issue is perhaps not as clear cut as this in that Parmenides calls his discussion of Unity a ‘game’, and a laborious game at that (Parmenides, 127b). Parmenides procedure is a method for finding the truth (136c), a method of conceptual analysis. The point of discussion revolves around whether this is a discovery (or a discernment, as Parmenides calls it) of the concept or a creation and construction of the concept. This is, in effect, the crux of the Deleuzian objection to the Platonic procedure, which is that it falls into a sense of discovery even whilst it carries out a fantastic process of creation.
\textsuperscript{39} ibid, p.82
\textsuperscript{40} The recognition of this is what underlies, I would suggest, a question Deleuze asks about phenomenology that hints at a more positive attitude than that found in the Foucault book or in the comment in the Nietzsche book (NP; 195). This question is ‘could phenomenology be this rigorous science of surface effects?’ and follows a discussion whereby the Husserlian noema is associated closely with the Deleuzian sense.
behind this stance is not pure fiat. There is, for Deleuze, a doubled nature of being given to us through the thought of becoming. This occurs because becoming eludes. In Plato this is seen as a dualism by Deleuze but not between the sensible and intelligible or Idea and matter. ‘It is a subterranean dualism between that which receives the action of the Idea and that which eludes this action’ (LOS; 2). It is, in this sense, the difference between the reactive and the active forces, the reactive as that which can receive the action of the Idea, the active as that which eludes it.

Becoming is thus elusive. The illusion of reality as given by logical arguments about the truth of being is thus replaced by Deleuze with a notion of the elusion of becoming. The importance of paradox is that it offers us evidence of the forces of elusion through the medium of language. ‘It is language’ Deleuze argues ‘which fixes the limits (the moment, for example, at which the excess begins), but it is language as well which transcends the limits and restores them to the infinite equivalence of unlimited becoming…’ (LOS; 2-3). In particular this occurs when the nominal gives way to the verbal. The strange adventure of Alice, Deleuze claims, rests upon the loss of personal identity, the loss of her proper name (LOS; 3) because ‘the proper or singular name is guaranteed by the permanence of savoir’ (ibid). The verbal opens for us the realm of events rather than things and through this opening allows us to follow and begin to fathom the elusive becomings of sense.

Paradox thus gives us a hint or clue upon which a notion of sense can be developed. The opening series of LOS begins by focussing on paradox as a double-directional sense, connecting it to Alice through the claim that the paradoxes of pure becoming are equivalent to the paradoxes of infinite identity. This loss of personal identity in the play of the paradox of pure becoming not only shows the disruption of what Deleuze calls ‘good sense’, the uni-directionality of sense, but also disrupts what he calls ‘common sense’, which he describes as ‘the assignation of fixed identities’ (LOS; 3). It is obvious that without these two elements of thought, both of which are part of what Deleuze calls the ‘image of thought’, we are going to have a hard time carrying out the activity of understanding. In a sense, then, the problem Deleuze is posing for us is, how do we do justice to the paradox of pure becoming knowing, as we do, that it radically disrupts our ability to think in the way we have become accustomed, that is, according to good sense and with common sense.

Having set this problem before us the next step is to alter the concept of the event. He uses the Stoic distinction of states of affairs – bodies, the physical mixtures of what we think of as substances – and effects or events – incorporeal, subsisting and verbal. States of affairs (SOA) exist within the present and time is then given another reading, simultaneous to the reading of the present, in which the past and the future are at the fore, in particular the infinite divisibility of the past and future in the present. Two further distinctions are then developed which layer onto these, the distinction between depth and surface, with depth aligned to states of affairs and the surface with events. Thus we have a series of distinctions; {being / present / SOA / depth} as against {becoming / past-future...}
These elements need further exploration but for now I simply want to sketch out these distinguished groups of associated terms. All these distinctions, moreover, have been rapidly outlined within the first two series of LOS.

It is with the third series that the notion of sense begins to be addressed directly when Deleuze turns to look at propositions. We have already seen him claim that it is language that shows us the power of becoming whilst at the same time constituting the limit upon which the paradox of becoming arises. Language thus has a key place in any understanding of becoming and so it is unsurprising to find the role of the proposition addressed so early in the LOS. Deleuze is noticeable, in many ways, for attempting to find ways in which to understand language which simultaneously allow him to expand his metaphysical constructions in the face of the problems and paradoxes that arise specifically from language. He distinguishes, in LOS, three relations within the proposition:

Denotation or Indication
Manifestation
Signification

Denotation is the name for the relation between word and thing. It is expressed by indexicals with the exemplary phrase ‘it is that’ and it’s negative. It is to this relation that the true and the false apply. The denotation is in effect filled (if true) by the SOA, that is, if the SOA is as the denotation posits. (LOS; 12-13). Thus ‘it is raining’ is true IFF it is raining. ‘Either it is raining or it is not raining’ is true in all cases and ‘it is raining’ is false IFF it is not raining. Proper names and indexicals (this, that, it, here, there etc) are key features of the denotative relation.

Manifestation is the second relation of the proposition and focuses on the relation of the proposition to the person who speaks it. The key manifester occurs in the use of the ‘I’, though it also includes a number of other particles such as you, tomorrow, always, elsewhere. Each of these particles has a particular role in a manifestation but each always relies upon the ‘I’ as the centre of this relation. Logically the relation of manifestation does not operate with the simple logical binaries true and false but ‘veracity and illusion’ (LOS; 14). The cogito thus plays a key role in showing the way in which this relation of manifestation operates under a different logical structure, with the cogito understandable no longer as a true or false proposition but as giving a relation of manifestation judged as veridical or illusory.

Signification is the third relation that Deleuze posits. The principal feature of the relation of signification is that of implication and includes the relation of the word to universals or general concepts. Thus signification is the order or connection between propositions and the realm of logical validity would apply most to the relation of signification, that is,
whether the syllogisms constructed by a series of premises and conclusions was valid. Logical validity does not take account, as is commonly understood, of the content of the proposition but only of the validity of the implications between the propositions. It thus is the realm of ‘the condition of truth, the aggregate of conditions under which the proposition ‘would be’ true’ (ibid). It thus establishes the condition of the truth of the proposition at the same time it establishes the condition of the falsity of the proposition and thus the signifying proposition is not opposed to the false proposition but to the absurd, ‘that which is without signification or that which may be neither true nor false’ (LOS; 15).

There are, aside from these three relations in the proposition further relations between the relations. Thus, from differing points of view, one relation may be primary to another. For example, in the order of speech the relation of manifestation is primary. ‘In the order of speech, it is the I which begins, and begins absolutely’ (ibid). Deleuze reads the Cartesian cogito within this primacy of the relation of manifestation in the order of speech, arguing that it is on this basis that Descartes can distinguish between the definition of man as rational animal (order of signification – conceptual) and the definition of man as cogito itself (order of manifestation – performative). The fact that the cogito arises from the activity of doubt and that it appears as though it is the conceptual folding back of doubt onto its own existence that establishes its existence is not, for Deleuze, a conceptual determination but rather depends upon this order of manifestation. It is this order of manifestation that establishes the cogito rather than a conceptual relation of doubt to existence. As the doubt is manifested, so the cogito is established directly rather than conceptually.

The realm of speech (parole) is not the only domain of the proposition, however, with the realm of language (langue) providing the example of a domain in which the relation of manifestation is no longer primary. Signification is implicit in speech whereas in language the relation between the word and the concept is primary, thus offering a model of the conceptual relations underlying the ontological arguments of God’s existence. The order of signification, however, is not homogenous because the propositions also embody the relation of denotation. Whilst symbolic logic may attempt to detach the concrete proposition from the order of denotation by replacing it with logical variables the conclusions established in a syllogism that derives validity from the order of signification can still be detached and placed back within the order of denotation, where their truth or falsity is dependent on the SOA. The valid syllogism is always true if…and that if is not capable of determination within the order of signification which can only establish whether the syllogism is valid, that is, if it is capable of being true or false rather than absurd.

There is, moreover, no single order in which the three relations, which I will call S, M and D, are arranged. They organise a constant inter-relation dependent on the domain in

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41 It is worth noting that in the TLP the logic of propositions is in addition to the order of validity, centred on the notion of the logical possibilities of the proposition.
which they are understood and operate. They form, according to Deleuze, ‘the circle of the proposition’ (LOS; 15). Having given the relations SMD, Deleuze then claims that sense cannot be simply reduced to any of these three relations. Denotation presupposes it, manifestation would reduce it to belief and signification would ignore it. It is with this model of the three relations of SMD in place that Deleuze moves to claim that ‘sense is the fourth dimension of the proposition’ (LOS; 19).

Sense, as a fourth dimension of the proposition, is something that Deleuze traces through the history of philosophy. He puts forwards the Stoics as being first to identify it, followed then by Gregor of Rimini and Nicholas d’Autrecourt and later by Meinong. He thus traces a line of thought which his own work plugs into. In particular he poses a challenge to any reductionism of sense to either of the relations SMD. ‘The question is as follows; is there something, aliquid, which merges neither with the object nor with the state of affairs which the proposition denotes, neither with the ‘lived’ or representation or the mental activity of the person who expresses herself in the proposition, nor with the concepts or even signified essences? If there is, sense, or that which is expressed by the proposition, would be irreducible to individual states of affairs, particular images, personal beliefs and universal or general concepts’ (ibid).

The strategy, therefore, is again one of resistance. Take the arguments for sense being located within any of the relations SMD and the way Deleuze would approach them would be to ask after the something that is resistant, something that cannot be accounted for. Paradox and aporia will necessarily provide very obvious tools by which reductionism can be resisted by posing problems that are irremovable. This is the first thing to note. The second thing, however, is that if there is a positive attempt to pursue sense, rather than a merely sceptical approach of denying it within any of the relations SMD, then it is going to have to follow vague inference and implications. It is unlikely to be established directly but must be inferred indirectly (LOS; 20). To do this the difficulties in the relations SMD as claiming that they are somehow sense-in-itself will be found not through conceptual arguments (the order of signification) but through constantly seeking the break in the circularity of the relations SMD which will take place in investigations of the propositions themselves, that is, outside of the strict specificity of any of the relations SMD. This is why Deleuze claims that ‘the logic of sense is inspired in its entirety by empiricism’ (ibid). It is, as it were, the propositions as givens that will open up the inferred sense, that by which the givens are given.

The first three series of LOS, then, put forward the model of the circularity of the relations SMD. Each relation enfolds and enjoins the others. The problem, thus stated, would be one of attempting to break the circle. What, however, is this sense that is not reducible to either of the relations SMD? Sense is at once, for Deleuze, inherent in the expression and yet simultaneously attributable to the SOA. It is, if you will, the sense of both the expression and the SOA and relates directly to both, inhering in the expression for it must be expressed and the expressed depends on the expression. Yet sense is also attributable to the SOA without being an attribute of the SOA. ‘It turns one side toward
things and one side towards propositions’ (LOS; 22) and is thus the frontier of the SOA and the proposition. In this sense, Deleuze claims, it is an event, providing the event is not understood as located in a spatio-temporal SOA. ‘…the event is sense itself’ (ibid).

What we come up against in Deleuze is thus a philosophy of a fluid embodied ‘always already begun’ thought. He claims that we need to resist a model of representation that sterilises thought and that a renewal of philosophy is called for. This renewal involves a shift from the paradigm of representation to one of production but this productivity is thorough-going, it goes ‘all the way down’. The productive model can be explored via the practice of concept creation, itself capable of being understood through the more general practice of sense creation as exemplified in fictional practices. Sense itself is understood to be an event and derives from what I have called the affect of sense, which is the general assemblage of forces taken as a partial whole or case and which can be investigated via the notion of character.
Chapter 3

Character, conceptual personae and maps

If philosophy needs to break from the non-philosophical image of thought in order to renew thinking within a productive paradigm rather than a reflective, it will no doubt need to examine the methods of thought. It is not uncommon to differentiate ‘methods’ of philosophy. The simple reduction of philosophy to the task of ‘truth finding’ at best seems naïve. In a post-Nietzschean world philosophy has spent a lot of effort grappling with its own purpose but it is a task that has always been present. It might even be the case that philosophy is defined, in part, by an awareness of the problem of method and ever since Plato’s struggle to define the sophist it has had to face up to the fact that its’ means and its’ ends can swallow one another whole. If we are to understand why the most difficult task is the creation of belief in this world then we need first to understand whether this is simply one method of philosophy that has limited, perhaps even limiting, possibilities.

Let me make a relatively simple methodological distinction between two different types of thought, that of analysis and that of production. Analysis involves breaking down the object into its elements and is essentially an analogous method to that used by modern chemistry. We take the object and reduce it to its components, then repeating or iterating the operation on the resultant objects, breaking them down further until we arrive at the basic elements, the unbreakable, unanalysable objects that are, as it were, at the root. These elements are then the radical elements, those baseline objects from which further compounds are constructed.

The predecessor to chemistry was alchemy and it is worth noting, if I extend the analogy, that alchemy is essentially a constructive or productive art, consisting in putting together combinations of base elements. We can distinguish these base elements of alchemy from the radical elements of chemistry in that the base elements of alchemy are, in effect, given already within the world, whereas the givens of chemistry are the composites, the true givens of nature are the radical elements which have to be discovered through specialised practices (scientific methods). The alchemist takes the given, compounds it, transforms it, perhaps repeats various operations, all in an attempt to produce a new element. The most fundamental aim of alchemy was the creation of the ‘philosopher’s stone’, which is that element capable of transmuting base metals into gold. This is not the place to enter into a judgement on the relative merits of the one as against the other method within material scientific practice. The analytical chemist has proven to be adept at the mapping and understanding of the material world and the results of the practice are essential to our society in a way that alchemy perhaps never could be. Rigour and

42 It is perhaps worth noting that the example of alchemy/chemistry as illustrating a methodological difference can be found in Wittgenstein. Cf Wittgenstein’s Lectures, ed. D.Lee, Blackwell 1980; p.21-cited in Kimberley Cornish, The Jew of Linz; p.113-114, n.14
Provability are tenets of chemistry which are incapable of being maintained by alchemy. Importantly, however, alchemy would almost certainly never want to maintain such standards of rigour or provability. If it were possible to develop a philosopher’s stone then the only rigour or provability worth its salt would be the actual production of gold, as Sir John Dee found when employed by his Bohemian patrons in the Elizabethan age. How you do it is irrelevant; the results are what counts. In chemistry the ‘how’ is vital because, as in mathematics, the route of proof is as much a part of the result as the end product.  

Different methods, in the instances of chemistry and alchemy, have implications that fold back upon themselves. To apply the same standards of proof to alchemical as to chemical writings would be to compare different activities. This would not be a comparison of like with like and if taken as such would be, in effect, no comparison at all. The implication of the different methods is so great that a radical break has occurred and understanding that break will involve a historical or sociological account of the differences rather than a methodological one. Yet it is the difference in methods that prompts us to look at the two subjects from another perspective. The difference in method, in effect, becomes the difference itself.

William James, in his book The Pluralistic Universe, also draws a distinction of method within philosophy. This distinction is drawn as part of a diagnosis of philosophical difficulties. James posits a notion of an immediacy of experience that is then, as it were, corrupted by the reflective intellect. The principal reason for this is that analysis breaks wholes into parts which it then finds difficult to put back together again. For example, James argues that in his pluralistic universe any simple thing has with it an ‘external’ open environment that never forms a totality but which never allows the simple separation of the thing either. ‘Things are ‘with’ one another in many ways, but nothing includes everything or dominates over everything’. He then goes on to say that ‘the word ‘and’ trails along after every sentence. Something always escapes’.  

43 This distinction is meant as a practical example of a distinction between analysis and production and is in fact not the whole story with regard to alchemy and its relation to chemistry, a subject that would be far too complex to enter into here. For example, Newman and Principe argue that there is in fact more continuity than might be at first thought between the two disciplines, although this tends to a rehabilitation of alchemy as pre- or quasi-scientific rather than challenging the status of chemistry; Cf William Newman and Lawrence Principe, Alchemy tried in the fire; Starkey, Boyle and the fate of Helmontian chemistry. Bensaude-Vincent and Stengers put forward a more genitive account, suggesting that chemistry arises in part from the creation of a new conceptual object from that investigated by alchemy; Cf Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent and Isabelle Stengers, A history of chemistry. Patrick Harpur gives yet another account of the role of alchemy by locating it within a practice of working with the imaginal or daimonic realm, a practice that runs as a thread throughout history, connecting the role of mythologies and the gods with alchemy, the Romantics and Jung’s depth psychology. Patrick Harpur, The philosophers’ secret fire; a history of the imagination.

44 William James, ‘The thing and its relations’, in A Pluralistic Universe, p347. This essay was originally published in the Journal of philosophy, psychology and scientific methods, vol.ii, New York, 1905

45 ibid

46 ibid, p321.
James makes a plea for a more ‘sympathetic’ and ‘intimate’ philosophy, drawing upon Bergson, amongst others, for his inspiration. His intention is to promote what he calls a ‘radical empiricism’ which admits of external relations as well as the discrete things of ‘normal’ empiricism.

Ansell-Pearson notes that Bergson himself was reluctant to use the term ‘radical empiricism’. The caution Bergson shows relates to the underlying notion of continuity within any doctrine of radical empiricism. For James, ‘what makes empiricism radical’ is not ‘chopping up experience into atomistic sensations’ which then need an abstract principle or category to give an ‘after the fact’ continuity. Instead radical empiricism posits a ‘continuity and concatenation between things (a synechism)’. Ansell-Pearson suggests that for Bergson this continuous experience, whilst preferable to atomistic models, is too reliant on conscious seen and felt experience. Bergson derives his continuity from the virtual, giving a ‘crucial role to the non-conscious and unconscious’. The key to both Bergson and James, however, is a notion of an objective continua and any difference with James is more one of how to get at this continua than whether it is there. Moore, for example, quotes Bergson from Creative Evolution; ‘life is no more made of physico-chemical elements than a curve is made of straight lines’, which suggests very strongly that Bergson views continuity as an almost necessary presupposition.

The intimate or sympathetic philosophy which James wants to promote is distinguished from an analytical method. It is worth being careful and noticing that this ‘analytical’ method differs from what has come to be called ‘analytical philosophy’ with its emphasis on the analysis of language. The analytical method James is criticising is exemplified by thinkers such as Bradley and the late nineteenth century ‘neo-Hegelians’. Russell and Moore, two of the founders of the movement that is sometimes called ‘analytical philosophy’, also criticised the neo-Hegelians in the break that formed the first steps of analytical philosophy. This ‘analytical method’, distinct from analytical philosophy, is also characterised by James as the ‘cynical’ method and the distinction between the sympathetic and the cynical method is given by James as part of the diagnosis of the underlying differences in philosophy that manifest in its materialist and spiritualist

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47 Ibid. The very same word that James picks out, to form the concept of the AND, is also explicitly repeated within Deleuze’s own work, for example when he discusses the work of Jean Luc Godard – (N; 44-45). The ‘And, and, and…’ structure of Deleuze is intimately related to the shift to a productive paradigm and designates what he calls the ‘productive synthesis – ‘the productive synthesis, the production of production, is inherently connective in nature; ‘and…,’ ‘and then...”’ (AO; 5)
48 Ibid, pp 16, 20, 21, 320 and Lecture 1 passim.
49 Ibid, Lecture 6 passim
50 For more on William James’ radical empiricism and its relation to the work of Deleuze Cf. David Lapoujade, From transcendental empiricism to worker nomadism; William James.
51 Keith Ansell-Pearson, Philosophy and the adventure of the virtual; p.12
52 Ibid.
53 F.C.T.Moore, Bergson – thinking backwards; p.119
Once again the difference in method becomes, as it were, the root of the difference itself.

One thing that is immediately noticeable in James distinction is the fact that it contains more than we might naturally and easily think of as method. The very characterisation as either intimate or cynical is given in terms of temper and thus the distinction of method is mixed intimately with a distinction in character. Now character is another way of describing what I initially called an affect of sense. That is, the character of an object or case is the way we discern the differences between cases where the difference is not brought under a concept and thus made into a conceptual difference but where instead we focus on the intensities of the case. It is these intensities that are given as the varying affects of sense, intensities that arise from the assemblage of variable forces but which have qualities or characters. The character of a concept or method of philosophy is, then, the quality of these things. This character, moreover, is not reducible to a particular type of person; it is not an individual character but an individualised character.

Ralph Waldo Emerson, for example, develops a transcendental notion of character that is trans-human. He declares that ‘This is what we call Character – a reserved force which acts directly by presence and without means’. Having given some examples of how the reserved force of character effects the individual, he goes on to claim that ‘...’. A few pages later Emerson develops the idea of a natural order of law which is also a moral order and following this the idea that character is a reflection of the ‘right order of things’ in the individual. This moral order pre-exists the individual and their action – ‘impure men consider life as it is reflected in opinions, events and persons. They cannot see the action, until it is done. Yet its moral element pre-existed in the actor, and its quality, as right or wrong, it was easy to predict’. We can also see the notion of character playing a central role in Nietzsche’s attempt to resist ‘reason’ without falling into some sort of simplistic irrationalism. This was referred to earlier as the Nietzschean ‘will to stupidity’.

This notion of character takes a pre- or trans-human stance, and thus cannot be reduced to any sort of psychological notion of character since it is not anything to do with the psychology of an individual. This notion of character is something that could not be produced by psychology even if it could be utilised by the psychologist, perhaps in the form of the concept of archetypes and archetypical characters. Even as an archetype, however, the concept of character works precisely because it is not given by individuals

\[54\] James, op cit, p23
\[55\] McGuiness is quoted by Cornish as saying that Wittgenstein read Emerson’s essays for their content – cf Kimberley Cornish, op. cit., p.114.
\[56\] Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Popular Works, London, undated, p.167. The quote is form the first paragraph of the text entitled ‘Character’, contained within Ememors ‘Essays’.
\[57\] Ibid, p.169
but helps instead to give us individuals. Individuals, Emerson is arguing, exhibit character as an individuation of a natural order, a pre-existent moral necessity. It is for this reason that the person with a particular character may well act against their immediate interests. Character, in this sense, is clearly a transcendental concept not a psychological one, ie; character is the condition of the individual as conditioned.

The distinction James makes between the two methods, the intimate and the cynical, can be looked at again. James talks specifically of ‘temper’ and his example works, to a large extent, on the basis of the empirical reality of such tempers existing. It appears, for example, that because we can readily admit a variety of tempers amongst philosophers that therefore James is drawing a distinction based upon the multiplicity of individual philosophers. This way leads to the route of opinion and the never ending conversation. If, however, we bring to bear the transcendental concept of character then James’ distinction is made more understandable, not as a distinction between types of philosopher but between types of philosophy. The concept works in so far as it is productive and it will be productive in so far as it enables us to see a difference. More specifically and in Deleuzian terms, the concept works in so far as it makes a difference.

If there are indeed different characters of philosophical thought then these characters of thought can be said to exhibit different methods. These different methods are, quite literally, different ways of thought. The different ways of thought can obviously be exemplified in particular philosophers but are not reducible to the individual and thus to nothing more than opinion. The different ways of thought thus suggest a plurality of methods within anything that can be understood as philosophy. The only reasonable alternative to this plurality it seems would be to either deny that philosophy had any character or temper at all, thereby making any concept of character irrelevant to philosophy, or to suggest that all thought had only one character. Neither option is readily satisfactory it seems to me.

My intention here has been to show that a difference of method can be such as to constitute a difference in itself, as in the case of alchemy and chemistry. The difficulty that then follows is that if two philosophies are radically different in method it becomes difficult to tell any sort of unified story without descending into either a history of philosophy or a sociological or anthropological account of philosophical activity. Such a radical break between varying self-professed philosophers can no doubt be seen in practice, is perhaps even inevitable and would constitute a difference in kind, such that one side no longer felt the other to be within philosophy at all. Alchemy, after all, is not chemistry even if it has some connections that can be understood historically. The actual differences of philosophy itself are what are necessary for an understanding of Deleuze however. If Deleuze is to be given, as it were, a ‘fair hearing’ it is necessary to understand how his own practice both utilises and promotes a pluralistic philosophy58, a

58 In Nietzsche and philosophy Deleuze claims that ‘…pluralism (otherwise known as empiricism) is almost indistinguishable from philosophy itself. Pluralism is the properly philosophical way of thinking’ – NP; 4.

Cf. also NP; 31, where the aphorism is described as a form of pluralism.
philosophy that, like James, sees radical differences in method, whilst pursuing a thought of an intimate heart of philosophy, which I will identify as the creation of concepts.

It is possible at this point to clarify the need to resist philosophy’s unthought and non-philosophical dogmas as an ethical need. It involves an acknowledgment of the impact of method in thought, one that recognises that a particular method can transform thought from one thing into another. Thought is thus plural and the choices between thoughts are never between the good and the bad. It is not a moral choice, but involves a criterion that is involved with life. It is thus an ethics, a practice that creates the criteria of choice, which in Deleuze’s case involves the ability of philosophy to begin and begin again. This is why it is essentially an ethical problem rather than a moral choice which lays at the heart of the particular route a philosopher takes. Deleuze is not posing a choice between a true thought and an untrue thought but trying instead to develop the general problem of philosophy in relation not to abstract criteria (transcendent) but to real living directions, immanent criteria of life. The struggle is less one of defining and defending decision criteria than of developing the tools of thinking that will enable the essentially ethical problems of how to think to be addressed thoughtfully.

Deleuze wants to have a pluralistic philosophy but one that is not simply disparate. In order to explore why this is necessary it is worth beginning from a practical example of a Deleuzian concept. The very broad typology given by James in terms of an intimate or a cynical thought led me to put forward what I called a transcendental concept of character. In its outline this transcendental concept points towards one fundamental feature of the character of thought, which is that it is prior to the individual. The crucial aspect of the concept is that the thought is given by the individuated case but the character of that thought is as much a trans- or pre-human thing as it is a particular. The purpose of this argument is to allow back into the method of philosophy a plurality whilst hopefully avoiding an immediate descent into simple and unconnected disparity. This is a distinction between something I would call a coherent plurality different to a radical or disparate plurality. The transcendental concept of a character of thought, however, needs to be brought back down to earth somehow if we are to actually utilise it in the work of philosophical description. This is what I believe Deleuze does through his notion of conceptual personae. In one sense it can be thought intuitively along the following lines; the concept of character is instantiated both in the works or plays of individual philosophers and also, at an intermediate level, in terms of the ‘dramatis personae’ of the particular play. Conceptual analysis, then, can follow the route of describing and outlining the particular conceptual personae of the theatre of philosophy.

This, at least, is how I would argue we understand the attempt by Deleuze, in What is Philosophy?, to outline some specific conceptual persona as well as the broader nature of conceptual personae. According to Deleuze, ‘the history of philosophy must go through

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59 The concept of ‘character’ is most notably related to the concept of the ‘theatre of philosophy’ that we find within the Preface to Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton, henceforth DR. For more on this link between theatre, character and philosophy see Chapter 8 and the discussion of acting and counter-actualisation.
these personae’ (WIP; 62). The reason for this is that ‘in philosophical enunciations we do not do something by saying it but produce movement by thinking it, through the intermediary of a conceptual persona’ (WIP; 64-65). One thing to note immediately to avoid confusion is that a conceptual persona is not a simple figure or metaphorical sketch; it is not deployed by the philosopher in the same way that a writer may populate his work with figures and characters (WIP; 65-66). The philosopher themselves and the style and method of thinking they use to attempt to think are the conceptual persona. This does not mean that every philosopher necessarily employs or is subsumed into a single conceptual persona nor does it mean that some philosophers do not deploy specific characters; one only has to think of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra to find a philosopher both deploying and becoming a variety of such personae. One of the strengths of the Deleuzian concept is that it allows the philosopher to try to both make sense of their own attitude and character at any given time as well as to become conscious of a technique of thinking that, if developed, can aid in the practice of philosophy. By becoming aware of the personality of the work the philosopher produces it may be possible to more explicitly construct conceptual personae by utilising a greater range of techniques for creating new thought. It is implicit in Deleuzes’ argument that a lack of such awareness doesn’t mean that the conceptual personae aren’t constructed; they arise, either consciously or unconsciously. ‘For most philosophers, their philosophy’s like a personality they haven’t chosen, a third person’ (N; 96). The notion of conceptual personae is used by Deleuze to motivate an account of immanence within philosophy at the level of the philosophers themselves, arguing, in effect, that there is a process which works itself out through this medium of the conceptual persona. The philosopher and the philosophy they expound are, using this concept, thus placed back within a wider functional context, defined by changing problem fields that Deleuze calls planes of immanence.

We can, very roughly, think of these planes of immanence as contextual fields but instead of using such fields to generate meaning we approach these fields as dynamic producers of concepts. A plane of immanence is the productive field from which the concepts arise and as such the conceptual persona forms the route of actualisation, the various and plural ways in which the individual is meshed into this underlying plane. This implies, of course, that the meaning of a concept is not easily definable but instead lurks on the edges of discernibility. Whilst this may suggest that Deleuzian concepts will have a vague meaning such an issue arises primarily from a presupposition that almost automatically assumes the right way to ‘do philosophy’ is by analysing concepts through understanding their meaning. The concept, however, does not rely upon an

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60 This principle of ‘doing’ is also found in Deleuze (N; 16), where it is contrasted with a ‘describing’ that he says characterises his earlier work. This suggest that there is a possible delimitation of the work of Deleuze into periods defined by the ‘doing’/’describing’ distinction, the earlier work in the philosophy of history and DR coming under the rubric of a describing, the latter, perhaps beginning with LOS, emphasising a doing. The role of description as an act would obviously have to be explored, as well as the concept of reading the history of philosophy as an ‘immaculate conception’ or ‘buggery’ (N; 6), which is how Deleuze describes his method. There is, unexpectedly then, no simple doing/describing breach but more a difference of emphasis that enables us to understand why there is the move to the work of Capitalism and schizophrenia (consisting of AO and ATP as volumes 1 and 2 respectively).
understanding of its meaning to work and the functional analysis of a concept is, if not primary, then radically heterogeneous to a semantic analysis. A concept, for Deleuze, is a power, not a meaning. This power is the power of the concept to resolve local situations through connection. A conceptual persona is the instantiation of this power of the concept.

To explore this further I want to look at another example given by Deleuze as well as at the functional structure of the conceptual persona. In *What is philosophy?* Deleuze puts forward a three-fold structure within which the notion of conceptual personae is but one element. This three-fold structure comprises (i) the concept (ii) the plane of immanence and (iii) the conceptual persona. The conceptual persona sits somehow between the concept and the plane of immanence or, according to Deleuze, ‘*halfway between concept and pre-conceptual plane*’ (WIP; 61). The conceptual persona is described as having a ‘*somewhat mysterious*’ existence, being a rare and elusive creature that must ‘*always be reconstituted by the reader*’ (WIP; 63). How exactly this is to work is made more concrete through the example of a reading of the Cartesian cogito.

The cogito is in this instance the concept and the conceptual persona is something Deleuze calls ‘the Idiot’. The persona arises from a distinction drawn between the ‘teacher’ or ‘schoolmen’ of philosophy who thinks through taught concepts (WIP; 62) and the private thinker, the Idiot, who relies upon ‘*innate universal properties of thought*’ (ibid). If we have the three-fold structure in mind we can immediately inquire as to the plane of immanence of the cogito. What we find in the example of the Cartesian cogito is that this plane of immanence is what Deleuze calls a ‘pre-conceptual image of thought’. What he means by this is a particular sort of presupposition which is necessary to the arising of the cogito. He distinguishes between what he describes as ‘*the way one concept presupposes others (for example, ‘man’ presupposes ‘animal’ and ‘rational’)*’ (WIP; 61) and implicit presuppositions. In the case of the cogito this implicit presupposition is identified by Deleuze as the idea that ‘everyone knows what thinking means’ which provides the contextual field understood as a productive context rather than a semantic context. In fact the whole notion of a context is in many ways inappropriate and has been used merely to motivate an understanding of the notion of planes, which I will use for the rest of this essay.

The Idiot, then, operates as a way of motivating this movement from an implicit or pre-conceptual image of thought, which rests upon the notion that everyone knows what thinking means, to the fixity of the cogito as a concept of thought which has explicit consequences about the nature of existence. The method of doubt that Descartes uses to motivate the cogito is the location of the conceptual persona that Deleuze calls the Idiot. The seemingly simple and obvious steps taken by Descartes are thus seen by Deleuze as a particular character of thought which relies upon implicit presuppositions. The force of the cogito is thus approached by Deleuze not from a logical or conceptual angle but from a wider perspective which attempts to re-assemble a conceptual machine and investigate the function of the cogito rather than its meaning or correctness.
I use the term ‘function’ here but it is not a fully adequate term since it implies a purpose which I do not want to ascribe. Function is meant more in line with a mathematical usage where it is a power or operation carried out upon variables. This is to take a broad reading of mathematical functions in which the term ‘function’ most commonly refers to a specific sort of equation. Euler’s definition of a function as a ‘variable quantity that is dependent upon another quantity’ and Dirichlet’s definition of a function as ‘a correspondence that assigns a unique value of the dependent variable to every permitted value of an independent variable’ both illustrate the way in which a function is a strongly connected variable correspondence. It is with this sense that I use the term function, where meaning or correctness are not central to the existence, rightness or method of the function but are reserved for the calculations which presuppose such functions.

It might seem strange to want to put aside an investigation of meaning or correctness since these things are often placed centrally within philosophical investigation. The mathematical model offers us a technique of activity which may allow us to understand the sort of activity we can engage in when we do not focus on the meaning or semantics of a concept but it might be argued that it also puts forward a model of correctness which seems absent from Deleuze. That is, even if we were to ascribe a sort of functional analysis to Deleuze, taken in a more mathematical sense of ‘investigating the various conceptual functions, understood as strongly connected variable correspondences’, we would still want to know where the mathematical notion of correctness fitted in. This correctness fits in, I would suggest, around the idea of ‘work’ and whether a concept works or not. Correctness is primarily referred to in terms of the correct use of a function. This correct use thus presupposes the function. On a ‘meta’ level the correctness of the function itself depends on criteria which are much more difficult to pin down but which are essentially productive – that is, whether or not the function works and ‘fits’. Just as in mathematical models one of their criteria for correctness is productivity so a criteria for Deleuze when investigating concepts is whether they work or make a difference. If a concept is a power then it must be able to do something. It must be productive.

Productivity, however, is not productive of an end-product but is rather understood as an essentially immanent and open, ongoing process. The opening pages of Anti-Oedipus recast the productive process by arguing that the standard typology of a productive process distinguishes it in terms such as production-recording-consumption which are only discrete in a very limited sense, and that production underlies all these processes forming a more general category. Nature and Man, for example, do not stand to each other as producer-produced, they ‘are not like two opposite terms’ but are rather ‘one and the same essential reality’ (AO; 4). In terms of AO, this process is the grounds for the creation of the concept of desiring-machines as immanent to the productive process.

61 For a useful discussion of mathematical definitions of function Cf; Jan Gullberg, Mathematics – from the birth of numbers, Chapter 10 passim. The definitions of Euler and Dirichlet are given on p.336. For an interesting discussion of the role of function in relation to our concept of truth see the essay by David Baird, Thing knowledge: function and truth.
Production as process overtakes all idealistic categories and constitutes a cycle whose relationship to desire is that of an immanent principle’ (ibid). These desiring-machines ‘make us an organism’ and ‘the body suffers from being organised in this way’ (AO; 8).

In effect what we might more traditionally call ‘products’ become things which are never discrete entities but rather individuations. The production of a concept, then, can be understood as the individuation of a concept, where individuation picks out the specificities of a singularity without relying on a principle of identity or self-sameness to establish the object. Further, because the individuations are not static end-products they are individuations if they are themselves productive, if they further contribute to the ongoing process of production, similar perhaps to the idea of a feedback-loop or the notion of effects as causes of further effects.

An understanding of the productive process, understood as a map or model rather than a theory, thus comes to stand as an individuated concept of production as a process. Understanding or the productive process thus becomes both self-productive – it produces, or attempts to produce, awareness – as well as constructive – it produces a model, implicitly or explicitly, of the process of which it is a part. For Deleuze, the model he puts forward rests upon the claim that philosophy is creative. He puts forward the model in an attempt to enable philosophy to become aware of this fact – to learn that it is creative – and he does it in a way that posits this creative activity not as a feature of a particular type of philosophy but as a feature of all philosophy, thus creating an image of a coherent plurality. Philosophy, for Deleuze, is not a singular pursuit of answers to questions but is instead a horde of warrior thoughts on its rampant journey through the world. The philosopher is not a Knight of Truth but a horse-backed archer within a nomadic war-machine.

Of course, this is to ascribe a character or conceptual persona to the philosopher as a general type. It draws a distinction between images that bring with them, as all characters do, a typology of realities. From these characters we can derive motivations, predict behaviours and responses and assume positions of like or dislike. The process is inherently fluid. A particular philosopher might be thought of as an Islamic Hashishin, lone assassin combating the Christian Crusades from a base within a mountain hideout. Spinoza is described by Deleuze as a ‘Christ’ of philosophers (WIP; 60) and Kant’s particular idiosyncrasies of behaviour seem to Deleuze to be vital elements in the construction of a character which will enable us to more easily access the concepts that surround and are produced by this particular persona62. What this approach does is to free up the way of thinking so that an exploratory and experimental practice is vital to productivity. What it also does, however, is to put forward hypotheses, suggestions and hints that rely upon an open experimental practice but which operate through specifying singularities. In putting forward the notion of a conceptual persona it may appear that Deleuze is allowing too much arbitrary activity into philosophy, such that no progress, no discussion and no common ground would ever be possible. Deleuze claims, however,

62 See the comments in the transcript of a lecture where Kant is for Deleuze an ‘austere philosopher, a severe philosopher’ – Gilles Deleuze, lecture transcript, Kant: synthesis of time.
that much philosophy already rests upon a presupposed ‘image of thought’ and thus on an already arbitrary presupposition. By making the process of creation more explicit the arbitrary nature of the production of the experimental hypothesis is reduced to a necessary preliminary of thought and the focus is shifted onto the singularity of the produced character or concept. In effect Deleuze attempts to produce more concrete and less arbitrary concepts through making explicit the role of the arbitrary and thus relegating its’ threat. The accusation of arbitrary methods can only become a threat if an alternative non-arbitrary method is convincingly sustained. If an element of arbitrariness necessarily exists then identifying its role is vital to undermining its danger.

Identifying the role of the arbitrary and constructing a model of production which involves the arbitrary prevents or attempts to prevent the arbitrary becoming a threat to the model. This approach is understandable as a form of holism and indeed Todd May has characterised Deleuze as a ‘contingent holist’ in an attempt to show how Deleuze operates a systematic thought but a systematic thought which rests upon a fluid and underlying contingency. May’s description still rests upon a notion of contingency as somehow a negative feature, as though there were an alternative and a more interesting characterisation is given by Deleuze himself when he characterises his thought as one of constructing ‘open systems’. He argues that it is critical to begin to think in terms of ‘open systems’ and claims that ‘a system’s a set of concepts. And it’s an open system when the concepts relate to circumstances rather than essences’ (N; 32).

May, for example, carries out his analysis in terms of the approach to the question of difference as interrogated by modern French thinkers such as Nancy, Derrida and Levinas. He argues that in contrast to the other three thinkers Deleuze wants a positive difference that ‘while similar to Nancy’s and Derrida’s in being both constitutive and internal to that which it constitutes, is conceived other than by means of the negativity of absence’. He argues that to achieve his purpose Deleuze must ‘embrace a contingent holism’. May’s claim relies upon an assumption that if Deleuze puts forward a holism which is simultaneously contingent then this holism is in effect only partial. A contingent holism leaves a hole where the contingency evacuates the content of any power since it is unable to contain this contingency within the holistic account – the contingency becomes an unknowable posited element, an unthinkable within thought. An open system, on the other hand, whilst still pursuing what we might call a holistic account in terms of it being systematic, maintains at the same time a refusal to close that necessitates its status being provisional. The open system may be described as a contingent holism but only on the condition that there is now a plurality of such holisms. At this point the very notion of a contingent holism becomes less productive than that of an open system because of the conceptual overtone inherent in describing something as a holism. A ‘partial holism’ would be a more accurate description and simply helps to identify the inadequate nature of describing such a system as holistic. It presupposes, as it

63 Todd May, *Reconsidering Difference*, Chapter 4, *passim*

64 May, *op.cit*, p.165
were, a contradiction which is only apparent on the basis of presupposing the thought to be holistic.

A plurality of open systems can be understood as in competition with each other only at specific points of engagement within the world. The notion of a system does not presuppose a complete or holistic account of anything other than the specific elements of the system itself, which if it is open is then, in some sense, an arbitrary abstraction from a wider whole. The organic body of a plant or an animal is an open system, capable of being understood as a systematic entity yet intimately connected with an environment that is ‘outside’. Open systems produce a series of nested hierarchies rather than a sequence of isolated islands. It also produces a situation in which no two open systems ever directly compete with each other but rather critically engage with each other.

Arbitrariness becomes a critical danger when two accounts are given of the same phenomenon. In such a situation the philosophical problem becomes focussed on the notion of criteria by which we might judge between one and another account. A contingent holism, in this situation, essentially puts forward an account that refuses to allow a judgement on the basis of criteria. Deleuze’s emphasis on immanence produces an insistence that such external judgements based upon criteria that must of necessity be transcendent to the accounts is inadequate and will fail to stay with the phenomena themselves. Open systems, however, do not directly compete with each other and thus the issue of transcendent criteria of judgement becomes irrelevant. Criteria move from a transcendent position to an immanent one and the issue becomes not one of judging between two or more accounts but of judging the value of an account understood as an open system.

We can see the difficulty in the distinction between open systems and contingent holisms in an essay by Paul Patton where he claims that we are given a new vocabulary by Deleuze. Pattons’ claim refers in particular to What is philosophy? A new vocabulary is new to something and for something and Patton notes this. In WIP it is ‘another vocabulary in which to express the distinction between conditioned and unconditioned forms of a given concept’. Specifically this new vocabulary of WIP involves the redefinition of ‘the objects of philosophical concepts as pure events’. The difficulty here is clearly seen if we ask about the criteria for judging between the new vocabularies. Why, for example, is the new vocabulary not simply a formal move, a wilful or voluntaristic renaming? Patton argues that the new vocabularies are part of a technique focussed on ‘change rather than truth’. This is the aim of philosophy for Deleuze, according to Patton. The technique of the new vocabulary works by ‘providing new means of description and therefore new ways of understanding and acting upon the world’.

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65 Paul Patton, Future Politics in Between Derrida and Deleuze, ed.s Paul Patton and John Protevi, pp. 15-29
66 ibid, p.23
67 ibid, p.16
Whilst Pattons’ account seems like a reasonable version of Deleuze’s philosophical method it leaves open the challenge of decision and judgement, the threat of arbitrariness. It appears, in this way, to be peculiarly un-philosophical since it relies not upon concepts but upon language and is essentially poetic in method. The argument is describable as follows: (1) if our descriptions of the world constrain our understanding of the world, (2) then changing the description will change our understanding, (3) therefore introducing new vocabularies enables a change in understanding through enabling a process of re-description. At no point in this argument is there any need to talk of concepts. Given that Deleuze, in the very book Patton is analyzing, talks of philosophy as the creation of concepts the only way in which Patton could be right is by reducing concepts to little more than vocabularies. Not only is this change of vocabulary a radically arbitrary notion it is one that is still open to the challenge of which vocabulary is the best or most productive? Patton’s account of Deleuze would leave him open to a charge of radical arbitrariness and provides no response to the challenge of criteria. Whilst I agree with Patton in placing the role of events and change central to the concerns of Deleuze I think his account of Deleuzian philosophy as a process of ‘descriptive change’ is unsatisfactory. Keith Ansell-Pearson also notes the inadequacy of using a notion of description when understanding Deleuze’s method when he claims that ‘there is no world to describe for Deleuze, only possible worlds to be constructed’ . The question of which vocabulary is best is plainly relevant and seemingly unanswerable on Patton’s account. Understanding Deleuze in terms of functional analysis and open systems prevents the problem of criteria from getting a grip and follows Deleuze in his emphasis on immanence.

The ‘descriptive change’ account that Patton gives is also open to a more obvious problem if we ask how do we understand the descriptions themselves? The process of understanding the world, even if it involves descriptions, includes understanding the very descriptions we give. Put rather more bluntly, how can our re-description of the world change our understanding of the world unless we understand the description in the first place? There is no simple relation between a description and our understanding of what is described or even whether anything at all ‘fits the description’.

Patton has re-described Deleuzian thought with the concept of description. This is part of an attempt to show the similarities between Derrida and Deleuze and to some extent it is to be expected that Patton will tend to ‘bend the stick’ a little in order to push his point that there is a structural similarity within the philosophies of these two thinkers. The noticeable word from Deleuze, however, is rarely – if ever – ‘description’ and is instead the word or concept of ‘mapping’. Ironically Patton uses a quote from Deleuze and Guattari which focuses on maps, yet passes this by without comment. Description, as writing, is to be distinguished from mapping if we are to grasp the method of Deleuzian philosophy and it is precisely in terms of method where we will find Deleuze and Derrida parting company, unable to have their conversation.

68 Keith Ansell Pearson, Pure Reserve, in Deleuze and Religion, ed. Mary Bryden, pp141-155. He goes on to note that ‘the emphasis throughout What is philosophy? is on philosophy as constructivism’ (p.151)
Patton’s account of descriptive change must implicitly pose a transcendent role for language and this would then tend to fall back into the difficulties that linguistic philosophy has long grappled with, the bulk of which stem from assuming that understanding a concept is only possible through understanding the language in which we express the concept. This approach runs radically counter to the whole thrust of Deleuzian thought. This issue – of the relation of language to the world – will become more important as this essay progresses. Some first indications of the differences at stake, however, can be found in the differences between open systems/contingent holism and mapping/writing. If we take these two pairs of terms as structured differences it is possible to put these structured differences forward as having implications for any notion of ‘description’. Maps, for example, could be distinguished from writings in the same way we might distinguish an open system from a contingent whole. A novel could be seen as a contingent holism, utterly arbitrary in its content yet producing, if effective, a holistic description of a world or character. A novel is, in effect, a prime example of a contingent holism. A map, on the other hand, is not in any real sense arbitrary or contingent since it must relate, if it is to work, to the territory of which it is a map. The difference between a map and the territory it maps, however, is always present; there is always a space of adjustment, an opening into which another map may be inserted. Whilst we may prefer one map to another for particular jobs every map reveals a sense of the territory it maps and every map is at the same time a production of that territory. Every map is also and of necessity open to other maps and even if we take the most prosaic and use-directed notion of maps it is impossible to close a map as a final account. It is in this sense an open system.

A map is functional in the sense outlined earlier, that is, as a strongly connected variable correspondence. Maps can be made at different scales and projections, they can be understood as events that change realities as they develop and they can also be applied to things other than physical territories as they merge into diagrams. Novels, on the other hand, can compete for descriptive accuracy but the world of each novel is in many ways entirely distinct from the world of any other novel. Maps, in this sense, point towards a perspectivism that is close to the notion of a coherent plurality, where we might have many maps for the same territory, whereas novels pose a radical contingency, almost solipsistic in tendency, where we have a perspectivism that is little more than a relativism. The difference between maps and novels lies in their relation to circumstances (maps) rather than essences (novels), the difference that Deleuze identified

69 Those examples of a deliberate use of characters from one novel to develop another (as in response to the work of Jane Austen) serve to illustrate rather than counter this point, since the new novel gains force precisely from revealing a new world. Even if derived from an existing novelistic source, the power of the novel lies in its ability to give life to another world, another life and another character form that of the source. The issue of ‘copying’ or ‘drawing’ characters from another existing novel has some resonance in the response to the work of Jane Austen – I am thinking in particular of Jean Rhys’s Wide Sargasso Sea, which tells the story of the madwoman in the attic in Jane Eyre and Lin Haire-Sargeant’s H. The Return of Heathcliff to Wuthering Heights. Alexandra Ripley’s Scarlett, a sequel to Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind and Susan Hill’s Mrs. de Winter, a sequel to Daphne du Maurier’s Rebecca also illustrate the use of a character from a previous work to develop a new one. There are probably many other examples.
as marking the open from the closed system. Thus whilst the process of creation may be shared between philosophers and artists, what they create radically differs, not in its relation to truth or falsity but in its relation to circumstances or essences. It is novels which explore the essences of characters or cases and not philosophy.

Deleuze and Guattari talk of maps quite explicitly within *A Thousand Plateaus*, a work that sees them extending their thought into an almost pure experimentalism. ‘*We are trying to make maps of regimes of signs*’ (ATP; 119) they claim, distinguishing between this method and either evolutionist accounts of such regimes on the one hand or historicist/historical accounts on the other. They clearly see maps as applicable to a wider domain than simple physical territories, citing Fernand Deligny in particular who developed maps of the behaviours of autistic children in distinction from accounts that focussed on either the signifiers these children produced or the structures of their behaviour (ATP; 202-203) 70. The practice of *schizo-analysis* that they are attempting to develop within the two part work ‘Capitalism and Schizophrenia’ is according to Deleuze and Guattari ‘*like the art of the new*’ (ATP; 203) and maps, diagrams and assemblages are central concepts in this art. These maps and diagrams are ways of presenting the assemblages, ways of presenting a functional analysis of concepts for example, in that they present strongly connected variable correspondences.

We can also see within ATP two further points with regard to maps. Firstly that Deleuzian maps are not merely applicable to the physical territories we live within and on. I have already hinted at this and it is clearly an element of the way in which Deleuze and Guattari use the notion of maps. One example can be found in their discussion of Artaud. In a discussion of what they call the ‘Body without Organs’, often referred to as the BwO, they cite a letter that Antonin Artaud sent to Adolph Hitler in which he says to the fascist dictator that ‘*I showed you roadblocks on a map that was not just a map of geography…*’ (ATP; 163-164). Deleuze describes this map of Artauds as ‘*something like a BwO intensity map*’ (ATP; 164). Maps, then, will be used to present more than simple geographical features and will have a specific relation to the intensities of the BwO. Secondly, however, it is worth noting the clear role that Deleuze and Guattari assign to maps within their methodology and the connections between the map and another word famously associated with Deleuze, the *rhizome*.

The rhizome is announced as central to the work of ATP within the introduction to that work. It is perhaps one of the most famous Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts. ‘*The rhizome*’ they claim ‘*is altogether different* [from the tree and tracing], *a map and not a tracing. Make a map, not a tracing. The orchid does not reproduce the tracing of the wasp; it forms a map with the wasp, in a rhizome. What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented towards an experimentation in contact with the real*’ (ATP; 12, emphasis added). The discussion of the difference between the map and the tracing then continues in ATP for the next page and a half, possibly the most sustained discussion of

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70 It is worth noting that the central quote that Patton uses in his essay comes from exactly this section of ATP.
the distinction in the book, towards the end of which they declare that this emphasis on the map ‘is a question of method’ (ATP; 13). Notably they specifically cite this method as one they derive from Fernand Deligny, the discussion of which later in the book provides the context for the quote which Patton uses to turn the Deleuzian method into one of descriptive change. They even, at one point, call this ‘Deligny’s method’ (ATP; 14).

Patton is correct, however, in one point and that is in focussing on the importance of the relation between the conditioned and unconditioned concept. One of the motivating arguments during the outlining of the mapping methodology is hostility to the form of the transcendental which we can see Patton noting in terms of the impossibility of the unconditional concept. Whilst the impossible possibility of the unconditional concept is central to the way Derrida orientates thought towards aporia, the fact that Deleuze also works with a specific relation to the unconditional concept does not mean that the two thinkers can be easily assimilated. The unconditional, for Derrida, is centrally productive within the world of the conditioned concept, the conditioned relying in effect upon the unconditional despite its impossibility. The impossibility or aporia of the unconditional concept presents us with a lack or absence at the heart of any concept in the Derridean model but Tod May was right in describing Deleuze as hostile to such absence even if his description of Deleuze as employing a contingent holism fails to understand the role of the map and the open system. Deleuze is a philosopher for whom affirmation is central and for whom the negative, lack and absence are all little more than derivative shadows of the positive affirmative structures of thought.

These are, of course, broad indications of the issues at stake between Deleuze and Derrida. Turning to the detail of the arguments in ATP, however, I can begin to show the way in which Deleuze articulates his particular method and the assumptions he necessarily works with which include the assumption of what might be called a primary affirmativity. One way of seeing this is in terms of the way Deleuze and Guattari discuss the difficulty of falling into a simple dualism. ‘If it is true that it is of the essence of the map or rhizome to have multiple entryways, then it is plausible that one could enter them through tracings or the root-tree, assuming the necessary precautions are taken (once again, one must avoid any Manichean dualism)’ (ATP; 14). There then follows a discussion of the difficulties of falling into dualisms between arborescent (tracing) and rhizomatic (mapping) models of understanding. The aim is to show the practical efficacy of the distinction whilst also showing its always conditioned reality. There is no unconditional distinction. That is, the distinction is made through the conditional conjunction, through the very act of joining together in a disjunction the tree/rhizome or the open system/contingent whole or the map/writing. What is important, though, is not a simple disjunctive method of drawing distinctions nor a focussing on the impossibility of either side of the distinction becoming a pure concept in the sense of an unconditional concept, but rather the emphasis is on the practical nature of the distinctions, one side of which is always ethically preferred by Deleuze and Guattari.
The practical nature of the distinction is shown clearly when Deleuze and Guattari describe the way in which the distinctions they draw are complex inter-mixed conditioned realities. ‘There exist tree or root structures in rhizomes, conversely a tree branch or root division may begin to burgeon into a rhizome. The co-ordinates are determined not by theoretical analysis implying universals but by a pragmatics composing multiplicities or aggregates of intensities’ (ATP; 15, emphasis added). This hostility to theoretical analysis implying universals is identical to the opposition to the idea of an unconditional concept. An unconditional concept is a pure concept, one that is not conditioned by particulars. Such a pure concept is exactly what is intended when anyone speaks of a universal. Purity refers to the content of the concept whereas universality applies to its applicability.

Whilst this is a broad claim about universals we can, I believe, see how this works if we look briefly at the structure of the debate between nominalists and realists. Armstrong defines nominalists as holding to the claim that ‘all things that exist are particulars’, claiming that this is their ‘fundamental contention’\(^71\). Realists, on Armstrong’s definition, thus hold in opposition to the nominalists that there are such things as universals. ‘Nominalists deny that there is any genuine or objective identity in things which are not identical. Realists, on the other hand, hold that the apparent situation is the real situation. There genuinely is, or can be, something identical in things which are not identical. Besides particulars there are universals’\(^72\). The reason that the universals are thus applied concepts is that these concepts, posited as existing in a pure state, which is to say outside of any conditioning by particulars, are posited as both real and capable of being connected to the particulars. That is, the pure concept, as a universal, is applied to the particular.

For Derrida the idea of an unconditional concept is aporetic but vital to the conditioned concept whereas for Deleuze and Guattari the important focus is on a pragmatic experimental approach in touch with reality and which rejects a theoretical basis – or rather, a pure theoretical basis - to philosophical analysis, particularly one focussed on providing universals. They thus drop the distinction between the description of a concept and its application, replacing it with a distinction between description and activation. The problem of the universal, in terms of how it can be applied, is thus replaced in favour of an emphasis on activity, on doing something with concepts.

For Deleuze and Guattari the rhizomatic is an alternative to the tree/arborescent model and despite acknowledging its complex interweaved and conditioned relation to the arborescent it is also clearly motivated by a perceived failure of the arborescent model which can be described as a failure of transcendental arguments. This is not a claim that transcendental arguments are invalid but rather that they produce certain results which are not themselves transcendental to the empirically real. We have no grounds to base our understanding of the world upon such transcendental arguments in opposition to the

\(^71\) D.M.Armstrong, Nominalism and realism; p.12
\(^72\) ibid
empirical world. The reliance upon transcendental argument, for example, underpins the reduction of the world to a realm of illusion or appearance. One of the spurs to the rhizomatic model is clearly that it is intended to provide a more adequate account of reality and one that is capable of thinking thought itself, understanding the operation of thought from a perspective that avoids – or wants to avoid – a fall back into inside/outside dichotomies. ‘Thought is not arborescent and the brain is not a rooted or ramified matter’ claim Deleuze and Guattari. It is, instead, a discontinuous system that ‘makes the brain a multiplicity immersed in its plane of consistency or neuroglia, a whole, uncertain, probabilistic system (‘the uncertain nervous system’’) (ATP; 15).

What are conceptual personas then? Are they, as I asked earlier, concepts of some sort? They are part of a three fold structure of (i) pre-conceptual plane (ii) conceptual persona and (iii) concept and form. The map or rhizome, we saw, is identified in the example from Artaud as a map of intensities and these intensities can be identified as located in the pre-conceptual plane. The thinker who must, to create concepts, do something by producing something rather than saying something does so, Deleuze claims, through the intermediary of these conceptual persona and thus we can see that the job of the thinker is, in effect, to bring into being these personae. By bringing such personae into being they also bring into being themselves as philosophical thinkers. If we take the method that Deleuze advocates, which we can call a method of mapping or more easily the rhizomatic method, we can see that what he puts forward is a method of drawing connections to form a system related to the circumstances or pre-conceptual field of intensities. Finally and perhaps crucially these conceptual persona which, as it were, embody the open systems, are experimentally orientated to the real. They are fundamentally pragmatic embodiments of thought.

These conceptual persona, more importantly, exhibit character, by which I mean they exhibit a particular relation to the pre-conceptual, the real, what Emerson calls the ‘reserved force’ which acts ‘directly and without means’. Thus any attempt to use Deleuze as a springboard for investigation must necessarily attempt to draw out the character of the object investigated, which in effect means drawing out both the way in which the map forms a system of concepts and ideas as well as the intensities which the map expresses and which will be expressed directly rather than representationally. The conceptual persona thus has a character which does not refer back to a reality it then exhibits but which, in effect, creates intensities through their embodiment within the character of the conceptual persona. It is not, therefore, what a concept means but what it does that is vital to Deleuze. To think the philosopher must do something and what they do is to make things, construct maps or open systems of concepts.
Chapter 4

Concept creation and the problem of the new

Creation and the event are bound together around a concept of sense that is developed in opposition to what Deleuze calls ‘good sense’ and ‘common sense’. This means, with regard to sense in particular, that the model of a determinate sense is to be dropped in favour of an affirmative account of sense rooted in a paradigm of production rather than reflection. The obviousness of the idea of a determinate sense, however, rests in the difficulty of knowing what a sense would be that was indeterminate. Surely the very notion of sense necessitates it being determinate in order to be known? This necessity rests in a presupposition of knowing, of what knowing consist of. Can we get away from the problem of knowing sense? The emphasis on creation is intended to shift thinking sideways, towards the edges of what it is in order to open up opportunities for its metamorphosis and renewal. To do this, instead of critically attacking knowledge – the Sceptical route – Deleuze develops an alternative affirmative account of thought and sense. At the heart of this is the issue of creation because the question now is not ‘what is sense?’ but ‘how is sense produced?’

The ‘affinity’ between the works of Derrida and Deleuze has increasingly been mooted in recent years. This affinity, however, has strange dissimilarities and some of the particular differences can be found around the ideas of immanence and creation. To this end I will attempt to draw out some of the distinctions between Derrida and Deleuze as I continue in the account of Deleuze’s philosophy.

At the funeral of Gilles Deleuze a speech was given by Jacques Derrida which has been translated under the title ‘I’ll have to wander all alone’\(^73\). This is a poignant moment, during which Derrida mourns the loss of a particular generation of thinkers in ‘all these uncommon endings’. They are uncommon endings in various ways and in the case of Deleuze it is because it was the funeral of a suicide, another unusual ending in a series of unusual endings\(^74\). Derrida’s speech shows a tenderness and comprehension towards Deleuze which maintains an intellectual honesty by marking, in passing, those possible points of philosophical engagement and disagreement with Deleuze. The speech traces a companionship between the two thinkers, with personal anecdotes of friendship, as well as noting the fact that the two of them had mooted the possibility of producing a text together, a text that would have comprised a long improvised conversation. It is this proposed conversation that provides the theme of having to wander alone – ‘and I’ll have to wander all alone in this long conversation that we were supposed to have together’.

\(^73\) Jacques Derrida, *I’ll have to wander all alone*, trans. Leonard Lawlor, in *The work of mourning*; pp.192-195

Derrida goes on to state that he first question of that conversation would have ‘concerned Artaud, his [Deleuze’s] interpretation of the ‘body without organs’ and the word ‘immanence’ on which he always insisted’. He also says, almost in an apologetic tone, that he did ‘on occasion happen to grumble against this or that proposition in Anti-Oedipus (I told him about it one day when we were coming back together by car from Nanterre University, after a thesis defence on Spinoza) or perhaps against the idea that philosophy consists in ‘creating’ concepts’.

Two things are worth noting in Derrida’s speech. First, the suspension of the word ‘creating’, albeit done in a provisional sort of way by use of the ‘perhaps’ – although the ‘perhaps’ is a perennial Derridean trope. The passage says to me, rightly or wrongly, that Derrida somehow thought the creation of concepts an absurd idea, naïve at best and ludicrous at worst. Second, the lack of a conversation that they were ‘supposed to have’ is given life by the inclusion of fragments of conversations that they did have. It might at first seem like Derrida is bemoaning the loss of a conversation to come, something they were supposed to ‘have’ as a future, as though a legacy that was to become his had been lost, a future possibility closed. The fact that the conversation to come is reported through fragments of a conversation that has been suggests, however, that the fact that they were supposed to have this conversation does not refer to a future event but to a way of being, a conversation that they were supposed to have, analogous to the lover that they were supposed to have but which slipped through their fingers. This ‘supposed to have’ would then refer to a sort of natural order of existence (the loss of the lover as the loss of a soul-mate). In particular it seems to me that it might suggest an event that has never actually happened but which somehow should have happened and moreover that this is an event which Derrida knows should have happened but never did. An event; something which has always already happened or which is always to come (l’avenir). Can an event be something that should happen? The difficulty of the question reflects the difficulty found in the ‘is/ought’ distinction. Should an event, which seems at first sight to be a fact, have the status of a value, such that it is an imperative for this event to happen?

I have already argued that Deleuze calls for a renewal of philosophy and that he puts forward a radically creative philosophy, one in which the creation of concepts is both a philosophical and ethical necessity. One of the last tasks Deleuze tentatively puts forward for philosophy, as John Rajchman has noted, is that of ‘believing in this world, in this life’. This ‘has become our most difficult task, the task of a mode of existence to be discovered on our plane of immanence today’ (Deleuze, WIP; 75). Deleuze is not speaking of the need to create a belief in a substance that is called this world, this life, but rather in the event of this life, in the time of this life. It is going to be a task that needs a radically new account of creation. This new account of creation is located at the very heart of Deleuze’s philosophy and yet is something he never fully articulates. It is,

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75 In the Introduction to Pure Immanence, p.18, Rajchman quotes Deleuze, from Qu’est-ce que le philosophie?, pp 72-73 (cf. WIP; 75). cf also Rajchman, The Deleuze Connections, p.25.

76 cf Keith Ansell Pearson, Pure reserve in Deleuze and Religion, p 152 where Pearson also notes the importance of this passage from What is philosophy? for an attempt to think through Deleuze’s concept of the event.
rather, a way of seeing the most intimate task of thought. This intimate task of thought is present within philosophy, not as another method, another story producing another creation, but as the intimate heart of thought. This is what I would call the ‘creative-discovery’ of Deleuzian philosophy and is not simply another way to do philosophy but rather posits this ‘creative-discovery’ as a fact of philosophical activity.

A closer look at the passage from Deleuze where he cites the task of believing in the world can bring this out a little better. In the third chapter of What is philosophy?, entitled ‘conceptual personae’, Deleuze explores the way philosophical concepts are developed by philosophers. During the course of this he gives an ‘example’. These examples form short examples within the text, providing something akin to a practical application of the broader discussions that take place during the chapters. ‘Example 6’ (WIP; 73) deals with that word, immanence, which Derrida rightly claims Deleuze insists on. In particular it deals with how the peculiar folding back of what at first appears transcendent into immanence. ‘Pascal wagers on the transcendent existence of God, but the stake, that on which one bets, is the immanent existence of the one who believes that God exists’ (ibid). What Deleuze is putting forward is the idea that the transcendent is something which can arise from the immanent as a force, as something that can ‘produce and reproduce intensities’ (ibid). This transcendent, however, is never anything other than apparently transcendent since its value derives from immanent criteria. In the case of Pascal, the gamble intends to counter the problem of faith and knowledge, providing a way to bridge the gap between the two and enabling a working faith to be established in the face of the sceptical claims of knowledge. For Pascal this gap is bridged through the bet, through a radical chance and Deleuze also cites the leap of Kierkegaard as another part of his example.

This Pascalian gamble opens up, for Deleuze, not a question of the existence of God but a question of the force and intensity of the gamble itself. The gamble is a powerful concept, capable of spreading itself across thought, capable of recharging immanence. Pascal and Kierkegaard are ‘concerned no longer with the transcendent existence of God but only with the infinite immanent possibilities brought by the one who believes that God exists’ (WIP; 74). What is clear is that Deleuze is articulating something very like a functional account of conceptual practice at this point, that is, an account immanent to the practice itself. This is confirmed when he claims that there is ‘not the slightest reason to think modes of existence need transcendent values by which they could be compared, selected and judged relative to one another. On the contrary, there are only immanent criteria’ (ibid). These criteria, in effect, become something like ‘vitality’; the force of the concept provides it with value because of the vitality – the productive and reproductive power – of the concept.

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77 This ‘apparent transcendence’ has an obvious resonance with the idea of the quasi-synthetic transcendental put forward by Rodolphe Gasche in his reading of Derrida’s method.
78 This is perhaps most obviously the case for Kierkegaard in terms of his *Philosophical fragments or a fragment of philosophy*. 

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These criteria are immanent to a particular field of organisation or association which Deleuze calls the ‘plane of immanence’. The plane of immanence in the case of Pascal and Kierkegaard is dominated by the question of God, by the difficulty of faith and by the philosophical struggle to maintain a belief in God in the face of a reason that was fast finding little room for him. The problem changes with a change in the plane of immanence, however, and Deleuze suggests that the problem that we face now is not that of God, not even that of not believing in God, but derives from an altogether different plane. This new plane of immanence centres itself on the world. The main problem that emerges from this new plane of immanence is a problem of belief in the world. This is not a problem with a belief in the existence of the world but, crucially, in its ‘possibilities of movements and intensities’ (ibid), that is, in its vitality. The difficulty contained within not believing in the worlds possibilities is that it becomes difficult to conceive – literally, to create the concepts of – a new world, what Deleuze calls ‘new modes of existence, closer to animals and rocks’ (ibid; NP; 101).

The passage, short though it is, speaks of a loss of belief in what we might, as a sort of shorthand, call the utopian. More exactly perhaps it speaks of a loss of belief in the radical possibility of change. In fact the ambiguity around the word ‘utopia’ might be seen as one symptom of exactly this loss. Utopias, for people such as Thomas More or the early French socialists, were positive visions of the future and the loss of belief in these futures is at least part of the shift in the concept of utopia. To call something ‘utopian’ could now just as easily mean futile, idealistic and made of the stuff of dreams as it could mean ‘vision of perfected future’. The change in the concept of utopia hints at the changes that Deleuze is suggesting have occurred with the loss of belief in the world. This is a loss of belief that comes to the fore even more strongly perhaps at a time when the ‘end of history’ is declared and the thought of revolution, once a powerful motivating force for human change, now seems popularly discredited and out of place. The problem Deleuze puts forward is of believing in the possibilities of movements and intensities within the world and this seems to be something revolutionary thought must necessarily have. It would be possible to describe the problem, I would suggest, in terms of the belief in revolutionary change and that the loss of such a belief is, for Deleuze, akin to a loss in belief in the world. On this reading the most difficult task is to once again find a way to believe in the revolution within a new world in which The Revolution has been defeated once and for all. What is suggested by this is that there are more than merely technical disputes between those who believe in the possibility of creating concepts and those that don’t. It is to suggest that fundamental ethical considerations are

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Francis Fukuyama, *The end of history and the last man*. In this Fukuyuma argues for a linear model of history in which modern western liberalism ‘triumphs’ as historical conflict plays itself out. This was an influential thesis following the velvet revolutions and the apparent collapse of a Marxist historical worldview. In recent years Fukuyuma’s thesis has come under attack from Samuel P. Huntington, *The clash of civilisations and the remaking of world order*. Huntington argues for a more complex view of history than the essentially linear and singular model of Fukuyuma, with a complex division of multiple value-laden coherent civilisations, implying multiple histories. Huntington’s view is that the imposition of the model of western liberalism on regions with distinct and incompatible civilisations creates a political and social backlash.
folded into the question of creating concepts. The power to conceive a future mode of existence rests upon a philosophical practice of conceptual creation. To lose such a practice by declaring it void or invalid and then slowly evacuating it from the world of philosophy would thus be an ethical destruction of thought’s capacity to think. To think and do philosophy must (ethical) involve creation, the creation of thoughts and of concepts.

What I want to address is the specific objection raised to this notion of creating concepts by Derrida in his funeral eulogy mentioned above. The intention here is to indicate different tendencies within the thought of Deleuze and Derrida and so I do not claim this as a comprehensive or even adequate reading of Derrida, merely one that brings out the differences.

In his text *Psyche: inventions of the Other*, Derrida addresses the allegorical in the form of the fable. The fable, both in its generic meaning and in terms of the text by Francis Ponge entitled ‘Fable’ that Derrida is reading in *Psyche*, opens onto a problem of invention and the other. It does so in that mournful joy that characterises much of Derrida’s work. Derrida relates this text to the problem of reflexivity, liberally referred to as reference (Ps; 203), reflexivity (Ps; 205), heteroreference, self-reference, relation to itself (Ps; 206), autoreference and heteroreference (Ps; 207). It is clear that at least one of the issues within this text is the problem of reflexivity or self-affection. Why self-affection? Though posed in terms of the mirror and the ‘specularity of language’ (Ps; 203) our affections or passions are our capacities to affect and be affected and poems as well as concepts possess such capacities, indeed they might be said to be nothing but these affections. The self-affection of the poem consists in the fact that the structure of reflexivity Derrida describes attempts to ascribe a capacity to the poem that is impossible. The self-affection at stake is the capacity of impossibility.

The problem of the other, the problem of changing our thought or producing whilst being within a background of an always already within-ness of the world is explicitly part of Derrida’s problem in *Psyche*. He says that Ponges’ text puts ‘into action’ the question of the ‘specularity of language or literature’ and that ‘the issue is unmistakably that of death, of this moment of mourning when the breaking of the mirror is the most necessary and also the most difficult’ (Ps; 203). He then goes on to indicate the difficulty, why the attempt by Ponge is the most difficult thing to try to do. It is the most difficult because ‘everything we say or do or cry, however outstretched toward the other we may be, remains within us’ (Ps; 203 – emphasis in original).

It remains within us. It never leaves us. It can never be anything other than self-affection. We are then presented by Derrida with the performative side of the poem, with the fact that before its relation to the other, even if this other is within us, the poem is an event. Derrida has already said that the poem put reference in question through action

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80 The text I am reading from is contained in *A Derrida reader: between the blinds*, ed. Peggy Kamuf, pp.200-221.
and so this event is one of self-affection because it is not simply a matter of reflecting upon itself but of enacting a capacity for such self-reflection that is impossible. This impossibility will be drawn out by Derrida as the tension between the constative and performative aspects of the poem, a ‘rapid oscillation between the performative and the constative, between language and metalanguage’ which produces instability but which also ‘constitutes that very event – let us say, the work – whose invention disturbs normally, as it were, the norms, the statutes and the rules’ (Ps; 207).

This event of work is produced by the ‘fabulatory economy’ (Ps; 208) of the poem and is the spontaneous deconstruction of the oppositional logic underlying the constative / performative distinction. This distinction is one Derrida has already associated with a number of other oppositions such as language / metalanguage, fiction / nonfiction, and autoreference / heteroreference (Ps; 207) and which he suggests or suspects occurs in many utterances, in particular the ‘most foundational or institutive of these utterances, thus in the most inventive ones’ (Ps; 208).

Deconstruction and invention are closely linked. We could almost say that invention is inevitably a spontaneous deconstruction of prior oppositional terms. Derrida and Deleuze come very close at this point. For Derrida, the invention is like a new game, which is created in the act of writing the new rule book. It is a new form which writes its own rules by enacting them, as in Ponges’ poem. The invention in enacting itself into existence, in so doing destabilises that existence. What for Derrida is a destabilisation of oppositional terms might be mapped onto the Deleuzian idea of the planes of immanence. As a new concept is created so is its plane of immanence also brought into existence and this plane of immanence can collide or clash with a prior plane, destabilising it in the process, forcing thought to think. This description assimilates both thinkers, very broadly speaking, into a sort of paradigmatic model of shifts and breaks. At least, this idea of them both as thinkers of such shifts and breaks enables the tensions between the thinkers to be addressed.

The tensions, however, are not specific but between tendencies, the direction of the current of thought. Derrida tends to focus on the halting, repetitious temporality of a sort of closed loop, as though each action was erased by its consequences which itself then forced the action to begin again yet always with the same consequences. A loop, logic folded back onto itself, the mirrors reflecting each other into infinity. Of course the mirrors could never reflect themselves into infinity except in principle, in the world of the possible. In the world of the actual light prevents infinity. Such an infinite reflection succumbs to the intractability of the material - not enough light, not enough resolving power of the image, not enough difference between the angle of perception and the angle of reflection, not enough speed. Derrida says that ‘we are caught in the mirrors’ trap’ (Ps; 211) but only in our thoughts of the possible. Perhaps Derrida should look out of a window rather than into a doubled mirror?
Derrida goes on in his reading to indicate his belief that the analysis of the 8 lined poem of Ponges’ would be endless (Ps; 215) as well as to describe the poem, its spontaneous capacity for deconstruction already established, as inaugurating a ‘process without beginning or end that nonetheless is only beginning, but without ever being able to do so’ (Ps; 216). The capacity for the impossible is an impossible capacity although one that is already an event. This event is that of a machine or procedure, a ‘model or method’ that is an invention only because it can be repeated (Ps; 215). The repetition, moreover, is not a repetition of production but of a capacity to be reused, ‘set within a public tradition and heritage’ (ibid). Derrida goes on to say, ‘deconstruction is inventive or it is nothing at all’ and it is so because it is not simply performative but because it too ‘produces rules – other conventions – for new performativities and never installs itself in the theoretical assurance of a simple opposition between performative and constative’ (Ps; 218).

Crucially, to do this deconstruction must therefore deconstruct invention itself, a ‘conceptual and institutional structure of invention’ (ibid).

The aporia, then, is that to invent, to create the new, deconstruction needs to open a space for the new, needs to break down the rules of what is new. It needs to allow the other to come through. To do this it needs to institute new rules, new rules that will then close back down the space for the new, turning the new into nothing other than what the old was. Fundamentally this involves a relation to what Derrida calls ‘the coming’, that element of the event, of the advent and of invention that he plays on in his writing (venire) but which doesn’t rely on a linguistic turn. It can be read as a specific understanding of the future; of the coming as something that is transcendentally Other. The other with a capital ‘O’, the Other than is infinitely distant, infinitely to come, never arriving, never present. It is for this reason that Derrida suggests that it is necessary to ‘reinvent the future’ (ibid).

This Other to come is both transcendent but also transcendental. It is the condition of impossibility, hence the fact that Ponges’ poem is an attempt to enact the impossible. As such the Other to come is the transcendental structure of the act of invention. The act of concept creation is thus impossible because of this problem of the never present infinite Other to come. As soon as it arrives it has no longer the structure of the transcendental Other, that Other to come that makes possible the very act of performative invention. There is only the affirmation of the performative act and also the role of deconstruction which offers both an affirmation of the performative act as well as rules for its repetition, structures and conventions that open a future to performativities. Invention, then, is aporetic, never here, never present, never something you can do, since it is an impossible capacity, but something you can affirm and perform as a capacity for impossibility (hence the relation to death, presumably Heideggerian, as the possibility of my impossibility).

Deleuze is not going to hold any great hostility to this argument but equally a Deleuzian conceptual creation is not effected by this aporia of the transcendental Other to come. In a sense both Derrida and Deleuze understand the doubled role of the invention or creation, the way it both establishes and enacts itself, the way it is a self-genesis. For
Deleuze this is what is meant by a nomadic distribution, where space is created by the
distribution of points within it, not pre-existing as a layer upon which points are then
placed. Concept creation, for Deleuze, is thus a process of enacting a series of
connections, birthing an operative, because functional, assemblage that produces thought
as much as it is produced by thought. Moreover this does not have to be something that
has to be capable of being used by any tradition or pre-existing body of thought. Each
concept creates its own plane of immanence which connects to but is distinct and
dependent from any other. Crucially this involves a different relation to the non-
philosophical. This can be seen when Deleuze talks of Spinoza and the way he creates a
plane of immanence and a series of concepts which will produce thought and affect the
reader, even if they don’t understand those concepts philosophically (N;140, 165-166).
This is not a reduction of philosophy to a fiction or a form or writing but is an
acknowledgement of the power of philosophy to produce affects of sense.

This difference in dynamic or tendency can be seen as one of a difference in emphasis
with regard to the grounds of affirmation. For Derrida affirmation is, as it were, in the
face of the future, it is an affirmation of the capacity for impossibility and for the future
that must be reinvented as the always to come. For Deleuze the affirmation is of the
depths of the present in what he calls the passive synthesis and of the pure past that is
always opening the present onto the future. This, again, runs against the line of Patton’s
argument in Future politics where Deleuze and Derrida are brought together with regard
to the affirmation of a temporal future or ‘to come’\textsuperscript{81}. Tamsin Lorraine also offers a
conjoined reading of Deleuze and Derrida with regard to the issue of time\textsuperscript{82}. She notes,
however, that ‘\textit{Derrida shies away from any ontologising definition}’\textsuperscript{83} just as Patton had
earlier noted that the internal connection between Derrida and Deleuze with regard to
their attitude to time was mediated by an ontological move on the part of Deleuze\textsuperscript{84}.

This is still too abstract or perhaps not abstract enough. It is a map or diagram with
which to try and distinguish vectors or lines of development, tendencies of thought.
Another way of understanding the difference in dynamic, another net as it were, has been
suggested by Daniel Smith, drawing on the work of Giorgio Agamben\textsuperscript{85}. This describes
the difference as one that lies between two trajectories of French thought, one focussed
on the problem of immanence and the other on the problem of transcendence, which both
pass through Heidegger. The immanent line of thought passes back through Nietzsche to
Spinoza. Foucault and Deleuze are cited as the key examples of this trajectory whereas
Levinas and Derrida are cited as examples of the transcendence trajectory which goes
back through Husserl to Kant. The notion of concept creation can be seen as mediated
through these varying tendencies with regard the concept of time, the relation to the
future and the ontological presuppositions of the philosophy. In order to explore these

\begin{footnotes}
\item Tamsin Lorraine, \textit{Living a time out of joint} in \textit{Between Deleuze and Derrida}, pp.30-45
\item ibid, p.31
\item Patton, op.cit, p.22
\item Daniel W. Smith, \textit{Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence} in \textit{Between Derrida and Deleuze};
\textbf{pp.46-66}
\end{footnotes}
differences further I want to explore the ‘basic tendency’ or underlying ontology or Deleuze, explore what I want to call the ‘oceanic’ element of Deleuzian thought.
Chapter 5

The force of life - life as relations of force

‘It is not clarity that is desirable but force. Clarity is of no importance because nobody listens and nobody knows what you mean no matter what you mean, nor how clearly you mean what you mean. But if you have vitality enough of knowing enough of what you mean, somebody and sometime and sometimes a great many will have to realise that you know what you mean and so they will agree that you mean what you know, what you know you mean, which is as near as anybody can come to understanding any one’

Gertrude Stein, Four in America

If Deleuze can be identified as a philosopher who is outside of the traditional representational models of philosophy it is worth being clear as to quite how he is outside these models. Merleau-Ponty, for example, also put forward a model of philosophical thought which understands the act of philosophy as an essentially creative one. In the preface to The phenomenology of perception he argues that ‘the phenomenological world is not the bringing to explicit expression of a pre-existing being, but the laying down of being. Philosophy is not the reflection of a pre-existing truth but, like art, the act of bringing truth into being’\(^{86}\). This sounds like it’s an account of philosophy as a creative process. Given the apparent similarity of the process of philosophical activity which both Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze put forward one question is posed which will be worth exploring; in what way does Deleuze differ from the phenomenological school of thought?\(^{87}\)

Despite some apparent similarities with phenomenology on a cursory inspection, the Deleuzian account of philosophy differs radically, one notable difference lies in the Deleuzian rejection of the centrality of the I, or the subject. Phenomenology is commonly thought to begin with the idea of intentionality, that is, with the idea that all consciousness is consciousness of something. For Deleuzian philosophy there is an emphasis on the idea of philosophy doing something or of philosophy being productive of something. Whilst not yet directly touching upon a difference as to the understanding of consciousness, this difference between consciousness of … and productive of … gives a clue as to the direction of the difference Deleuze has with phenomenology. For phenomenology, consciousness is a directedness, whereas in Deleuze, whilst a directed

\(^{86}\) Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, p.xx

\(^{87}\) John Protevi distinguishes between Derrida and Deleuze by claiming that it is in fact Derrida who may be described as a ‘post-phenomenologist’ whereas he describes Deleuze as a ‘historical-libidinal materialist’ – cf, the essay Love in Between Deleuze and Derrida, p.183. This distinction fits in with his argument in Political Physics that Derrida sits in a preliminary or propadeutic role to Deleuze. In this sense both Derrida and Deleuze have to pass beyond phenomenology but cannot be distinguished simply by this move. Protevi’s distinction is useful in that, within Deleuze’s writing phenomenology is not even on the horizon for the vast majority of the time, which is initially surprising given the environment Deleuze developed in. The lack of phenomenological references in fact points to an even greater distance from phenomenology than that found in Derrida.
nature of consciousness may at times be noted, this directedness is less important than the produced nature of consciousness. We may put this Deleuzian difference from phenomenology in the form of a question that would be directed to phenomenology; if consciousness is directedness, what is it that produces this directedness?

Phenomenology suffers, under a Deleuzian perspective, from a blind-spot when it comes to consciousness which it has placed as the primary point from which to orientate philosophical investigation. Merleau-Ponty, in the same passage from which I have already quoted, says that ‘whatever the subtle changes of meanings which have ultimately brought us, as a linguistic acquisition, the word and concept of consciousness, we enjoy direct access to what it designates’\(^{88}\). In this he acknowledges that there may well be a genesis, as it were, to consciousness even if this genesis or history is located inside meaning itself. Simultaneously with acknowledging the concept of consciousness may have changed he dismisses such a genesis as something irrelevant since ‘we have direct access’ to consciousness itself. This idea of direct access puts forward a privileged consciousness and this privileging of consciousness is difficult to sustain. Merleau-Ponty, whose philosophy shows a complex mixture of a phenomenology of consciousness and an acute awareness to embodiment and sensibility, notes only a page earlier in his preface that the priority of consciousness can never be absolute when he addresses the Husserlian reduction. This reduction is, in effect, an always open movement, incomplete in principle, because ‘there is no thought which embraces all our thought’\(^{89}\). Phenomenology therefore appears to face a limit that is irreducible but what is the nature of this irreducibility?

For Merleau-Ponty, the irreducibility is the fact that ‘the world is not what I think but what I live through’\(^{90}\). The innovation of phenomenology is its’ realisation of this fact and thus whilst consciousness is central to phenomenology it goes hand in hand with a world, intimately bound in with the experience of the world. The aim of phenomenology then is to regain access to this intimacy. The directedness of consciousness can thus be seen as a necessary result of this intimate interweaved nature. Merleau-Ponty argues that if phenomenology were to be identified solely on the basis of intentionality then ‘there is nothing new in that. Kant showed in the Refutation of Idealism, that inner perception is impossible without outer perception’\(^{91}\). The real gain that phenomenology makes, for Merleau-Ponty, is not in the idea of intentionality, which he associates with Kant, but with the idea of the phenomenological reduction. This process opens up the ‘Weltlichkeit der Welt, what causes the world to be the world’\(^{92}\). It enables us to bring forward the facticity of the world. It specifically enables a distinction to be drawn in the notion of intentionality between act intentionality and operative intentionality. The former, the intentionality of Kant’s version of directed consciousness, can connect the consciousness to the world but only operative intentionality can produce ‘the natural and

\(^{88}\) Merleau-Ponty, op.cit, p.xv  
\(^{89}\) ibid, p.xiv  
\(^{90}\) ibid, p.xvi  
\(^{91}\) ibid, p.xvii  
\(^{92}\) ibid
antepredicative unity of the world and of our life”93. This notion of operative intentionality is vital to the way in which phenomenology claims to present the world to us ‘for our ratification’94 rather than establish truths about the world. Indeed Dorion Cairns suggests that this ‘presentation to us’ is perhaps the most important element within Husserlian phenomenology. He argues that the ‘fundamental methodological principle of Husserlian phenomenology’ may be formulated as ‘no opinion is to be accepted as philosophical knowledge unless it is seen to be adequately established by observation of what is seen as itself given ‘in person’.95

There is, then, something of a limit, an irreducible limit, to our knowledge but this limit is specifically addressed through the phenomenological method. The epoche or reduction, the bracketing of the natural attitude – at its most simplest – enables us to rework our relationship to this epistemological limit. It also converts the limit into an epistemological limit and phenomenology’s development into the work of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty comes about in part through an attempt to grapple with the problem of meaning, primarily reworked as something that can be shown as much as something that can be said. For Merleau-Ponty this is expressed in the tragic phrase, that ‘because we are in the world, we are condemned to meaning’96.

It is around the difference between the shown and the said, between the visible and the articulable, that the most sustained discussion of phenomenology takes place within the work of Deleuze. It takes place during the course of Deleuze’s work on Foucault. Like many of Deleuze’s works on other thinkers, this book forms a sort of peculiar history of thought or a thinker, converting the conceptual structures of the original into a strange hybrid formation, a sort of Deleuze-Foucault, created by the infamous method of ‘immaculate conception’(N; 6). In distinguishing between Foucault on the one hand and Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty on the other, despite their similarities around the concept of ‘the fold’, Deleuze focuses on Foucault’s break with phenomenology, particularly with phenomenology ‘in the ‘vulgar’ sense of the term; with intentionality’ (F; 108).

The directedness of intentionality is what is primarily rejected. The way Deleuze approaches this is to read the rejection as located around the notion of learning and an implicit humanism that is not overcome within either Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty. Despite the intention to go beyond any ‘psychologism or naturalism’ phenomenology invents a new one – i.e.; it breaks with one view of the human to replace it with another. In particular this can be seen through the fact that phenomenology appears as a new form of learning. It provides a model for a new sort of human experience – the ‘savage experience’ – and a method by which we can learn of this experience.

93 ibid, pxviii
94 ibid
95 Dorion Cairns, An approach to phenomenology, p.224 – in Kersten and Zaner, Phenomenology: continuation and criticism – essays in memory of Dorion Cairns, pp.223-238
96 Merleau-Ponty, op.cit, p.xix
The two elements that seem important to this argument are *unity* and *meaning*. The way in which a new human is posited by phenomenology is through restoring a synthesised consciousness and a signifying world – that is, a unity of the self and a meaningful world. In contrast to the syntheses and signification posed by phenomenology, Deleuze argues that the attempt it makes to ‘place things in parenthesis’ (F; 109) ought to ‘push it beyond words and phrases towards statements, and beyond things and states of things towards visibilities’ (F; ibid). Statements and visibilities form a doubled pre-individual realm of the given, understood as a double ‘there is’; there is language and there is light. It is these pre-individual realms that are opened up by statements and visibilities.

Statements and visibilities are distinguished from words/phrases and things/states of things by not referring back to anything but rather exhibiting or evidencing a realm of existence. Thus they are not representational objects within an isomorphic matrix but ontological in themselves. The duality of these two forms opens a ‘non-relation’ between seeing and speaking – ‘*all intentionality collapses in the gap that opens up between these two monads*’ (F; ibid). Deleuze refers to this difference posited by Foucault, this doubling of the visible and the articulable, as a move that converts phenomenology into epistemology. ‘Seeing and speaking means knowing’ claims Deleuze and these two realms are irreducible, thus neither seeing nor speaking can make any claims on the other realms. Thus speaking is not seeing, nor vice versa. Both are knowing but knowledge is in two forms – hence neither a synthesis of intention nor any unified meaning is possible. ‘Knowledge is irreducibly double, since it involves speaking and seeing, language and light, which is the reason there is no intentionality’ (F; ibid).

Deleuze argues that this doubled nature of the visible and articulable was the motor pushing the ‘surpassing’ of intentionality in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, predominantly realised through the notion of ‘the fold’. ‘*From intentionality to the fold, from being to Being, from phenomenology to ontology*’ (F; 110). The folding that is developed from the interrogation of the irreducibly doubled nature of the visible and the articulable is seen as an ontology because ‘*Being was precisely the fold it made with being; and the unfolding of Being …was not the opposite of the fold but the fold itself, the pivotal point of the Open, the unity of the unveiling-veiling*’ (F; ibid). However, despite a similar concept of the fold, for Deleuze there is a strong difference between the concept as employed by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty and as employed by Foucault.

‘...according to Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty, the fold of being surpasses intentionality only to found the latter in a new dimension; this is why the Visible or the Open does not give us something to see without also providing something to speak, since the fold will constitute the Self-seeing element of sight if it also constitutes the Self-speaking element of language, to the point where it is the same world that speaks itself in language and sees itself in sight. In Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Light opens up a speaking no less than a seeing, as if signification haunted the visible which in turn murmured meaning. This cannot be so in Foucault, for whom the light-Being refers only to visibilities, and language-Being to statements; the fold will not be able to refound an intentionality, since
the latter disappears in the disjunction between the two parts of a knowledge that is never intentional’ (F; 111)

The irreducibly doubled nature of the visible and the articulable prevents any notion of a single object or subject, thereby preventing any singular relation of intentionality. It produces a ‘fold’ in Being and knowledge of Being must therefore grapple with the ‘non-relation’ between these two forms, both of which ‘has its own objects and subjects’ (F; ibid). Being, lying ‘between two forms’ (F; 112) is thus known through a form of interlacing or interweaving. Horst Ruthrof points out that this interweaving as a method of knowing is found in Derrida also, in what he calls ‘a heterologous approach of entrelacement, after Plato’s dialectical art of weaving or the ‘science of symphloke’’ ⁹⁷. Knowledge, which as a part of Being Deleuze names knowledge-Being, is necessarily bound into the fact that Being is doubled and interlacing is thus a method for establishing the non-relation of the Visible and the Articulable. Yet this ‘is still not the fold of Being, but rather the interlacing of its two forms’ (F; ibid) Whilst Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty have managed to go beyond the singular objects of intentionality and in so doing have surpassed the principal limit of phenomenology, they too have, for Deleuze-Foucault, fallen back into what in effect is a new attempt to restore unity. The irreducibility of the Visible and the Articulable posits two orders of Being in such a way that the visible cannot be made to speak nor can speech begin to see. The implication is that it is not the same world that ‘that speaks itself in language and sees itself in sight’.

There is a series of moves here, from the initial ‘bracketing’ of the phenomenological reduction, through the claim of the difference in the forms of Being that constitute the Visible and the Articulable to a method for dealing with this difference of Being. Deleuze claims that ‘everything takes place as though Foucault were reproaching Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty for going too quickly’ (F; ibid). By using the method of the Platonic symploke, by weaving together the two forms, the difference is lost, dropped beneath the being of the forms, casting Being back into oblivion. The move that Deleuze sees as critical rests on approaching the two forms more slowly, resisting their pull and acknowledging an interlocking that is a ‘non-relation’, that is irreducible, and asking what the nature of this non-relation must be. A third element then needs to be brought into the diagram, a third element that must be informal. The non-relation of the two irreducible forms of the Visible and the Articulable occurs because of a third element that must not constitute a new form, for this would merely multiply the irreducible forms. The ‘double capture’ of ‘knowledge-Being’, Deleuze claims, ‘could not be created between two irreducible forms if the interlocking of opponents did not flow from an element that was itself informal, a pure relation between forces that emerges in the irreducible separation of forms’ (F; ibid).

It is this ‘relation between forces’ that is critical. It is around the notion of ‘force’ that Deleuze breaks with or rather distinguishes himself from phenomenology. He also

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⁹⁷ Horst Ruthrof; Pandora and Occam – on the limits of language and literature; p.96 – Ruthrof footnotes his claim about symploke by reference to Jacques Derrida; Dissemination.; p.122
claims Foucault as an ally in this process. The move to force is presented as a transcendental move, echoing Kantian formulas of ‘conditions of possible experience’. The informal element is the ‘source of the battle or the condition for its possible existence. This is the strategic domain of power, as opposed to the static domain of knowledge’ (F; 112). What is curious, however, is that the two irreducible forms are said to engage in a struggle or ‘battle’ and that it is this struggle that needs the conditioning realm of force. It would seem that anything that might be described as a battle cannot simultaneously be said to exhibit an irreducible non-relation – the combatants are engaged, within the battle, in what might be claimed to be the most basic relation of all. The battle, however, must be seen as what occurs within knowledge-Being, within the attempt to know the Visible and the Articulable and the conditioning realm of force is not a condition of possible experience but is described explicitly as a condition of possible existence. Force is claimed by Deleuze to be a condition of the possible existence of the struggle to know the two irreducible forms of the Visible and the Articulable.

This gesture, to a necessary ‘third element’ is something that can be found in various places within Deleuze’s work. For example, in his attempt to develop a concept of ‘expression’ within the work of Spinoza and Leibniz, he opens his text with the claim that ‘we confuse substance and attribute, attribute and essence, essence and substance, as long as we fail to take into account the presence of a third term linking each pair’ (EPS; 27). This third term enables a connection to be established between each pairing, forming a series of triads (EPS; 28). Whilst in the book on Spinoza this third term is expression itself, in his reading of Foucault the third term is primarily that of force. Force, of course, is a notoriously abstract term, ranging from a quantitatively measurable physical relation to a qualitative aesthetic sensory description. In Foucault it refers to the outside (F; 113). It is explicitly referred back to the Nietzschean concept of the ‘will to power’ and Foucault’s relation to Heidegger, notably around the concept of the fold, is mediated, according to Deleuze, by the concept of Nietzschean force98.

With this notion of force in place Deleuze outlines three specific forms that Being takes within Foucault’s work – knowledge, power and self. Each of these three forms is historical, by which it is meant that there are no universal conditions by which the three forms are constituted (F; 114). This implies that analysis must proceed with a historical and pragmatic orientation, attempting to look beneath the immediate forms to the varying conditions and then begin a process of outlining these conditions and the changes they have undergone. Firstly this means that ‘the conditions are not ‘apodictic’ but problematic’ (F; ibid) and secondly ‘the question of the new’ will form a central place in the analytical tools we use since outlining the moment of a new form will be a key strategy in developing an understanding of the conditions historical development. This is carried out through the development of diagrams of relation, diagrams which aim to reveal not the static relation of the objects under consideration but the movements of the

98 Force as the outside ‘accounts for the importance of Foucault’s declaration that Heidegger always fascinated him, but that he could understand him only by way of Nietzsche (and not the other way round)’ (F; 113)
conditions of these objects (F; 85). It is this focus on conditions that moves the work Foucault is doing so close to philosophical analysis of concepts, whilst fully acknowledging itself to be an analysis of praxis. It is, Deleuze claims, praxis that ‘constitutes the sole continuity between past and present, or, conversely, the way in which the present explains the past’ (F; 115) and this involves asking after the new modes, functions and types of life that can be found.

The introduction of force as the outside is what primarily brings in the need for thought. The specific arrangements of forms of knowledge, power or the self constitute what Deleuze calls strata, what we can think of as sedimented layers (F; 47). This refers to what we might call ‘naturalised forms’, the elements that would constitute for phenomenology the ‘natural attitude’. This is the specific horizons we are caught within, where it is common to assume the elements of the natural attitude to be universal, a-historical and eternal. The initial reduction of phenomenology took the first step in breaking the implicit presuppositions we live within, posing the fact that we necessarily live within a particular natural attitude. Foucault historicised this natural attitude, Deleuze converts them into what he calls strata, and both Deleuze and Foucault then attempt to develop an ontology in which a motor force, a more primary dynamic category, can be explored, primarily under the name of the outside, or force.

As I have already mentioned, force is a notoriously vague and difficult concept to either define or understand. Its use, therefore, often marks a sort of blank spot, a place where a variable is placed into the argument that can best be understood in terms of its function. Whilst it is possible to ask what force is this will lead rapidly into a definition which, for example, relies upon a notion of power or capacity. Force is measured in various ways and according to varying standards but exceeds the domains of its immediate application. It might be said, then, that it is essentially a metaphorical concept – that we take a literal notion of force such as the force of the punch or the force of the hammer, assess it as a measurement of its power and then metaphorically apply this to realms as diverse as painting, theatre, literature or even philosophy. The difficulty, quite simply, is that force is simply something we refer to when we attempt to assess or measure the power of an object in a specific situation. Power, unfortunately, gives us no way into a more rigorous definition since it too immediately slips into a flux whereby it is determined as a value in terms of the specific situation of observation and assessment. Against this vague concept of force, however, Deleuze attempts to extract from Nietzsche a more rigorous conceptualisation of force.

It is worth remembering the claim that Deleuze operates a functionalism. This is distinct from any attempt at analysis, whether it is reductive or otherwise, whereby we break up the object into smaller, and more manageable and definable elements. It poses instead a sort of methodology, whereby the object is taken as a process, with no simple a-temporal fixity or spatially immediate presence. This is a sort of methodology because it is the barest methodology possible. Operating on the basis of continual fluidity it attempts to account for any apparent object as states, between which there will be essentially sortal or
familial correspondences within a more general ontology of becoming. This ontology is essentially fluidic and the nearest analogy is no longer chemistry but perhaps geology, oceanography and meteorology. These disciplines operate their analysis on the movements of various sectors of the planet’s whole, constructing models which operate within radically different temporalities and with radically different raw conceptual tools of analysis. Being is no longer understood, as in physics or chemistry, at a molecular level with a linear direction of determination from molecular to molar but is instead predominantly seen as a molar process within which the molecular level is still at play but never determining.

Within this framework the concept of force is critical. To attempt any sort of description of processes involves analysing movements from state to state, these movements being determined by the forces at work. Force, however, is an essentially pragmatic concept, impossible to see outside the example. It is a concept that is instantiated in the example but never as a property of the object. Foucault argues, according to Deleuze, against power being the property of any class within society – ‘it is less a property than a strategy…it is exercised rather than possessed’ (F; 25). Force never exists, then, as a property of an object.

If, then, force is inextricable from its instantiation it is also what underpins this instantiation. Deleuze claims in the opening pages of the Nietzsche book that ‘The object itself is force, expression of a force’ (NP; 6). The whole of the rest of the Nietzsche book is, in one way, an attempt to explicate this notion of a self-generating dynamic category and a model or method by which we can understand it. In very broad terms this divides into a two-fold diagram of force. On the one side there is the ‘ontological’, where Being is nothing but relations of forces. On the other side there is the ‘epistemological’, whereby necessity and law arise from the affirmation of these relations. The relations of forces constitute a radical empiricism, an intimately contingent notion of Being such that it can be named chance. The affirmation of this chance constitutes the law, the necessity of law. Necessity is the affirmation of chance, law the result of contingency (NP; 26, F; 117).

Described in such broad terms, of course, the model Deleuze develops in Nietzsche and Philosophy has little force in itself. What motivation lies behind the model of forces, relations of forces and the affirmation of these relations? Deleuze is understandable only on the basis of the fact that the model he develops is one that arises from a basic empiricism. The radical difference in the empiricism of Deleuze, however, lies in this idea that ‘the object itself is force’. We begin, therefore, from positing simple objects as the fundamental element of Being but these simple objects are no longer discrete atoms but rather are forces themselves. There are forces. There are only forces and everything else – objects, sense, knowledge, history, time, space – all arises from this basic premise; there are forces. It is on the basis of this that Deleuze attempts to develop the ‘superior empiricism’ (NP; 50), an empiricism of becoming. From this we can begin to understand what Deleuze means when he says that he has always been a vitalist. This does not mean
that he poses a mysterious ‘vital force’ that lives like a ghost in the machine but that becoming, the movement and changes of forces, underlies all of Being and all of Deleuze’s conceptualisation of Being. Being is Becoming; this is the central thought into which Deleuze plunges in an attempt to develop his own thought.

The difficulty with any thought of Becoming is obvious in that a notion of constant change makes any form of identity problematic and with it any thought of knowledge. What is it that is known if it is nothing but something that is changing? How can we know the change takes place if we don’t know the thing in the first place that is changing or has changed? At the heart of this difficulty, as can be seen in common formulations of the Heraclitean paradox, is a notion of identity or ‘the same’. Becoming appears in philosophy at its birth in this strange form of an unthinkable thought, posing almost as a mysticism of Being. Assuming that we do not want to halt at some mystical point of unknowing where we merely repeat, mantra-like, ‘Being is Becoming – All is Change’, the primary problem is to attempt a thought of Becoming. How is it possible to think Becoming?

The Heraclitean paradox depends upon identity – the fact that it is the same river – and so there are at least two routes open if we want to pursue a thought of Becoming. The first route, as Michael Clark outlines, draws on the fact that we can complicate the notion of identity by giving it a four-dimensional character, that is, by allowing for continuity over time. What Heraclitus identifies as the ‘same river’ that it is impossible to step into in fact relies upon a temporal simultaneity that is logically impossible. It is obvious that we cannot simultaneously step into the same river at two different times but entirely logical that we can step into the same river at two different times since the difference lies not in the river itself but in the times of the stepping-in. Thus the paradox is reduced by assuming it to be the product of an ill-thought out concept of temporality.

This route, however, then needs to give an account of identity over time, which is quite reasonably seen as the problem that Heraclitus’ paradox was posing in the first place. The paradox simply re-appears producing a new problem. For example, the difficulty of identity over time can be seen if we suggest that there is a medium of time within which identity resides. If this temporal medium is capable of analysis into moments, discrete moments of time that we call the present, we will merely invoke Zeno’s paradox of the Arrow. Hobbes formulation of the paradox known as the ‘Ship of Theseus’ is one way in which we can see the paradoxical relationship of parts to the whole within time played out explicitly as a challenge to identity.

This first route out of the Heraclitean paradox can be seen to become rapidly embroiled in the sort of logical paradoxes taught to undergraduate philosophy students. The second route out of the paradox, however, is to re-work the paradox within a wider scheme of

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99 cf. Michael Clarke, Paradoxes from A – Z, pp.77-79
100 ibid, p.7-8
101 ibid, p.184-185
conceptual structures. This can be seen as taking a position along the following lines; given certain premises about identity, sameness and change we inevitably end in paradox; therefore the paradox arises from the nature of these premises. This does not stop the paradox from still having its force – it does indeed block lines of thought – but it does see it as a block to a particular line of thought. It also, implicitly, suggests that there are other lines of thought. This is the route of strategic thinking, whereby each line of thought is, as it were, a strategy of thought encumbent with its own paradoxical limits as well as conceptual advantages.

Strategic thinking is essentially experimental. It employs, fundamentally, a technique of variable questions. Different questions produce and arise from different strategies of thought, creating variable problems. In Nietzsche and Philosophy, for example, Deleuze cites the example of the difference between the question ‘what is…?’ and ‘who is…?’ with reference to Socrates’ investigation of Beauty. Deleuze argues that there is a new form of the question in Nietzsche and that ‘from this form of question there derives a method’ (NP; 78). ‘What is…?’ is the form in which metaphysics constructs the question of essence (NP; 75) constituting a ‘particular way of thinking’ (NP; 76). Plato, moreover, wants ‘to oppose this form of the question to other forms’ (NP; ibid). From this form of the question there comes a necessary opposition between essence and appearance, between Being and Becoming. Thus we can see that for Deleuze this strategic thought that takes shape in the metaphysical (Platonic) form of the question relates immediately to the very structure of the permissible ontology. An ontology of Becoming is necessarily paradoxical within this strategy and hence illogical but this aporetic production may result from a conceptual blunder and at the least can be held as responsible for the production of the aporias. The aporias resulting from the Socratic dialogues thus result from the form of the question and do not reflect discoveries about reality that the questions lead us to. The only conclusions we can draw is that the Socratic method produces aporias. For Deleuze, therefore, ‘this Socratic method does not seem to be fruitful; it dominates the so-called ‘aporetic’ dialogues, where nihilism is king’ (NP; ibid).

It seems, therefore, reasonable to follow Hugh Tomlinson who points out in his translators’ notes to the book Nietzsche and philosophy, that the issue of the form of the question is central to Deleuzes’ reading of Nietzsche (NP; 206n3). The ‘who’ or the ‘what’ - and the methods derived from strategies based upon these different questions – form the key to understanding what Deleuze calls a symptomatology (NP; 3, 75, 78). It is through this symptomatological method that we can begin to analyse force.

I want to recall the motivation for force at this point. In terms of the work on Foucault it is because the difference between the visible and the articulable necessitates some other thing within which the non-relation of these two orders can be somehow situated. In terms of the method or form of the question it is because the variable form of the question produces variable results for thought. In both situations it is a two fold movement that is

102 It is also central to the reading of Plato – cf. DR p.188
seen; firstly, a radical differentiation – an irreducibility – followed by a move to posit another element within which this irreducibility is articulated. This other element is force and it forms an oceanic fluidity of changing states, continuous movements and the flows of various and variable currents. Force evokes this oceanic element. The ocean can form an image of the Deleuzian philosophy and I would suggest it as a way of attempting to characterise his method and approach to thought\textsuperscript{103}. I would say that the Deleuzian philosophy offers the difference of the ocean to a predominantly land-locked philosophical practice. It offers, as it were, the element of water to a discipline too weighted down by the element of earth\textsuperscript{104}.

The oceanic element is something that may not at first seem immediately apparent in reading Deleuze’s works but there is one example that can point out its importance. After Deleuze’s monographs during the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, including the works on Hume, Kant, Bergson, Spinoza and Nietzsche, the two primary works of his philosophical output where produced, \textit{The Logic of Sense} and \textit{Difference and Repetition}. Deleuze has commented on these works himself, noting that they differ from his later texts, notably the two part work \textit{Capitalism and Schizophrenia}, consisting of \textit{Anti-Oedipus} as part 1 and \textit{A Thousand Plateaus} as part 2, by having a more ‘academic baggage’ and general scholarly style. Whilst I wouldn’t want to necessarily ascribe particular periods to Deleuze’s work, in the way that Heidegger is divided between the early work of \textit{Being and Time} and the later works following his ‘turn to language’ originating in the \textit{Introduction to Metaphysics}, I would say that there is an obvious difference in the intended audience of the different works. The \textit{Logic of Sense} and \textit{Difference and Repetition} appear to be aimed at a more academically orientated audience whereas the two works that form \textit{Capitalism and Schizophrenia} are most definitely aimed at a more popular audience. In both of these, shall we say, more academic books, however, there is a common metaphor used and this is the metaphor of the ocean as a sign of being. In the \textit{Logic of Sense} this can be found in the 25\textsuperscript{th} series on Univocity (the book consists of 34 ‘series’ rather than chapters). Referring to the thesis of the univocity of being, Deleuze claims that ‘the univocity of Being signifies that Being is Voice, that it is said, and that it is said in one and the same ‘sense’ of everything about which it is said’ (LOS; 179). This Voice then merges with what Deleuze calls the ‘disjunctive synthesis’ to form

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{\textit{the highest affirmation. It is the eternal return itself, or – as we have seen in the case of the ideal game – the affirmation of all chance in a single moment, the unique cast for all throws, one Being and only\textsuperscript{105} for all forms and all times, a single instance for all that}}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{103} In suggesting that the Deleuzian philosophy is constructed on an oceanic model there is a clear echo of the Leibnizian concept of matter, developed in line with his law of continuity – cf. Leibniz, \textit{Preface to New Essays in Discourse on metaphysics and other essays}, p.59

\textsuperscript{104} An interesting texts in this respect is that by Luce Irigaray, \textit{Marine lover of Friedrich Nietzsche}, in particular the first section/essay entitled \textit{Speaking of immemorial waters}, pp.3-73.

\textsuperscript{105} The translation by Constantin V.Boundas gives ‘\textit{one Being and only for all forms and all times’ which appears to be a typographical error, the passage presumably reading ‘\textit{one Being and only one for all forms and all times’ (addition in bold)
exists, a single phantom for all the living, a single voice for every hum of voices and every drop of water in the sea.’ (LOS; 180)

The primary image in this passage is of course the Voice and not an ocean. It is worth comparing this passage, however, with the final words in Difference and Repetition.

‘A single and same voice for the thousand-voiced multiple, a single and same Ocean for all the drops, a single clamour of Being for all beings; on condition that each being, each drop and each voice has reached the state of excess …’ (DR; 304)

Although having slightly different formulations and concerns, the two passages appear to show a very strong family likeness arising from the conception of univocity that is being motivated in each of them. The Ocean, however, has had less immediate presence within the study of Deleuze even though it sits alongside the Voice of univocity as an equal factor in the descriptions Deleuze gives.

What the Ocean gives us is a model of reality that works from a very different intuitive image. The land and the places on it, including the place of our bodies, distances and separates through the visibility of the horizon and reference points. The Ocean still possesses a land with its reference points but its horizon is radically different, contained as it is within the medium of water. The fluidity both changes the relation of light and sound as well as physical effects such as gravity and weight. Our bodies radically change when placed in water, the world becoming more and more alien the further into this medium we dive. The film ‘The Abyss’ is one of numerous cultural expressions of this radical alien nature of the Oceanic depths. More interestingly, the works of H.P.Lovecraft, which are filled with strange creatures of ancient times and slippery becomings, rely upon the Ocean as the residence for Cthulhu, one of the central members of the mythology. Deleuze’s own knowledge and interest in Lovecraft is clear but the implications become most apparent when connected with the Oceanic image.

The Ocean is heavy with connections. Distance is not an absence but rather a space. Of course, we know through science that the world is full of chemicals and currents and unseen atmospheres which we could not exist without but these things are beneath the visible in the realm of the Air. The Oceanic realm is, in fact, more visible than the Air realm. These metaphors, of course, are more than that. They reflect ways of knowing, ways of seeing and thinking the world. We can see the world as an Oceanic mixture of atmospheric chemicals and pressures which simply extends itself into the Ocean proper or we can view the world as an Air filled emptiness of clarity and distinction within which the realm of the Ocean proper is a world of otherness and strange creatures. The difficulty comes in seeing the alien nature of the Ocean proper as revealing the thing from which it appears to be alien. If we are to embrace the Oceanic model of existence, as the chemists and physicists would no doubt advocate when dealing with the realities of atmospheres, then the Oceanic model of the alien depths is in fact the most productive.
In thought, too, there is an atmosphere in which we live, a way of thinking that goes beyond the simple form of the question but which the variable form of the question reveals. The thought of force is like the Oceanic horror of Lovecraftian literature because it pursues a thought of involvement. The teeming crawling chaos of Lovecraft produces its horror through a sense of closeness rather than distance. The creatures and characters of dread are both older than time itself and yet intimately current within our lives. Their presence is in a permanent periphery and the horror arises not specifically from encountering the dreaded creatures of the abyss – in fact, one rarely actually comes across any creature within Lovecraft’s stories. No, it is not an encounter of the kind where we meet someone on the street that is the cause of the fear; it is, rather, the encounter caused by a peripheral vision, a slipping into consciousness of an ‘always-already-here’ horror. This is the lurking horror and like Lovecraft’s literature, Deleuze’s philosophy involves us plunging into this lurking thought of becoming, of forces and of external relations that brings to the fore the subtle, sideways understanding of the world and Being.

The concept of a symptom can be put to work within thought. It implies, first of all, that there are things which thoughts’ point towards, things that lies below or behind or rather out of sight. This is not an order of being, a hierarchy of realities – the symptom is as real as the cause after all, perhaps more so for the patient. This is an order of visibility; the concept of symptoms allows us to construct particular understandings and pushes us to look for particular factors. Thus the concept of a symptom within philosophy pushes us to look at the causes and investigate the factors that lie hidden within specific and particular arguments. If we combine this symptomatology with the ontology of forces and the idea of conceptual personae we can easily derive a strategy of thought. Describe the character; investigate its aetiology; discover the forces.

Chapter 6

Problem fields and the character of an aporia

Philosophical problems are, unlike many problems, highly idiosyncratic in that each philosopher tends to feel the problems differently. The attempt has been made on numerous occasions to objectify, in some way, the list of philosophical problems but it is a premiss of my argument that philosophical problems are not capable of objective or final definition. Russell’s popular little text The problems of philosophy is a classic example of such an attempt and one which is capable of being clearly seen, because of Russell’s position within the history of philosophy, as a way of describing the problems of philosophy. To claim that Russell – or anyone – could in reality determine the list of philosophical problems, let alone determine the structure and content of these problems, is to fall into a partisanship that would be little more than dogmatism. Russell’s text is fascinating and still enormously interesting not because of its finality but because of the

106 Bertrand Russell, The problems of philosophy, Oxford, 1983. This was first published in 1912, before Russell developed his theory of logical atomism.
clarity with which it presents Russell’s problems of philosophy, which are still philosophical problems even though they are connected intimately with a proper name and a historical argumentative position. Rather than positing some sort of simple objective determinability, I would suggest that philosophical problems form on the junction between thought and experience and may even be said to form the junction itself between thought and experience. This is not an argument against there being any philosophical problems, merely one that suggests the problems of philosophy are not quite the same as the problems, say, of physics, or chemistry, or mathematics. There is something necessary about the philosopher in the philosophical problem, something that cannot, in truth, be removed.

Think for a moment of the difficulty of the philosophical problem within the practice of writing philosophy. The machinery of reading, teaching, writing and administrating needs an ability to process, efficiently, the books, essays, students and money that forms the material basis of the academic practice. It is inevitable, perhaps, that a desire for a certain degree of homogeneity is formed, currents identified, arguments delineated into specific forms. This is a little like processes of map-making. The field of any intellectual discipline is so vast in our present age that strategies and methods need to be adopted to enable a finite time and effort to produce results from what is, in effect, an infinite supply of words, books and students. The maps we make that take us from position one to position three in an argumentative chain form methods of classification and identification. ‘That argument over there is realist, this one nominalist, those two down the hall are probably existentialist but we can’t quite be sure because they might be absurdist.’ This is a basic image of an intellectual life that forms a sort of backdrop or gestalt of a practice or habit that might be termed ‘institutionalised’ and which constitutes, in part, the ability to speak of a philosophical ‘tradition’.

Against the tendency to institutionalisation, which I would suggest is a sort of ‘necessary drift’ of the material facts of intellectual life, there is the struggle of the intellectual to create their own voice, their own thought. In many ways this is as commonplace as the struggle of the infant to speak their own words and mimics a sort of language learning practice, or the practice of familiarisation with a place, whereby the abstract and codifiable content of a practice is taken in and digested, enabling a sense of the form of the whole to arise, from which new forms may be experimented with or drawn forth. This is, at least, a model or image of intellectual practice that I would suggest applies to philosophy. It also indicates one way of understanding the need for a resistance to thought that I discussed in Chapter 1, since without a resistance to this process only its sterile reproduction will occur.

107 Sande Cohen, Academia and the luster of capital. cf. Chapter 1 in particular for a hostile critical argument that places academia in an almost entirely negative light but which also forms an interesting polemical essay, highlighting the oddly self-contradictory status of academic texts that bemoan the strictures or institutions of academic life. I hope to tread carefully along this line of contradiction, aware both of what is said as well as where it is said and who says it to whom.
Given this model of philosophy as a sort of practice of learning to speak, how would we go about specifying philosophical problems? The problem arises because this seemingly reasonable model of philosophical practice prevents, in principle, any possibility of a simple specification of a philosophical problem. Each problem creates at the same time its own concepts or expression as well as its own ‘solution’. The way in which we describe a philosophical problem must rely upon the use of pre-philosophical or naïve-philosophical concepts and moreover betrays, in the method and form of the description, the presupposed concepts. The claim is that we all operate, as philosophers, with an image of thought within which problems and thoughts are expressed and thus only by having a doubled relation to this image of thought can we begin to return to a naïveté in our thought that is a naïveté of honesty rather than a naïveté of lack, of a lack of experience. There is a necessity for a radical honesty in radical thought. This radical honesty is in effect what is meant by naïveté. Deleuze declares at one point that ‘I wasn’t better than the others, but more naïve, producing a kind of art brut, so to speak, not the most profound but the most innocent’ (N; 89). What sort of innocence is being spoken of here? In the answer that Deleuze gives to his questioner, during which he brings up this idea of innocence, he also declares himself to be a philosopher and, moreover, one who feels no problem, no difficulty in his role. He says quite clearly that issues of the end of philosophy are not what interest him, in a deliberate attempt to separate from the French philosophy that owed so much to Heidegger. He is, he declares, a kind of empiricist who ‘sets out to present concepts directly’ (ibid).

At first sight this seems contradictory with the view that there is an image of thought implicit in thinking which necessitates the study of these images, what Deleuze called a noology, as a prolegomena to philosophy proper. If we take ‘directly’ to be without any mediation then this would be an obvious problem since one of the implications of the idea of the image of thought is that there is no ‘pure’ thought such that it could be presented ‘directly’. There is, however, a more useful way to understand this ‘direct presentation’ and that is through the idea of a performance or theatre of conceptual production. The concepts are presented directly in that they establish, by their presentation, the connections they make. The concepts directly connect elements in the presentation and it is through this that they become concepts. Direct presentation is in this instance not an unmediated or pure thought but the drama of the thought made up of and making the concepts.

Aside from this direct presentation there is another key element in Deleuzian concepts, which is their mobility. Witness, for example, what he says in the preface to *Difference and Repetition*: ‘I make, remake and unmake my concepts along a moving horizon, from an always decentred centre, from an always displaced periphery which repeats and differenciates them’ (DR; xxi). A mobile concept is mobile precisely because it is only capable of existing within a mobile or open structure. The paradoxes of Zeno surrounding mobility are taken inside the Deleuzian system in such a way that they are spread across all his works, infecting each argument and consequently each attempt to codify, summarise or analyse these arguments. The difficulty arises because mobile
concepts conflict with analytical practice giving the impression, therefore, to a discipline steeped in analytical practice, that the Deleuzian concepts are not really real\textsuperscript{108}.

As I described in Chapter 2, however, the concepts Deleuze employs are directed at resolving local situations, the cases. I have tried to show how this is part of a style of thinking, a general atmosphere or model that I called ‘Oceanic’ at the end of Chapter 5. This involves a resistance to sense being reduced to Signification, Manifestation or Denotation and instead locating it in an event. I then discussed how this event of sense can be understood through a model of forces and their combination as events and the way that the character of these events can be explored through a symptomatology. What I intend to do now is explore in more detail some specific concepts that Deleuze develops. In particular it seems that there is a need to understand what exactly a problem is within the Deleuzian framework.

The first thing I want to do is indicate a case which motivates the basic line of thought I’m working with. This is a case of an intuition or clue found in the ‘ordinary language’ use of the phrase ‘what’s the problem?’. The purpose of the particular formulation of the question is to investigate rather than define. It is a sign of curiosity, which can be either calm and objective or enthused and passionate. It is possible to imagine an argument in which one person shouts at the other ‘what’s the problem?’ but it is not possible to imagine the same situation in which the passionate cries of ‘what’s a problem?’ will be heard. Whilst in a sense this is a trivial point, in a rather grandiose way I would claim that the move from the question ‘what is a problem?’, with its almost transcendental attitude, towards the question ‘what is the problem?’ with its definitive particularity and investigate stance, marks a critical attitude change. It marks a change from asking about problems from a transcendent position to an asking about problems that is particularized, that is beginning from the real problems in front of us. In a philosophy such as Deleuze we can see that his understanding of ‘a problem’ can best be approached by understanding the way in which the concept of problems is constituted through the investigations of particular problems.

What's the problem? The situation in which the demand is suddenly made, 'what's the problem?' can be one which ranges from life threatening to innocuous but I would suggest that the question itself can operate as an impingement in the same way that the foreign language, as foreign, can operate as an impingement – we notice what previously went unnoticed. This does not, however, happen through the questions' grammatical status as an interrogative. Quite often, the question is more demand than question. It is

\textsuperscript{108} At the heart of this notion of ‘mobility’ is a Bergsonian intuitive method. Bergson argues perhaps the main problem with ‘traditional’ philosophy is its reliance on static states rather than mobile tendencies in its investigation of thought and the world. Mobility cannot be reduced to static states any more than a curve is made up of straight lines or life made up of chemical elements. The reliance on static states arises because the intellect is fundamentally practical. On this see the method Bergson tries to formulate in a series of 9 propositions in his \textit{Introduction to metaphysics}; pp.55-65. On mobility – ‘\textit{reality is mobility. Not things made, but things in the making, not self-maintaining states, but only changing states, exist’} – ibid, p.55
not its' interrogative grammar but its disruption, its noticing of the out of kilter, the not quite right, it is this impingement that makes 'what's the problem?' seem capable of at times being oddly hostile, peculiarly necessary in its asking. It is also a question that is forced by a new problem, by something occurring as a problem. This raises the question of how we might be said to meet a new problem or perhaps even discover one. This could be put as the issue of the encounter with the problem.

What is being impinged, however, is a screen of sense, a surface that shines with meanings that are suddenly scattered as a ripple spreads. In the case of impingement, we are looking at some form of disruption of precisely this sort of 'surface' or 'everydayness'. Of course, if a tradition was a 'way of speaking' and your own idiom was peculiar, odd, neologistic and hence disruptive, it could constitute merely through its incongruity an impingement, another ripple across a surface. In the situation of impingement we might be said to find, in some degree, the event of the problematic, a disruption of the surface. Ansell-Pearson suggests that 'Deleuze's transcendental empiricism goes beyond man, beyond the human experience towards concepts, not in order to lay the ground for all possible experience in general but rather to secure the experience of the peculiar in its peculiarity'. I would suggest that part of this process of showing or finding the peculiar comes about through the explicit or implicit asking of the question 'what's the problem?'. The suggestion will be that this question is itself not simply intellectual, not an exercise of mind, thought and language, reliant upon a subject or central ego in order to process itself but that this particular phrase identifies an attitude, an affect, a moment of singularity.

This is to emphasize, as it were, the style of thinking that I have been discussing in the first five chapters, where forces and affects, the general field of indeterminacy surrounding an object, are vital to philosophical inquiry. It is, however, only necessary to emphasise this point because when we look at DR we can in fact find Deleuze speaking as if he had a 'theory of problems', that is, as if he had asked or were answering the question 'what is a problem' as a general concept.

In Chapter IV of DR, Ideas And The Synthesis Of Difference, Deleuze gives considerable attention to the Idea and the problem. The argument in these passages take us through a Deleuzian Kant, a Kant who connects Ideas to problems or the problematic and who sets reason up as the producer of such problems through the ability it has to set limits to the practice of the understanding. The understanding, in its empirical blindness, would never constitute a solution since it could not constitute the problem to which the solution is the solution; 'for every solution presupposes a problem - in other words, the constitution of a unitary and systematic field'. (DR; 186) Importantly, although solutions require the formulation of the problematic field in which they are located, the problem itself has another life, both grounding the solutions and having what Deleuze calls 'an objective value'. The Idea has the problem as its object, Deleuze argues. The problem organizes the practices of the understanding, it co-ordinates them as a structure (DR; 183), giving

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109 Keith Ansell-Pearson, Deleuze and Philosophy, p.8.
specific researches of the understanding horizon and focus\textsuperscript{110}. ‘Such focal points or horizons are Ideas - in other words, problems as such - whose nature is at once both immanent and transcendent’. (DR; 169)

We are thus presented with a model in which Ideas have the problem or the problematic as object. Reason employs the Ideas and their concomitant problems to structure understanding and constitute a problem-solution field. If 'solutions' are found they do not effect the problem/idea by removing it since the Idea and its problem are the ground for solutions, indispensable even when solutions exist. At all times the problem, the solutions, and the Idea are in relation within the problematic field such that there is no possibility of simply 'giving' either questions or solutions independently. For Kant, the correct use of Ideas, the limits of the Ideas and their use by reason, is the critical moment of philosophy at which it can avoid 'false problems' arising from illegitimate employment of Ideas and problems. For Deleuze, however, it is not a matter of categorising true or false problems; rather it is a matter of grasping problems as productions of the true and the false (DR, 162)\textsuperscript{111}. Problems are in this sense not delineated by a transcendental philosophy but are rather the limits themselves of the activity of thought. I will come back to the productive nature of problems later but want to first draw out the notion of problematic fields.

We have, then, a notion of the problem as somehow a field, a range or horizon within which more localizable research questions might become 'contextualised', as it were, given a structure within which to operate. Quite what is meant by this notion of a problematic field however? Is it simply a suggestion of connections, a way of intertwining one problem with another, of suggesting that our thought needs to be more complex in its operation, needs to build up wider viewpoints in its work and acknowledge that a particular question is always part of a wider context? In part this is no doubt what is meant by Deleuze but that would be to reduce the notion of a problematic field to the rather trivial suggestion that we need to contextualise our questioning, a suggestion that would place Deleuze within a pragmatics whereby the specific context surrounding any particular question was determined on the basis of the role or use that question had, its motivational force or desire behind it. If it is assumed, for the sake of argument, that the problematic field does not equate to a simple and trivial notion of context what else might Deleuze be attempting to formulate with this idea?

One way into the Deleuzian problem is perhaps to ask ‘how do we learn’ which we can ask both in a general sense and, more specifically, with regard to Deleuze’s work itself. Here I want to draw on the image of the ocean outlined at the end of Chapter 5. To approach DR we need to think of it as a dimensional philosophy, with an image of the ocean.

\textsuperscript{110} Deleuze cites passages from Kant’s Critique of pure reason at this point, referring to the ‘Appendix to the transcendental dialectic’ and the idea, introduced at the start of the appendix, of the focus imaginarius – CPR; A644/B672.

\textsuperscript{111} cf John Marks on this point since he still wants to link problems to ‘good’ or ‘bad’ ones; ‘Philosophy must locate well posed problems questions and reject false problems.’ – Gilles Deleuze – vitalism and multiplicity, p23.
learning swimmer in particular as the way in which to actualise this Idea. The person learning to swim begins to feel their way into the water, gradually moving from the dimension of land to that of water, beginning to fold their selves into another matter, to become with the matter in which they exist. This is a movement that folds back into the already existing practice they have on land but which has been forgotten, for example in the process of childhood development. With learning to swim we once again experience the incapacity of the newborn, with the exception that the newborn, if placed within water, can find their way around and move more comfortably than if they are on land, an ironic paradox perhaps.

Deleuze argues that ‘the problematic is a state of the world, a dimension of the system...’ (DR; 280) and this notion of a ‘state of the world’ is a clue, a sort of indication that the problematic must be thought of as part of a world rather than as a problem of the mind. ‘Rather than’ is perhaps too strong, still implying a duality, and thus we might re-say this as the problematic must, if thought of with regard to the mind, be thought of with the mind understood as part of the world. We have already seen Deleuze speaking of the problematic as having the nature of a ‘focal point’ and giving a ‘horizon’ and these things would only go to strengthen the sense in which we might speak of a topological approach to problematics.

We need, Deleuze argues, an imageless thought, one, presumably, which is free from determinations, such as those imposed by the cultural constraints of an image of thought\textsuperscript{112}. There are eight postulates to this image, the last of which is the ‘postulate of the end, or result, the postulate of knowledge (the subordination of learning to knowledge, and of culture to method).’ (DR; 167) This final postulate arises through a discussion of learning and involves two aspects. The first is an attempt to move learning away from products, to shift the focus back towards the process of learning as an active verb rather than the product of an activity which turns learning into something possessed. Learning is not to be taken away and traded for wealth or position nor is it to be reduced to the purer academicised version of ‘knowledge’. Learning does not produce an object for exchange or possession. The process of learning as a method for acquiring knowledge is opposed by Deleuze.

We might describe the method of acquiring knowledge as one where there is a teleology of possession and gain, and thus of accrual. Whilst there may be something accrued in this model there is no necessity to reduce the accrued to a material object since this would be little more than a very crude materialism. We could use a less material concept of possession such that it might be possible for possession of knowledge to be the gaining of wisdom, where wisdom is taken in a broad sense to indicate a wise relation to the world. This would imply that learning is the process of accruing experience (relation to the

\textsuperscript{112} The role of the image of thought as a cultural phenomenon appears to operate in a ‘false ideology’ way, whereby we are born into a necessary thought to the extent that necessity is the culture of thinking. Such a culture could obviously be changed since it is itself contingent and not necessary; the necessity of the cultural is in its effect. In this respect it is worth looking at the ‘positive’ role culture is given in the discussion on learning and apprenticeship – DR; 165-166.
world). Knowledge as ‘held’, as somehow ‘gained’, would thus be equivalent to the accumulation of experience. Knowledge is experience in this sense. This allows us to construct a notion of knowledge that maintains a sense of possession or gain but which doesn’t end up in the difficult situation of a closure in which knowledge is somehow packaged and parcelled up neatly. The gaining of experience as the basis of an understanding of knowledge would allow a process of open learning to be conceptualized without contradiction. Is this ‘open learning’ what Deleuze is motivating? In effect, yes, because the main problem with learning is not the process or method of learning but the product orientated nature of a dominant concept of learning. This is why Deleuze argues that it is not a product we possess in the form of knowledge it is instead a conjugation. Why would learning be a conjugation?

‘To learn to swim’ Deleuze declares, is to ‘conjugate the distinctive points of our bodies with the singular points of the objective Idea in order to form a problematic field’ (DR; 165). This is a nice, succinct formulation and one that will enable us to unpack, a little, the notions of problematic fields and Deleuzian Ideas. To conjugate here means to join, to enter into reciprocal relation, a meaning derived from a use within biochemistry. It also includes the senses of common roots, derived from mathematics, as well as the more common grammatical use of giving the parts of a verb, its various inflections or states of affairs. Conjugation thus has three points or nodes as a concept; that of reciprocity, of a reciprocal relation between the parts conjugated; that of a common root; and that of giving the possible states of affairs. Conjugation is then a form of unity that is more than a simple additive process; it is a productive union constituting a veritable world of points. Conjugation constitutes a dimension of being that is dynamic and plural, what Deleuze would call ‘a becoming’.

Learning is thus a conjugative process, a combinatorial activity (DR; 205). This combinatorial activity is precisely one in which a dimension of being exists and comes into being each time. Whenever Deleuze approaches an issue, there is a combinatorial activity of world creation. This is what I think is best described by a notion of dimensionality since this latter term avoids the implications that may be present in using the term world, not least the implication of subjective or subject based distinctions between worlds. Problems and problematic fields do not rely upon the subject but in effect form subjecticities, types of subjecthood. It is with bodies that problematic fields are constructed, not with subjectivities, and the problematic field, the combinatorial addition of body and Idea produces what we understand as a subjecthood, the varieties of which form the field of subjecticities.

If learning is a conjugative process of body and objective Idea, what then is the objective Idea. In the example of swimming I have been looking at the objective Idea is the sea. At this point, plainly, the notion of an Idea is undergoing some sort of radical relocation. How can we talk of the sea as an Idea? Surely, we are dealing with the utmost empirical reality when dealing with the sea, the ocean, whereas it seems inconceivable to think of the Idea as outside the realm of the mental, to think of the Idea as somehow ‘outside
thought’. In the passage we are looking at we find learning in general, as opposed to learning to swim, described as an entrance into the relationality of the Idea. The Idea is composed of singularities and ‘to learn is to enter into the universal of the relations which constitute the Idea, and into their corresponding singularities’ (DR; 165). This ‘universal of the relations’ is the point at which the Idea is given an objective being, where the problematic field is seen not as the production of a subject but as producing subjects. In this sense, an Idea is a multiplicity of singular points with a series of relations that can be discovered through the conjugation of a body with the Idea, a process that can be understood as the entrance into the dimension of the Idea.

What we see here is a radical alteration in the structure of relations surrounding Ideas and thus a radical reconstitution of Ideas themselves\(^{113}\). Radical according to what we might ask? Radical in the sense that a whole history of philosophy could be seen as a fault line along which we might negotiate another territory, a territory other than the one in which we have settled. Deleuze uses the term ‘deterritorialisation’ in a way that suggests a breaking with tethers, a launching into the unknown, although it has been suggested that the English word ‘outlandish’ might have a greater resonance, not least by Deleuze himself\(^{114}\). The outlandishness of the sea as Idea, deliberately and strategically breaking tethers, leaving one slightly bemused as to where to settle, where to find Deleuze and his arguments. This outlandishness is again something I think can be understood in part with the idea of a dimensionality, except this time in the sense that Deleuze himself constitutes a certain dimension, his radicalism being precisely that fact. We have to understand, I would argue, that entrance into the Idea as Deleuze writes it, for example in the activity of learning, is, with regard to Deleuze himself, an entrance into the Deleuzian Idea.

The Idea, written in the capitalized form, is strongly reminiscent, at a superficial level, of the Platonic Form. It appears in the text as a sort of transcendental feature and yet it is the relation of the Idea to the immanent process of production, including the production of any transcendence, that is its central role. The Idea clearly provides a sort of organizing factor, a way of structuring the unities that exist amongst the manifold of sensibility. The Deleuzian Idea, however, restructures the relations of particular to universal, of case to concept and of real to possible, resting as it does upon the productive model that is central to Deleuze and which marks him out as a thinker of immanence. To explore this situation necessitates exploring this Deleuzian Idea, not least because it is intimately connected with his notion of a problem.

If we begin with Plato we can see that Deleuze objects not to Plato, per se, but to the direction in which Plato is developed, the direction of representationalism\(^{115}\). Deleuze argues ‘The ‘sameness’ of the Platonic Idea which serves as the model and is

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\(^{113}\) Cf. Martin Bell’s essay *Relations and reversals: Deleuze, Hume and Kant* in Rehberg, *The matter of critique*.

\(^{114}\) This comment is found in Charles Stivale’s ‘*Summary of L’Abecedaire de Gilles Deleuze*’, in the first section entitled ‘A as in Animal’.

\(^{115}\) DR; page 265 – ‘*A slippage occurs in the transition from the Platonic world to the world of representation (which is why we can present Plato as the origin or at the crossroads of a decision)*.’
guaranteed by the Good gives way to the identity of an originary concept grounded in a thinking subject’. (DR; 265 – 266). The Platonic world of forms is organised in the schema of the Idea as model from which the copy derives. This copy is then determined as ‘good copy’ through the guarantee of the good expressed in the search for the good copy. The Idea determines the good copy through the relation of resemblance because to distinguish between good and bad copy is to decide upon a good resemblance. The model is the form of the copy and to be a good copy the object must bear a good resemblance to the original model that is its form. The Idea bears down on the object through the relation of resemblance.

There is here a particular relation within the schema between Idea and object or the model and its copy. This relation is isomorphic, unidirectional and in itself the good. Deleuze’s anti-Platonism, if it exists, is directed against this relation. He wants to replace or perhaps replicate the relation of the good that gives the Idea as determining the objects truth, with a variety or replication of relations that coalesce or arise from what are called ‘aleatory points’. In terms of the problem, the aleatory point is the location of the question. The aleatory point is that of the dice throw and questions, Deleuze says, are the dice themselves. I will come back to questions in a moment but I want to continue with the Idea for a moment and what Deleuze means by the Idea.

As I mentioned earlier, Deleuze’s Ideas follow Kant in connecting with problems and this notion of Ideas as problematic is something Deleuze wants to hold onto from Kant. For Deleuze the problem is the object of the Idea. For Kant the Idea arises from the aim of reason in its tendency to the absolute, the pure conceptions of reason that are the transcendental ideas. These are, as Kant says, ‘only ideas’, beyond representations and it is from this that Deleuze derives the notion of problems without solutions or rather ‘incapable of solution’ by which is meant an incapacity of dis-solution, or removal of the problem. For Kant there are three classes, three distinct areas, in which there arise transcendental ideas that can be identified around the terms soul, world and god. The doctrines or sciences of these three ideas are what Kant calls the ‘pure and general products, or problems, of pure reason’ (CPR; 230). For Deleuze, however, the classes of transcendental ideas are transformed into moments of the Idea (DR; 169). He goes on to argue that in the Idea there is ‘neither identification nor confusion ... but rather an internal problematic objective unity of the undetermined, the determinable and determination’ (DR; 170). In this trinity of determination the singular direction of the Platonic model Idea in its relation as archetype is radically shifted towards a mutual reciprocity such that the Idea is now no longer the determinant but the field of determination which is itself never finalized. Deleuze wants to posit for the Idea, a

116 DR; page 198. ‘The singular points are on the die; the questions are the dice themselves; the imperative is to throw.’
117 CPR; 226 – ‘...the absolute totality of all phenomena is only an idea, for as we never can present an adequate representation of it, it remains for us a problem incapable of solution.’ (Emphasis in original) Transcendental Dialectic, Section 2.
118 Cf Kant, CPR, 221 – Transcendental Dialectic, Section 1; Of Ideas In General.
structure that is distributive rather than archetypal (DR; 181). This distributive nature of the Idea is moreover a dimensional distribution, a distribution in all directions at once.

If what we might call the Deleuzian Idea is dimensionally distributive, what activates this process of distribution and how do we enter the distribution or conjugate with the Idea? We do this through the problem and question and at the point of their incarnation and instantiation. This point is the aleatory point, the moment of the fiat or dice throw. Problems, Deleuze argues, ‘are inseparable from a power of decision, a fiat which, when we are infused by it, makes us semi-divine beings’ (DR; 197). It is worth returning to questions at this point.

Around the role of the question, we find Deleuze closest to and furthest from the philosophies of difference amongst which Heidegger plays a prominent role, having perhaps the largest name of the philosophers of difference. Deleuze associates the question in Heidegger with the ontological difference in the five theses that he outlines in his ‘note on Heidegger’ (DR; 64 - 65). ‘Ontological difference corresponds to questioning’ Deleuze argues (DR; 65). The difficulty that is identified within Heidegger, which Deleuze suggests is recognized within the ‘turning’ beyond metaphysics, is still that of understanding difference in itself. It is to be capable of this that Deleuze attempts to construct concepts that work separately, distinctly and disparately from the concepts of representation. Deleuze does not want to throw out the interest that has been once again taken in the issue of questions and problems but to create a concept that, whilst recognizably using singular points that can be found in other philosophers, reassigns these points within an outlandish creation of his own. This new concept of the Idea, the dimensionally distributive Deleuzian Idea, relies upon the aleatory point for the power of the distribution and this aleatory point relies in turn upon the question.

The formulation of the aleatory point is threefold but having given the three-fold formula he then goes on to further identify Ideas with what he calls ‘the problematic conditions which result from throws’ (DR; 198). We thus have this game of chance distributing being in the same way that fortunes are distributed through the game of chance. Indeed this is not an analogy but the actual activity of the imperative, of the force of the encounter. ‘Something in the world forces us to think’ Deleuze argues and ‘this something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter’ (DR; 139).

Having tried to sketch the relationship of problems through looking at the Deleuzian Idea I am now faced with the issue of what motivates the question ‘what’s the problem?’ This phrase is taken from a scene in which it is asked, not placed here as a technical starting point and it is what calls for this question that interests me. The question does not arise from doubt but from the force of sensibility. Two kinds of things can be found in Plato, only one of which will force us to think. The first are the objects of recognition that may well engage thought, which may ‘busy us’ as Deleuze says, but which do not call upon us to think. The second kind of thing that Deleuze wants to extract from Plato is not an object of recognition but the kind of thing that forces us to think. This second kind of
thing is not defined by a failure of recognition as though there was simply a matter of making up for a lack. Instead of an absence of something, this second kind of thing is a pure force, neither present nor absent but rather forceful. It is in the encounter that these things attack us with their full force. Such things, such enemies of wisdom and knowledge, have two characteristics. Firstly they can only be sensed. Thought, Deleuze argues, moves from the *sentiendum* - that which can only be sensed (DR; 140) to the *cogitandum* – that which can only be thought (DR; 141). This movement from the force to the thought is the movement or distribution of the Idea which operates from the aleatory point and within which the question and problem find their place. We can, as it were, map the problem field, locate and assemble a Deleuzian Idea from the elements he presents but this immediate force, this moment of encounter is still left outside.

The force we are now talking of, the *sentiendum*, is both the origin of the phrase ‘transcendental empiricism’ as well as the location for the difficulty I want to address with the notion of ‘an affect of sense’. Quite what is this difficulty? In effect, it would be something like the following; the *sentiendum* gives sensibility a privilege as an origin (DR; 144-145). A problematic Idea is distributed through the aleatory point. To maintain or repeat the force of the question we need to allow this aleatory point to come back towards us, to feel the force that originated the thought. Yet, how do we begin to reach this point? How do we begin to tell that we have ever actually begun to release the force of intensity that gave rise to the problematic Idea?

Surely, we just examine the assemblage that we have constructed. This, however, just moves the question outside the aleatory point and into a problematic field as though it were a tool and not the dice themselves. The question, to be repeated, must come from within the intensity of the aleatory point. So we move back towards a notion of intensity and then we find that the question before us seems to disappear into simply the intensity of ‘any question’. We lose the question, the problem in its specificity and singularity within a moment of intensity that cannot be covered by qualities attached to it (DR; 266). What I want to suggest is that through a certain sort of affect we in reality come up against the character of a problem and this character is there from the oddness of what Deleuze calls the ‘dark precursor’ through to the very inside of each moment of the Idea.

In some sense this issue is located around Deleuze’s concept of ‘individuation’. It is through the notion of character that Deleuze is able to distinguish the varying and singular forces as particular forces rather than generic force, since character is the sign of individuation. Individuation could be said to focus around the movement of Ideas in the spheres of what Deleuze calls the virtual and the actual, centered in the complex interweaving of the double spelling of different/ciation, where the differentiated virtual multiplicity of the Idea (DR; 245) individuates throughout the differenciated actuality of the problematic field. Within the field of the virtual Idea, there is a fluid movement of the differential relations of intensity. There is a coexistence of all Ideas, which we see

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119 DR; 139 ‘Thought is primarily trespass and violence, the enemy, and nothing presupposes philosophy; everything begins with misosophy’.
when Deleuze talks of the logical character of Ideas as being at once ‘distinct and obscure’ (DR; 252). The Ideas, composed of differential relations of intensity and their elements, comprise a dimension of implication. Within this dimension, the Ideas are fully differentiated but completely undifferentiated. The issue here is not one of simply tracing a movement from chaos to cosmos, from a random mass to a specific being; this is far too unproductive a concept for Deleuze. Instead, he wants to maintain difference in itself (differentiated) whilst simultaneously being able to construct a process of individuation. (differentiated). The issue is how to maintain the disparity of the virtual multiplicity, of difference in itself, whilst enabling a process of individuation, not least, because differentiation, Deleuze argues, ‘implies the creation of the lines along which it operates’ (DR; 246).

The suggestion with regard to the notion of individuation is that we look at the Idea and the problematic field within Deleuze’s DR through a sense of character and I want to explore that suggestion a little more at this point before returning to it in later chapters. Deleuze argues that ‘intensity is the determinant in the process of actualization. It is intensity which dramatizes’ (DR; 245). How might we find any play within intensity such that it is not a monologue, such that there is not simply one line of differentiation? The Ideas, which are differentiable, enable a sense of disparate characters but since they are virtual multiplicities, they are also, as Deleuze says, composed of pre-individual singularities. It is how this sense of the different Ideas and their problematic fields exists that can perhaps be seen through some form of character.

Intensity individuates the Ideas but not through a correlation or instantiation of a possible but rather through the establishment of a resonance between the differential relations of the Ideas. ‘The act of individuation consists not in suppressing the problem, but in integrating the elements of the disparateness into a state of coupling which ensures its internal resonance.’ (DR; 246) The individuation of the aleatory point and with it the problematic field and its question arises from intensity activating resonances between Ideas. We cannot precisely determine a problem, therefore, aside from the intensity of its individuation which is why Deleuze argues that ‘individuation is what responds to the question ‘who?’’ (DR; ibid) This ‘who that responds to the question’ is the ‘who’ of the individuation of the problem but not in the sense that we reduce the problem to a name but rather expand the problem from concept to character. One of the main ways of approaching the problem and the Idea through a thought of characters is precisely to ask about the affect of the character in exactly the way in which a psychiatric assessment might distinguish particular affects as results of symptoms of mental health. Any character in a dramatization is reliant upon the intensity of their individuation to occur through affects that are produced and thus to ask after a problem would lead rapidly to asking about the affect.

It is perhaps in this sense that we can begin to think about the clothed repetition Deleuze is so keen to distinguish. To be able to return to the question and allow its force to operate again – to allow a clothed repetition - we might work with a sense of character,
instead of seeing the aleatory point as a randomness or simple arbitrariness, which Deleuze has already argued against. We could begin, through this framework, to form a more finely tuned sense of the problem, perhaps even an aesthetic of the problem or a symptomatology. In order to begin to understand how such a symptomatology takes place I want to read an aporia in the text of Derrida’s called *Aporias*.

Derrida makes a fascinating claim with regard to aporias which is that ‘in this place of aporia there is no longer any problem’ (A; 12). There is no longer any problem but that does not mean that all the solutions are available, rather that the aporia is a place where the problem is unable to constitute itself, thus unable to exist. The aporia becomes a vacuum, a blackness that is not ‘outside’, as a contingently unknowable object capable of at some point being known through an extension of knowledge. The aporia is the ‘approach of the other as such’ (ibid), a blackness of the beyond sight, beyond words. This idea of the ‘approach’ of the ‘other as such’ plainly intends to indicate an ethical aspect to the situation that occurs when faced with aporia. Even here, speaking of being ‘faced with’ an aporia the personal difficulty, the intensely personal problem of the aporia is indicated.

The first response might simply be to suggest that this is to overblow the situation, to engage in a hyperbolic distortion of what is, in effect, nothing more than a logical result of incorrect thinking. This approach would be in essence a denial of the reality of aporia and its reduction to intellectual confusion. This is something that I want to leave to one side. For the moment I want to begin to draw out a picture or territory of aporia and attempt to mark some points of reference. First, Derrida's notion of the aporia as a place where there is no longer any problem, for example, can be placed next to the introduction to the *Tractatus*. The TLP itself has more focus, more content, in terms of tautologies but is also, fundamentally, the staging of a peculiar moment that takes place at or around proposition 7. The denouement of the TLP is the arrival at a place of aporia in which there is no longer any space for philosophical problems. Next, Derrida speaks of the aporia as a figure, as what Deleuze might call a 'conceptual persona'. How does this conceptual persona of aporia figure within Derrida's little book? It is a figure that is like a place, a landscape, somewhere returned to or circled by Derrida, like a hawk circling above its prey. Derrida hangs weightlessly and apparently immobile in the face of this figure. It is a place, he says, of paralysis. We might say that Derrida presents himself as though caught by the sight of the aporia, maybe even caught in the light of aporia like a rabbit in the headlights of an oncoming but never arriving juggernaut. The immovable object of infinity is that towards which we rush headlong, ‘a certain impossibility’ which often seems to push thought towards death or at the very least towards its finitude.

Derrida speaks of attempting not to move ‘against or out of the impasse but in another way, according to another thinking of the aporia, one perhaps more enduring’ (A; 13). It is difficult to conceive of the aporetic as something that might be said to be a deathly paralysis of thought and yet as something which can be thought in such a way as to
accord with the aporia itself. How or why might this be attempted? What pushes Derrida
this way, why not simply avoid the dead-end?

One reason might be that in this place of aporia we find an energy or power for thought.
In a simple, straightforward sense, aporias give us something to think about. In some
sense this is obvious and a necessary presupposition of this essay itself. Derrida's take on
the matter is that if there is something to think about it is because there is no thing, no
concrete problem that can be addressed. This is the structure of aporia itself according to
Derrida - it gives something to think about precisely because it removes anything that
could be thought about. Given this formulation we now have to, in part, withdraw it
again to try and remain, somehow, faithful to the spirit of Derrida's text. He says he
wants to think in a way that is more in accord with aporia. It cannot, then, simply be to
reproduce the form of the aporetic, can it? Does Derrida only want to say something like,
'to think aporia is to think aporetically'? What would this actually mean in any case?

To be more in accord with something is to be able to live with it. To become the object
with which we wish to be in accord is already rejected if any need for accord is felt. We
feel the need for according with something only when the object opens discord in
existence. Something arises that doesn't fit with the way in which we live or think.
Aporia is thought of as blockage, error, illusion and difficulty. It is a difficult child of
thought, the errant line of thinking that seems to take us into oblivion or paralysis but
which we might become more acquainted with and better able to think alongside. It is, in
this situation, an inevitability that must be lived with and it is the task of Derrida's
thought to posit ways in which we might think and live with aporia. Derrida would here
be heard to say to those who felt the frustrations of aporia - 'live with it'. Does Derrida,
however, give us any means by which we might be able to think in accord with aporia?
Is his plea to better live with it simply empty desire or is it a practical course of action for
thought?

Derrida, faced with the aporia, wants to think according to this figure of thought. Why is
this thought? Aporia blocks thought and thus thought needs, apparently, a way of
continuing. The problem, even as a non-problem or a place whereby we cannot
formulate a problem, becomes something to be overcome or got round or dealt with or
addressed - at the very least something to be written about. It is, however, overcome only
ever 'in order to continue'. It is, thus, possible to pause at the very hesitation in which we
find the figure; to pause before the hesitating impossibility that aporia faces us with.

Derrida speaks of the aporia as a person but, importantly, as a person 'with whom I would
have lived a long time, even though in this case one cannot speak of a decision or a
contract' (A; 13). He also says that he speaks 'in memory of this word'. Like a lost
father-mother-parent complex, as though the origin of the aporia came through bare
biological necessity, aporia is given here as an undoubtedly familiar and familial figure.
Who else can be lived with without decision or contract other than the parent? The
memory of the parent is indicative, if not of their death, then of the thinkers maturation,
of their growing into adulthood and a state in which relations based upon decision and contract come to offer alternatives to existence as it was when a child.

This is nothing more than an attempt to flesh out the character of Derrida's aporia, to give a face to the conceptual persona within his work that takes the name of aporia. We might find, of course, that this particular figure is as much the child of Derrida as it is his supposed father-mother figure. Does Derrida father the aporia he wishes to think with, in accord with, or is he attempting to try and speak with the father of his own thought? Even without deciding, as is perhaps inevitable when faced with Derrida, on the relation of fatherhood within Derrida's thought of aporia, we can say that the familiar nature of aporia is implicit in the way in which Derrida speaks of aporia. Derrida himself clearly takes the fact of aporia to be prior to his own thought. He is, after all, trying to think 'another way' when faced with aporia. To think another way presupposes an already existing way of thinking, even if this already existing way of thinking is such that it almost loses the right or ability to be called 'thinking'. This already existing way of thinking about aporia is rooted, if we simply follow Derrida a little longer, within the work of Aristotle and the Greek root of the word also pushes us towards an ancient philosophising. ‘The word 'aporia' appears in person in Aristotle's famous text’ (A; 13). Derrida's perception of the aporia as familiar and even familial involves itself in a process of filiation whereby aporia is accepted as a child of thought, rooted in the family history of thought going back to Aristotle and beyond. If the figure is familiar, if it has been lived with, if the history of this figure is one 'within' philosophy, as is strongly suggested by Derrida, the apparent concern to think the other through the aporia appears difficult. The only route is for the other to come back within the fold, the eternal prodigal son, the lost thought or loss of thought that, somehow, inevitably infects thought. The aporia is an outside determined as outside by the inside of thought. It is Derrida's other, my other, thoughts' other, yet never simply itself. It is determined on a basis of lack, loss, absence and impossibility.

The presence or recurrence of aporia, what we might even venture rhetorically to call its 'perpetual presence', is always a problem for traditional philosophy, always a block or break on its work even when, as in Kant, the aporia briefly merges with a creative thought in the attempt to 'overcome' the antinomies of thought. Derrida doesn't lose this model of the 'difficult son', the essentially negative understanding of what an aporia is. His attempt to think in accord with aporia is an attempt to prevent violence to thought, to attempt a complication of thought. It never alters the understanding of aporia at root, it merely offers another strategy for 'dealing with the problem' through an argument within which the problem is that there is no problem to find. The problem with aporias is that 'there is no longer any problem'. It is within this overall framework of a troubling problematic that Derrida works and any attempt to think in accord with aporia, to endure it, to offer ways of living with it, begins from this framework that is put forward as a break or alteration of the traditional approach to aporia. The first step in learning to live with aporias, according to Derrida, would be to break from the naïve notion of problems when faced with aporias and to realise the absence of the problem as a problem.
How might it be that there is, with aporia, no longer any problem? In one sense the phrase suggests a relaxation, a loosening of concerns since there is no longer any problem; kick back, relax, don't worry. Problems are something to worry over, so if there is no problem then there is also no worry. This, with regard to aporias, seems at best a wishful thought and one many philosophers would be most put out by. If nothing else, aporias provide a worry for philosophers. Even if the aporia is a worry the philosopher might ignore, it is a worry when they do deal with them. Thought seems impotent in the face of aporias. We might even suggest a stronger worry in that some philosophers might find that it is thought itself that creates aporias, holes and gaps in its own self-operation. Inconsistencies in thought, of which an aporia is plainly an example to some degree, are almost always a worry for philosophers and thus the suggestion that 'there is no problem' with its concomitant of 'there's nothing to worry about' is highly likely to provoke many philosophers into dismissing whoever says such a thing as a simple irrationalist. No worries, how dare you say such a thing? This is plainly not what Derrida intends, although it is certain that this provocative statement - that there is no longer any problem - is in part provocative because of this problem of worrying, or lack of it, that it throws up.

Provocation, of course, is as capable of being a strategy to arouse thought or reason as argument itself. We would in this situation have the humorous, ironic situation of the 'true' rationalist 'appearing' irrational in order to provoke the presumably lazy rational opponent to a response. Provocation in thought, however, is prone to the same dangers as in life generally - what is provoked is most often a violent response, the blame for which lies as much with the provocateur as with the proponent of the violence.

Leaving aside the problems surrounding a provocative strategy and assuming Derrida does not simply mean 'no, there's no problems with aporia, nothing to worry about with aporias', what else might he mean? For a start the phrase he uses is in a particular tense; ‘there is no longer any problem’. The problem has gone but perhaps unnaturally, perhaps it has somehow passed away; he is no longer.

How does Derrida get to this statement, 'there is no longer any problem'. It comes after a discussion of borders, of impassable borders that constitute problems. It comes as part of the second reason for focussing on problems or, in block capitals in Derrida's text, the word 'PROBLEM'. It is this focus that has drawn Derrida into this essay. Derrida's text, then, begins fairly early to focus explicitly on problems. What is this text, where does it come from? It is a minor text within the Derrida corpus, not as wide-ranging and systematic as Of Grammatology, nor as central to the history of philosophy as Writing and Difference. It is not as playful and provocative as Glas nor as thorough and scholarly as Of Spirit. It is a little text, a minor text, derived from an almost self-contained conference held in 1992, the subject of which was Derrida himself120.

120 Cf. footnote in Aporias, Pg ix
Aporias, the text, consists of two short pieces the subject of which is death, truth and property and the 'borders' of each\footnote{ibid, p3 Curiously, these issues seem rather appropriate for a conference whose subject is still alive, present, even attending and giving a key paper, yet who is being treated as though he were one of the 'great dead men' of the philosophical canon. Intellectual property rights and issues of heirs and legitimacy might be interestingly explored in relation to Derrida, Derrida's 'followers' and detractors and what he says/said at this conference.}. At these borders we find, amongst other things, the place of aporia. The texts also occupy themselves with other issues, other roots, not least of which is the problem of translatability and the 'border of translatability' (A; 10). This border is brought up by Derrida citing an 'untranslatable' sentence (Il y va d'un certain pas) from the French, a sentence with which he introduces the 'step' that is also a 'not', the 'pas' (A; 6). Crossing borders. The possibility of crossing borders is going to guide much of Derrida's text but here it is, too often, the issue of the possibility rather than the crossing. How is it possible to cross borders? What are the conditions of possibility for border crossing? These are the type of questions we will find helpful in locating the point of Derrida's text.

Aporias, the aporos, comes into Derrida's text precisely around this possibility of the passage. There is a fidelity to the origin of the term aporias in this focus on movement since we find, if we look for established translation definitions of aporia, that the term means a 'difficulty of passing'\footnote{Moorwood and Taylor’s \textit{Pocket oxford classical Greek Dictionary}, for example, cites this meaning for 'aporía' - p.45}. The term is, however, not limited to this partial root. It is defined by Stephen David Ross for example, as about 'moments' in the movement of thought - \textit{including but not restricted to metaphysics} - in which thought loses its ability to understand itself or opens conflicts in such understanding\footnote{Stephen David Ross, \textit{Metaphysical aporia and philosophical heresy}, p.3}. Ross' definition is focussed on what he calls 'metaphysical aporia' and has one characteristic that is not immediately apparent within Derrida though implicit in the root notion of passing and that is the idea that the aporetic is a problem in the \textit{movement} of thought.

Could we, for example, think of the aporetic as anything other than as a problem for the movement of thought? Derrida describes it as \textit{paralysing} although \textit{in a way that is not necessarily negative} (A; 12) and his interest in aporias derives from the fact that he has found himself regularly paralysed by such non-passages (A; 12, 13). Here we have reached the blockage. A paralysis that is not necessarily negative can perhaps be read as something other than a blockage, although I think such a reading would verge on the sophistic since the plain problem facing us in a situation of non-passage or paralysis is the issue of blockage, at least if we consider it as an event of intermittent occurrence rather than as a way of being. It is obvious that there is nothing in principle in the contingent fact of paralysis within the human being that is 'necessarily negative'. It is more than reasonable to assume that someone paralysed from birth is within a way of being that has its own positivity and that is not 'necessarily negative'. It is clear, however, that what is interesting about aporias is not some notion of a disability of thought but rather the prevention of something thought is aiming at. In this the idea of the aporia as a
limit device can be brought back and perhaps expanded; the aporia is a limit device operating on thought. In this sense, in the sense that the aporia blocks the movement of thought in some direction, the aporia is a paralysis, a blockage.

Any understanding of paralysis comes from a physical, indeed even bodily incapacity. This much seems reasonable to assume. Of course to many philosophers such an assumption may be exactly the very thing that cannot be assumed, invoking as it does an ever-present preconception of knowledge that belies a hidden epistemology. If, however, we were to grant this assumption of a bodily basis to the notion of movement, bodily implying some element of spatial extensiveness, then it seems reasonable to further suggest that the idea of an aporia as a blockage in the movement of thought relies upon a deep metaphoricity. The metaphor of thoughts' movement might perhaps be undermined by rematerialising thought into brain activity, with all the attendant problems of such a reduction. Nevertheless, the point I want to make is that the aporia as a non-passage or paralysis is a particular way of conceiving aporia that may well rely upon a primary model, that of movement, that is itself not obviously true or satisfactory.

What sort of idea or image of thought is needed for thought to be able to be paralysed? Thought must move or be capable of moving for it to be able to be paralysed or blocked, for this form of thinking about thought relies upon something moving. To move something itself relies upon or draws from a spatial model and thus thought itself becomes spatialised, given extension. The philosophical danger of an over easy use of the notion of 'movement' of thought lies less in the idea of movement than it does in the possibility of an objectification of thought. Thought could easily become an object crossing borders, crossing a terrain, a vehicle that needs driving correctly, avoiding large potholes and blocked roads. Looking back to Derrida's text we find the idea of a problem presented in such a way that we are left dealing with an object. There is no longer any problem at the point of the aporia because, Derrida says, one 'could no longer find a problem that would constitute itself and that one could keep in front of oneself, as a presentable object or project' (A; 12).

Is Derrida's concept of a problem essentially governed by thematisation, by the formulation or ability to formulate the problem? What is Derrida's attitude towards thematisation? The sudden turn to this issue of thematisation after talking about movement is in order to try and connect the two aspects through the Derridean metaphor. The objections, from a Derridean point of view, to what has so far been said too quickly about movement and thought would in many cases arise from within or around the question (or problem) of the way Derrida deals with metaphor.

Geoff Bennington reads Derrida quite reasonably and in his account of Derrida's metaphor it is clear that an attempt is being made to overcome the dichotomy of literal and metaphorical; ‘there is no such thing as a literal reading, only differences of ‘tropic capacity’(RM16)124 This is the trap with Derrida, with reading Derrida, the trap of the

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124 Bennington and Derrida, Jacques Derrida, p.124
literal reading. Literal reading attempts to operate through appropriation, through précis, through being able to say what the other is saying. Of course if the point of what we are trying to précis is somehow beyond the possibility of such substitutionism then in principle such an attempt is destined to either failure or at least non-completion.

It is worth indicating that this is only part of what might be said about Derrida. It is also worth noting that, taken as it is from Bennington rather than Derrida, we are always going to be subject to a question of returning to Derrida himself, to the original text, to the original translation, to the original context of the speech, that it is at least worth noting that the context of certain phrases was a self-contained context, in a sense, as in the statements made within the Aporias text. We have to bear in mind here that if, say, Derrida was to argue against the possibility of a 'literal reading' of a text then any priority of a supposed 'original' would be questionable - it would be as reasonable to quote Bennington's Derrida as to quote Derrida's Derrida. Indeed 'Derrida' would no longer be anything other than a specific site of interpretation and argument, owned by no one, least of all by the Derrida that signs himself Derrida and perhaps the model of the 'plus d'un' would be appropriate here125. Of course, this would be the case if and only if Derrida were arguing against the possibility of a literal reading and that is itself an open question.

What might be being done if we were to measure 'tropic capacities'? What are 'tropic capacities'? Plainly this is a technical term, that much is worth noting, even if it is a trivial point. It is a technical term for something within philosophy, that much could also be reasonably and fairly trivially added. If it is a technical philosophical term it is likely that it names a concept and yet this is something any reader of Derrida would immediately baulk at agreeing to lightly. If we try to work out in practice what might be meant by 'tropic capacity', what function this variable has within the Derridean text, we might be able to move along in defining its sense. In the context of our current discussion returning to the issue of movement can do this.

The difficulty Derrida could be said to be pointing to with the problem of movement across borders, and this is obviously an issue in metaphor, is more easily seen, at least in part, by asking about what it is that has the problem of movement. We might describe this as asking after the 'actualisation' of the problem of movement within Derrida's text, using another technical philosophical term, this time directly drawn from Deleuze. The question is then; how is the problem of movement actualised within Derrida's Aporias and further to this, what function does the notion of 'tropic capacity' have within such an actualisation?

In terms of Derrida's paralysis in the face of aporia the problem of movement might be thought to relate to thought itself. In terms of metaphor, where we will ask the same questions as in the case of movement, the problem relates more to sense. Thought and

125 Jacques Derrida; Spectres of Marx – ‘plus d’un [more than one/no more one]: this can mean a crowd, if not masses, the horde, or society, or else some population of ghosts with or without a people, some community with or without a leader – but also the less than one of pure and simple dispersion’ – p.3
sense, movement and metaphor, are connected in an almost systemic way, at the very least in a way that might be mapped or drawn out. The issue of aporias draws around itself two threads within Derrida’s text, that of movement of thought and that of the movement of sense within the metaphor. The first thread is that of the movement of thought, which could be said to be the ‘general’ problem whilst metaphor is a more particular actualisation of this more general actualisation. When I asked at the beginning of this chapter the question ‘what’s the problem of/with aporias?’ I was pointing towards the beginning of an ‘answer’ that occurs when we examine the way in which the ‘problem of aporias’ is actualised within a text or argument, in this case Derrida’s text Aporias.

The character or part of the character of the aporia Derrida seeks to endure is given by the notion of paralysis, itself a response or solution or perhaps construction of the problem-field of movement and thought. Movement is something as much as something might move and thus to follow a notion of thought ‘moving’ without opening the problematic ontological commitments that we might bring with us is to cover over a pre-determination of the possibilities of thought. This brings us back to a simple question, which underlies a lot of this discussion, and that is quite simply, how could thought be paralysed? How could thought be blocked? How could the aporia be understood as a blockage or limit to thought? The very concept of a ‘limit’ to thought is at issue. We need to think the unthinkable. Aporia is, perhaps, nothing more than the call to such a task. Thus the aporia, as a call to think the unthinkable, either stands as a call to ridiculous aspirations or as a spur, a crystal of resistance that thought is unsure of. The intuition that I am trying to develop in this all too brief reading of Derrida, is that of a free undetermined thought. It seems that aporia can be taken two ways at least, that it can have a character of finitude or infinitude, which do not form two faces of one character but two characters that share a name.

There is, nonetheless, a problem with this approach and that is that whilst the intuition underlying the questioning of thoughts’ movement and thus of its paralysis appears strong so does its opposite, that thought indeed does come to a halt at aporias. Logical contradictions and paradoxes, aporia in general, do appear to block thought. The aporia does appear quite reasonably as a limit device. It would seem we can motivate a contradictory pair of intuitions; the first, that thought is a free and undetermined activity thus incapable of blockage, limit or halt and the second that thought does indeed, in the facts of its existence, come across limits and aporias that seem to present strong evidence of an inability to move in that direction, what Derrida calls the ‘paralysis’. Very crudely we might want to phrase the difference in the character of the aporias in terms of the problem of presence. If thought can be paralysed and have to endure the aporia then this might be described as a necessary inability to bring the determinations of thought, caught in the aporia, to presence, to pin down and close upon determinate sense. If the aporia is not paralysis but something like an aleatory point, an event of sense that goes in both directions at once, a productive rather than paralysing experience, then this might be described as an ability to bring the free, undetermined thought to presence, although as free and undetermined it is thus distinctly different to a determinate thought. Put even
more formulaically and bluntly, Derrida’s aporia has the character of what cannot be said whereas Deleuze’s paradox has the character of what can be shown. This, at least, is the suggestion with regard to the character of an aporia in Derrida and Deleuze.

In order to pursue this suggestion it is perhaps worth noting that the intuitions being contrasted derive, at least in part, from the Kantian Copernican revolution, from the critique and its strategy of immanent limit; thought is free and undetermined by anything other than thought yet this in itself gives us a ground for establishing thoughts limits - thought limits itself in its self-determination. The danger, for example, in undetermined thought, the danger Kant was desperately trying to counter in many ways, is the danger of a thought that spins out of control, that becomes lost in the rhetoric of good oratory, buried beneath a weight of words which, when closely looked at, form nothing more than hot air. Free thought, unrestrained thought, thought beyond the limits of anything, including logic, would no longer be thought as reason, as rational, as anything other than, perhaps, brain process. It is this danger of an anarchy of thought that underlies Kant and the court of reason. The shift to production as a concept with which to understand thought and through which to approach aporia is intended to rework and reconfigure the problems that are implicit in an understanding of thought and its limits which rests upon the notion of movement. It is in the confrontation with Kant that the Deleuzian productive philosophy becomes itself most clearly because it is in that confrontation that Deleuze outline the structure of thought’s movement that underlies any productive philosophy.
Chapter 7

Transcendental arguments and transcendental empiricism

Deleuze has, I have argued, an ‘oceanic’ model of philosophy in which the most basic element ontologically is the relation of forces. He opposes his model of an ‘imageless thought’ to the ‘image of thought’ by a method of resistance, attempting to use the model of forces to open up the folds within which thought is caught, pointing out the subtle play of the concepts of identity, similarity, resemblance and unity which are key elements of the ‘representational’ model of thought, what has been called ‘reflective thought’. Sense is located as an event and the object as the combination of forces. This overall model is intended to produce a philosophy of immanence, which shifts the overall conceptual relations from one in which the concepts are predominantly determined within a model of representation or reflection to one in which concepts are predominantly determined within a model of production. This can be understood as an attempt to displace questions such as ‘how can the concept be a concept?’ or ‘how can we judge the relation of our knowledge to the known object?’ in favour of questions such as ‘how does the production of concept X take place?’ or ‘what does concept X produce?’

Two key things need to be noted. Firstly, Deleuze is plainly putting forward within his work an essentially metaphysical philosophy but one which wants to draw its principal resources from the sensible. In doing this Deleuze reuses or reorganises key elements of the philosophical tradition, notably the empirical current, in a very strange way. Nothing could be stranger, in many senses, than to take on the title ‘empiricist’ hand in hand with the transcendental method. Secondly, Deleuze motivates an empirical philosophy but his ‘empirical stance’ owes less to a suspicion of metaphysics per se than to a suspicion of thought itself. The suspicion of thought characterises the misosopher, the character Deleuze motivates in the attack on the image of thought. The misosopher does not speak for anyone, let alone everyone, and relates directly to the role of stupidity. Stupidity plays a critical and doubled role in DR. It both stands as that which thought must resist, that which literally forces thought to think, as well as

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126 Bas C. van Fraassen characterises empiricism in terms of a ‘stance’ and broadly characterises empiricism in terms of its targets for attack; ‘As I see it, the targets are forms of metaphysics that (a) give absolute primacy to demands for explanation and (b) are satisfied with explanations-by-postulate, that is, explanations which postulate the reality of certain entities or aspects of the world not already evident in experience. The empiricist critiques I see as correspondingly involving (a) a rejection of demands for explanation at certain crucial points, and (b) a strong dissatisfaction with explanations (even if called for) which proceed by postulation.’ – The empirical stance, p.37. A direct confrontation between Deleuze’s ‘transcendental empiricism’ and Van Fraassen’s attack on such a notion will become stuck in a conceptual conflict over the validity of a metaphysical (transcendental) argument but Van Fraassen’s critique hinges on this notion of ‘validity’ whereas Deleuze would see such discussions as attempts to impose transcendental criteria on judgements. Whilst it would be useful to compare the two arguments in detail – a task I cannot take up here – the nature of Deleuzian arguments around immanence need to be understood as a prologue to any such comparison because the role of immanence is structurally fundamental in Deleuze’s thought, underlying the most basic of concepts, not least that of ‘validity’ itself.
underlying the ability to resist thought. ‘Stupidity (not error) constitutes the greatest weakness of thought, but also the source of its highest power in that which forces it to think’ (DR; 275) As stupid as it is, the only resistance to stupid thought comes through stupidity itself. The arguments of reason that produce the stupidities that call for thought also carry a force of reason that can only be resisted by another form of stupidity, that which Nietzsche characterised as a sign of character.

The resistance to an argument that appears irresistible is inevitably going to appear stupid but this particular stupidity, which would be the sign of character, is not explicable through a simple ‘bait and switch’ argument such that its ‘appearance’ is dropped in favour of it being a more ‘true’ thought. Resisting an irresistible argument is stupid but that does not make it irrational or worthless. It is no doubt easier in some ways to try and define the ‘real’ stupidity and the use the argument that it only appears stupid to resist irresistible arguments. It might be argued that, for example, if the irresistible argument is actually wrong then it would in fact be entirely rational and intelligent to resist the argument even if arguments as to why it should be resisted were not available. This bait and switch forgets that its characterisation then relies upon the reality/appearance dualism. The more difficult thought is that reason and thought may need that which appears as stupid to exist in order to open themselves to the world. The stupid does not represent a bad reason or a false thought but is the world imposing itself onto thought with the actuality of existence. In this I would agree with Jean-Clet Martin who says that ‘stupidity, or idiocy – the inability to grasp the rationale of certain concretions – is thus a passion for the concrete without which there would be no concepts’¹²⁷. Deleuze’s ‘empiricism’ might be said to owe more to this stupidity as a feature of the imposition of the world than to any metaphysical thesis about the nature of reality (atomism) or the nature of concepts (nominalism). It might be described as a stubbornness born of affirming the world as actual. In this sense it does present us with an overall ‘stance’ towards the world, although this ‘stance’ owes more to immanence than to a thought of empiricism.

It is on the basis of a thought of immanence that Deleuze develops his ‘transcendental empiricism’. In essence this intends to present us not with the givens that we might find in ‘simple empiricism’ but rather with the giving of the given. In order to do this, however, a shift in emphasis has to take place from ‘the given as given to the self’ to ‘the giving of the given including the self’. John Rajchman suggests, for example, that the peculiar form of empiricism that Deleuze articulates was ‘a way out of the impasses of the two dominant schools of his generation, phenomenological and analytic’ and enabled him to elaborate ‘a new conception of sense, neither hermeneutic nor Fregean’¹²⁸. Rajchman goes on to point to the central role of the self within empiricism where, as a theatre for the sense impressions, it is relied upon as the basis of knowledge. Deleuze replaces this central point of the self with another concept; that of life. Life is that which

¹²⁷ Jean-Clet Martin, Philosophy of the concrete, in A Deleuzian century, ed. I.Buchanan, Duke 1999; p. 242
¹²⁸ John Rajchman, Introduction to Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence; p.7
the oceanic model models. It is the basic element of forces and the only ‘originary’
ground of thought. Most importantly, it is within this life that immanence arises and a
life is an immanent actualisation of the virtuality that is life. A life is a ripple in the
surface of an ocean.

Transcendental empiricism is an attempt to invoke the thought of immanence into an
empirical stance understood not as a rejection of metaphysics but as an open-ness to the
actuality of the world. We have seen Keith Ansell-Pearson describing the role of
transcendental empiricism as a way of securing the ‘peculiarity of the peculiar’ and so far
I have attempted to develop this in terms of the idea of character, symptomatology and
affect, suggesting a need to become sensitive to the peculiar in its peculiarity because it is
through this sensitivity that we can understand concepts in their working. This has still
rested on an attempt to show what sort of imageless thought Deleuze would advocate in
place of a philosophy dominated by the representational image of thought. It has thus
been a call towards a different method of thought and thinking that resists a too simple or
too quick conceptualisation of the actual. One of the central weaknesses of this approach
is that it will inevitably appear to lack a certain bite. Its intention is not to destroy an
argument but to resist a paradigm.

Deleuzian thought eludes an easy argument because it attempts to present that which is
elusive to argument. The central task of philosophy, however, is posed as being the
creation of concepts. In offering up the task of the creation of concepts as the central task
of philosophy, one that is pre-figured by the activity of empiricism (the most insane
creation of concepts), it would appear necessary to do more than offer a resistance to an
image of thought. A positive account of philosophical practice must be given if the claim
that philosophy is the creation of concepts can be sustained. A positive account of
philosophical practice implies that the relation of philosophy to the world cannot be one
of resting in indetermination. If philosophy is going to create concepts it surely must
create concepts that say something rather than nothing for otherwise the practice of
creation itself becomes redundant. In a world of becoming, in which being is necessarily
elusive, how can any philosophical talk take on a value?

The concept of transcendental empiricism is one of the major creations Deleuze offers.
Ansell-Pearson suggests that the ‘transcendental and superior empiricism’ of Deleuze
arises from his struggle to think individuation that itself arises from his reading of
Bergson. He outlines how Deleuze puts forward a transcendental principle of energy
which is used to establish the virtual field of intensity that underlies processes of
individuation and focuses on the way this process of individuation is to be thought, in
particular in terms of what he calls a ‘reworked and revitalised Kantianism’ that is
constituted by the Deleuzian ‘diagram as transcendental field’. Ansell-Pearson
emphasises the role of the virtual within Germinal Life and traces the role of Bergson

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129 This would be a general characterisation of the thesis in Keith Ansell-Pearson, Germinal Life
130 ibid, p.80
131 ibid, p.224
within Deleuze’s thought. In particular it is in developing Bergsonian conceptions of evolution that a specifically Deleuzian conception of immanence begins to emerge\textsuperscript{132}, a development that Ansell-Pearson situates around the works of DR and LOS – the end of the 1960’s - and the move towards the ‘machinic’ concepts of ATP and AO.

The relation between a Deleuzian concept of immanence, transcendental empiricism and individuation is one that is tied into the Virtual / Actual double. Ansell-Pearson identifies individuation as the process mediating the Virtual / Actual pair\textsuperscript{133}. Individuation, however, is not a simple process of the genesis of an individual but a process involving a field of intensities that \textit{‘becomes what in the later work is called the plane of immanence’}\textsuperscript{134}. To understand the transcendental empiricism of Deleuze it is necessary to locate it in its relation to this concept of a field of individuation or plane of immanence. It will thus be necessary to understand how this field of individuation mediates the relation of Virtual to Actual.

To begin with, the pairing of virtual and actual plays a vital role in Deleuze, principally in shifting conceptual structures of transcendental thought away from the pairing of the possible and the real. This is a complex process but begins from the distinction between the possible and the real. The virtual is distinguished from the possible because;

1) \textit{‘from a certain point of view’} (B; 96) the possible is the opposite of the real whereas the virtual is the opposite of the actual. This essentially says that the pairing of virtual / actual will replace the pairing of the possible / real. In itself this shift is supposed to have some conceptual dynamic because the possible \textit{‘has no reality (although it may have an actuality)’} (ibid). More importantly \textit{‘the virtual is not actual, but as such possesses a reality’} (ibid). This first move then enables the new pairing of the virtual / actual to be a pairing of realities, not of possibles or impossibles. This enables the ‘slogan’ that Deleuze derives from Proust – the virtual is \textit{‘real without being actual, ideal without being abstract’} (ibid)

2) there is another way of describing the distinction between the two pairings and that is through the process of movement from the one to the other. The possible / real distinction involves a \textit{‘process of realisation’} (ibid; 97) whereas the virtual /actual distinction involves a process of actualisation. The process of realisation involves two

\textsuperscript{132} For example, Ansell –Pearson locates the background of Bergson’s ‘bio-philosophy’ in DR and LOS by pointing out that the concept of ‘individuation’, which is so central to those works, derives from Gilbert Simondon. He then argues that this can only be understood against a background of ‘Bergsonism’, in particular a concern with creative evolution – ibid; p.79-80. Whilst this Bergsonism is argued by Ansell-Pearson to be the background of the DR and LOS works, this Bergsonism is undergoing a re-configuration through the introduction of the concept of individuation – ibid; p.77-78. The relation to Bergson can perhaps be seen as one in which Deleuze ‘takes on’ the line of thought opened by Bergson and develops it, in some sense, beyond the weaknesses that he found in Bergson. This at least seems to be the general line of argument within Ansell-Pearson’s work.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid, p.94

\textsuperscript{134} ibid, p.95
factors, viz. limitation and resemblance. The process of actualisation, however, involves the two factors of ‘difference or divergence and of creation’ (ibid).

Turning to the second of these distinctions, the claim is that the relation between the possible and the real and the process of realisation that occurs necessarily presupposes a concept of resemblance. The real resembles the possible (DR, 279). The real man is a resemblance of the possible man, for example. Deleuze argues that for Bergson this is at the heart of the claim that the possible is a ‘false notion’, ‘the source of false problems’ (B, 98). There is a ‘sleight of hand’, in that the possible stands to the real as though it preceded it, as though the possibility were prior to the reality, whereas in truth the possible is derived from the real. This claim that the possible derives from the real is argued for in part by reference to living evolution and in this sense Ansell-Pearson is right to focus on the ‘bio-philosophical’ background to Deleuze’s work. For the possible to precede the real would involve, within the realm of biology, a notion of preformism that is destroyed by the theory of evolution (ibid). The prior nature of the possible is thus an illusion.

In DR Deleuze argues that this distinction between the possible / real and the virtual / actual is not a verbal dispute but ‘is a question of existence itself’ (DR; 211). The difference between the real object and the possible is one of existence but that very existence cannot be conceptualised within the possible / real duality and instead appears as a ‘brute eruption’. Existence cannot be distinguished from non-existence in terms of the possible, according to Deleuze, since there is no difference between the existence or non-existence of the possible object. As a possible object it makes no difference whether it exists or not since it is possible regardless of its existence. The concept of the possible object is indifferent to existence which is conceived as something that is both outside the concept and an ‘indifferent milieu’. The object is conceived of as existing, if it exists, in space and time but it is these that are nothing more than an indifferent milieu. Deleuze opposes a notion of space and time as an indifferent milieu with a productive notion of existence which occurs in ‘a characteristic space and time’ (DR; 211). Existence is thus something that has a character. The possible and the virtual are thus distinguished by their relation to existence. What this means for Deleuze is that a notion of the possible / real relies upon a negative in order to establish the difference between the two.

‘Difference can no longer be anything but the negative determined by the concept; either the limitation imposed by possibles upon each other to be realised, or the opposition of the possible to the reality of the real.’ (ibid)

The virtual, as distinct from the possible, is not outside or indifferent to existence since it is fully real. It is the ‘characteristic state of Ideas’ (ibid) and the production of existence is on the basis of this virtual Idea. Again, the idea of a character occurs, referring to a particular collection of intensities. The character of time and space is then assimilated to the Idea rather than being seen as an indifferent milieu, implying that there are a plurality of such characters, that different Ideas have different characters, these characters going so far as to determine different characters of time and space, which are immanent to the
Idea. Ideas are distinguished from concepts in this regard since the concept relies upon a notion of identity whereas the Idea is a multiplicity that is virtual, which means fully real but not actual. The Idea is a multiplicity of intensities which provides the ocean from which the actual currents arise. The actual object is not to be related to a concept of the object but to the virtual multiplicity that underlies the actualisation of the object. Deleuze goes on to claim that ‘any hesitation between the virtual and the possible, the order of the Idea and the order of the concept, is disastrous, since it abolishes the reality of the virtual’ (DR; 212).

What is clear from this notion of a virtual Idea is that there is more than the biophilosophical concerns that Ansell-Pearson points to within Deleuze’s notion of individuation. The relation of the virtual / actual relies upon a negative determination of the possible / real pairing as incompatible with evolutionary theory but it is not this incompatibility with evolutionary theory alone that is contained within the difference. In particular this distinction between a virtual Idea and the concept rests upon a notion of multiplicity. The Idea is the virtual multiplicity which underlies and produces the problem, as I described in Chapter 6, where we saw Deleuze claiming that the Idea is ‘neither identification nor confusion … but rather an internal problematic objective unity of the undetermined, the determinable and determination’ (DR; 170). I discussed how, through a notion of learning we might see the Idea as dimensional and this now can be connected with the idea of character more clearly through the concept of the Idea as a characteristic state. What is effectively being claimed by Deleuze is that there is a broad range of singular points that constitute the Idea which operates as a productive field for the problem.

This pairing of the virtual and actual is one of the most fundamental conceptual shifts that Deleuze motivates in his work but it has a primarily ontological status. Manuel De Landa, in his work Intensive science and Virtual philosophy, points towards the way in which this ontology has radical implications for the activity of scientific thought and, like Ansell-Pearson, presents Deleuze as a philosopher of what might be called ‘practical metaphysics’, whereby a general model or paradigm with scientific as well as philosophical implications is garnered from his work. Whilst this ‘practical metaphysics’ may offer the sort of positive account of the world and as such is the result of concept creation, it still doesn’t offer a positive account of philosophical practice. The difficulty with this account is that, whilst it may be valid, its involvement with science opens up a huge realm of inquiry that is, in some sense, outside philosophy. In particular it hooks into what Prigogine and Stengers have called a new view of matter as no longer inert. In their view this involves a conflict between the static view of classical dynamics and the evolutionary view that involves the notion of entropy. The work of Ansell-Pearson,

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135 De Landa’s reading of Deleuze develops what he calls a ‘problematic epistemology’, the most controversial claim of which is the discarding of a notion of laws whilst retaining a concept of ‘the objectivity of physical knowledge’. Inevitably this would involve a transformation of science and philosophy. See Manuel De Landa, Intensive science and virtual philosophy, p.5-6
136 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order out of chaos, p.9
137 ibid, p.14
De Landa and a number of other Deleuzian scholars lies on the borderlines of this dispute within science which undoubtedly involves philosophical issues but which is incapable of resolution on purely philosophical grounds.\(^{138}\)

On the reading Ansell-Pearson gives Deleuze ‘seeks to develop a new conception of the transcendental philosophy by approaching it as a topological field’.\(^{139}\) As I have argued, this involves the replacement of one model for another. One immediate problem with the general thrust of Deleuze’s work that I have been developing is that this implicitly seems to put forward another ‘image of thought’ rather than an imageless thought. This tension is something that I think reflects a two-fold dynamic within Deleuze to both critique philosophy as a method of thought and offer a new metaphysics. It is one thing to argue that thought needs to be more resistant to common sense, needs to operate without an implicit image and needs to adopt a more sympathetic or intuitive method and quite another to then develop a positive metaphysics on the basis of this method. The dispute over method is not going to be resolved before the practical metaphysical work is presented and interdependence exists, whereby the method and the result intermingle. My interest so far is much more on the side of the method Deleuze is using. To thus rely upon the idea of the virtual / actual distinction to do the work of argument, implicitly rejecting the possible / real distinction, is to engage more directly with the practical metaphysics. Consequently my own focus needs to remain with the problems that surround the possible / real distinction rather than the implications of using the virtual / real distinction. If we turn back to the question of the possible it seems that the question of existence and its relation to the possible / real distinction may offer more ground for conceptual work than the argument from the strength of evolutionary theory. In particular in may take us closer to the way in which the transcendental is reworked within Deleuze.

The relation of existence to possibility can be approached through an investigation of modalities and their linguistic representation. De Landa describes this problem in terms of Quine’s question about the possible fat man and the possible bald man in the doorway, asking whether they are the same or whether they are two. The issue here is how to decide between possibles. Quine points to the problem of whether the concept of identity can be applied to ‘unactualised possibilities’ asking ‘what sense can be found in talking of entities which cannot meaningfully said to be identical with themselves and distinct from one another’?\(^{140}\) As De Landa points out, modal problems are most often addressed through linguistic analysis, in particular through the problem of counter-factuals. The response to this that De Landa pursues, citing the work of Ronald Giere, relies upon the way in which physical laws, when combined with the initial conditions of a state space, can have their ambiguity reduced by reducing the set of initial conditions. ‘Given a

\(^{138}\) Other works of Deleuzian interpretation which work at this border of philosophy and science are; Timothy S.Murphy, *Quantum ontology; a virtual mechanics of becoming* in Deleuze and Guattari – new mappings in politics, philosophy and culture, ed.s E.Kaufman & K.J.Heller, pp.211-229; Alistair Welchman, *Machinic thinking* in Deleuze and philosophy, ed. K.A.Pearson, p.211-229

\(^{139}\) Ansell-Pearson, op.cit, p.85

\(^{140}\) W.V.O.Quine, quoted in De Landa, op.cit, p.34
specific initial condition and a deterministic law (such as those of physical science) one and only one trajectory is individuated, a fact that may be used to challenge Quine’s sceptical stance. In other words the problem of unactualised possibles is removed by showing that the process of actualisation can be predictable, thus removing the ambiguity of the possibles. What this does, of course, is shift the conceptual problem of possibles that Quine points to into an ontological problem, solving the conceptual problem by asserting an ontological status to the possibles.

There is something left over in Quine’s scepticism, however, if we use an ontological structure to explain the reality or otherwise of various possibles. In effect this excess is a linguistic excess, an excess of meaning resting upon the relation of possible to its negation, the impossible. Through a series of conceptual connections the possible / real pair is linked to the possible / impossible pair, which then enables a link to be made between the possible / impossible and the contingent / necessary. This can be seen as far back in philosophy as Aristotle, who develops an intimate relation between possible / impossible and contingent / necessary within his work De Interpretatione. He argues there that. ‘From the proposition ‘it cannot not be’ or ‘it is not contingent that it should not be’ it follows that it is necessary that it should be and that it is impossible that it should not be’.

More importantly a conceptual connection between possible and actual is set up which lies at the root of the problems Kant attempted to overcome in his transcendental move by limiting possible things to possible things of experience.

Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism can be formulated in opposition to Kant in a crude way by saying that Deleuze wants to replace the Kantian ‘conditions of possible experience’ with ‘conditions of real experience’ (DR; 232, 285). It is clear that ‘possible experience’ is vital to the Kantian project of the Critique of pure reason (CPR) as we can see, when he declares in the ‘Doctrine of Method’ that ‘it is only possible for reason to use the conditions of possible experience as conditions of the possibility of things; but it is by no means possible for it as it were to create new ones, independent of these conditions, for concepts of this sort, although free of contradiction, would nevertheless also be without an object’ (CPR; A771/B799). This seemingly positive assertion can also be paraphrased as a negative injunction, viz. that it is impossible to use anything other than the conditions of possible experience to establish the conditions of possibility of things. This impossibility restricts things to the things of a possible experience which is then defined by the form of this experience. Absolutely central to this Kantian argument is the notion of possibility. It determines the limits of knowledge as the limits of possible knowledge.

141 De Landa, op.cit, p.35
142 Aristotle, De Interpretatione (On Interpretation) pp. 38 - Bk.1, part 13, section 2.
143 The distinction between conditions of real as against possible experience is not found in Deleuze’s book on Kant. Kant’s critical philosophy, published in 1963, but is present by the time we get to DR. It appears to stem from the work on Bergson, published in 1966 – cf. B; 23, 28 – and is also prominent in the 1978 lectures on Kant, where Deleuze returns to a work he says that he has not read for a long time (lecture transcript Kant: synthesis of time).
Whilst the Kantian critique rests, on the one hand, on the famous formulation of CPR A51/B75, that ‘thoughts without contents are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind’, there is on the other hand an attempt to limit the extravagances of the concept rooted in distinguishing a general logic from a transcendental logic. The combinatorial element of the famous Kantian formula is brought together with the transcendental logic. Distinct from any ‘general logic’, the transcendental logic underpins the very structure of any combination and any verdict since it delimits the realm or domain of such verdicts and thus of any knowledge. The conditions of possibility that Kant introduces thus shift the emphasis from the empirical to the ideal realm, locking knowledge into the transcendental idealism that takes prime position over any empirical realism. It is the court of reason, not the play of sensation, that is of utmost importance to Kant and it is this juridical judgemental emphasis that Deleuze radically opposes, not the necessity of a combinatorial activity put forward in the formula from B75.

One place in which this distinction between general and transcendental logic can be clearly found is within the discussion of the antinomies. Paul Abela argues, for example, that ‘the central stratagem Kant advocates for dissolving the apparent antinomy is to identify and challenge the shared transcendental realist epistemic framework in which the confrontation is located’\(^\text{144}\). At the heart of this is the claim that the conceptual relations given by a general logic are insufficient to determine real relations. In particular the idea is that the central principle of non-contradiction of a concept, which rests at the heart of general logic, does nothing more than outline a necessary but not sufficient condition of the concept. If the concept of an object is not inherently self-contradictory then this does nothing more than allow that object the status of a possible object not the status of a possible object of experience. With respect to the antinomies the argument on both sides presupposes the reality of an object solely on the basis of that object not being inherently self-contradictory. The relation of the possible to existence is made clear in terms of the antinomies, Abela argues, through considering the affirmation of the disjunction. That is, if we are to judge between either A or B and both A and B are possible concepts of an object, then we can use the strategy of affirming the disjunction by arguing for a contradiction on one side or other of the argument. The logical structure of the antinomies thus becomes:

\[(\exists w) (Fw \lor \neg Fw)\]\(^\text{145}\).

This implies that at least one of the sides of the logical disjunction (Fw \lor \neg Fw) exists. The existential quantifier, whilst being interpolated by Abela into his reading of Kant, points to the fact that existence is presupposed in the structure of the antinomies\(^\text{146}\). This

\(^{144}\) Paul Abela, Kant’s empirical realism, p.219

\(^{145}\) ibid, p.221

\(^{146}\) The role of the existential quantifier is open to dispute and Wittgenstein notes in a letter to Russell that the job of philosophy is not to comment on the existential status of the object of the concept but instead to elucidate the structures of implication. It is the job of physics, not philosophy, to determine the status of objects Wittgenstein argues. He compares two forms of logical proposition – (1)(\exists x)x=x and (2)(x):x=x.⊃ (\exists y).y=y claiming that (1) is a proposition of physics whilst (2) is a proposition of philosophy. cf. P.M.S.Hacker, Insight and Illusion, p.8 fn.2
is another way of putting the problem of a general logic illegitimately extrapolating from conceptual determinations to real determinations.

The structure of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, resting as it does on the notion of conditions of possible experience, replaces a general logic with a transcendental logic. What is transcendental about this logic is rooted in the notion of a condition of possibility (COP). Whilst this condition of possibility is tied into experience within Kant, the COP itself encloses experience within the particular transcendental framework given by the COP, which itself is determined both by the idea of ‘condition’ as well as ‘possibility’. It is not experience, per se, that is important for Kant but his determination of experience as possible experience which enables the transcendental thought to begin. The transcendental in general, in this situation, can be thought of as asking after the conditions of the object and not necessarily as the conditions of possibility of the object.

Karl Ameriks notes that Kant describes the general search for the conditions of the conditioned judgement as the ‘general logical maxim of reason’\(^{147}\). Is Deleuze not simply dropping the transcendental move in order to replace it with this general logical maxim of reason? In replacing possible experience with real experience, it is not a reduction to a general logical maxim of reason that Deleuze proposes but a different transcendental move, focussed not on the conditions of the conditioned judgement but on the giving of the given experience. The general logical maxim of reason as indicative of a peculiar tendency or search particular to reason is still as much a part of Deleuze’s argument as it is of Kant’s but the object of the transcendental move is not to inquire into judgement but directly into experience itself.

Deleuze’s move to replace possible experience as the object of the transcendental move with a concept of real experience derives essentially from the break with the possible / real pairing and its replacement with the virtual / actual pair, both sides of which are fully real. At this point I want to introduce a diagram of the way in which I am describing the differing conceptions of the virtual / actual and possible / real.

![Diagram of the virtual, actual, actualisation, realised, possible, and real concepts](image)

*Figure 1*

\(^{147}\) Karl Ameriks, *The critique of metaphysics; Kant and traditional ontology* in *Cambridge companion to Kant*, ed.P.Guyer, p.251
What this diagram describes is the difference in movement that is being claimed between the virtual / actual and the possible / real. What this diagram does not describe is the transcendental movement. The transcendental movement, as it relates to the diagram, would be the reversal of the movements of actualisation or realisation, it would involve a sort of ‘thinking backwards’ along this diagram. Specifically this involves what Deleuze calls counter-actualisation. It is through the notion of counter-actualisation that we will be able to understand the ability to think the movement of actualisation as an immanent movement. What is at stake in thinking immanence will then be the ability – not the possibility – to think the actualisation of the virtual through a counter-actualisation of thought. Critically this will provide a basis for the Deleuzian idea of sense as an event and will enable us to understand the basic outlines of the logic of sense as the logic of the event.

Before moving on, however, I want to re-trace my steps to deal with some obvious criticisms of the account of Kant’s transcendental philosophy that has been given. Kant’s transcendental philosophy does not discuss a process of realisation but is instead centred on the distinction between the a priori and a posteriori and famously asks after the possibility of the synthetic a priori. As Deleuze himself notes in Kant’s critical philosophy, ‘transcendental’ qualifies the principle of necessary subjection of what is given in experience to our a priori representations, and correlative the principle of a necessary application of a priori representations to experience’ (KCP; p.13). Whilst for Kant this involves establishing a set of limitation arguments for the nature of experience by constraining experience to the phenomenal realm, for Deleuze the ‘transcendental’ involves what can be called the ‘giving of the given’, which would include the giving of the phenomena that constitute the phenomenal realm. Kant is not transcendental enough for Deleuze, he ‘botches’ the transcendental and gets caught within the empirical. This implies that what is called the transcendental is not identical to the Kantian formulation and there seems no reason to suppose it must be. What is ‘Copernican’ about the Kantian critical move is not the ‘formula’ of ‘conditions of possibility’; it is the move to grasp the very possibility of the world itself within experience, within the empirical, within intuition. Therefore it is not the case that Deleuze simply avoids the implications of the conceptual structure that is established by the particular Kantian formula. These formulations produce a peculiarly Kantian transcendental philosophy but do not therefore produce the only transcendental philosophy and Deleuze is pursuing an alternative account of the transcendental rather than a specifically anti-Kantian argument.

148 This phrase derives from F.C.T. Moore, Bergson: thinking backwards, Cambridge 1996. Moore describes Bergson’s method as a sort of ‘thinking backwards’ and whilst this is not an accurate description of the transcendental move qua transcendental, I think it indicates intuitively what is occurring in the attempt to think the transcendental. Cf. also DR; 282
149 Bas Van Fraasen suggests that this is Kant’s main contribution to a ‘purified’ empiricism, by establishing through a sceptical argument the limits of knowledge – cf Bas Van Fraasen, op.cit. Karl Ameriks account runs counter to Van Fraasens’ by ascribing a positive metaphysical content to Kant’s work (metaphysical immaterialism), which would imply that the limiting of experience to possible experience is merely part of a general move to limit the knowledge claims of metaphysical statements, what Ameriks calls the ‘combination of metaphysical commitment and non-specificity’ –Karl Ameriks, Kant’s theory of mind; an analysis of the paralogisms of pure reason, p.313.
Does this not avoid the problems Kant poses however? On the one hand the Kantian critical move seems to rely on a notion of form such that the general form of an object must be in accord with the general form of experience for the object to be knowable. Thus it has an epistemological import. Or, again, it has the structure of enabling an apodictic structure to be established in our knowledge that enables it to be law-giving with regard to the world. Thus it has an ontological import. A transcendental philosophy is not a formula or, if it is, it is a formula that is structured to provide both the world and our knowledge of the world. It is, therefore, fundamentally a formula of relation. It is not a conceptual problem – such as the unity or plurality of being – that defines the transcendental philosophy but the problem of the relation of knowledge to the world. This is what is transcendental because this is the structure of the relation of an object to a transcendent otherness. There can be no transcendental without a transcendent structure being implied. The transcendental problem is thus the problem of the relation of the transcendent object. Immanence is the alternative transcendental structure of the object proposed by Deleuze as a fundamentally radical alternative to the Kantian proposal of the form of the understanding, transcendental idealism. It is for this reason that Deleuze calls his alternative structure of immanence a transcendental empiricism.

If Kant’s critical move has both an epistemological and an ontological import the question that seems crucial to the Deleuzian project is how it is going to cope with the epistemological side of this move. The structure of immanence seems to be of more relevance to the ontological side of the problem. It proposes what I have called the ‘oceanic model’ but isn’t this to go in exactly the opposite direction to Kant? After all, in Kant there is not really any ontology to speak about. The world in itself is unknowable, so it seems peculiar to talk of a Kantian ontology. The ontological import, rather than the ontology, of Kant is that ontological knowledge is specifically and necessarily limited to the form of knowledge itself. What is the Deleuzian form of knowing? Fundamentally Deleuze addresses the problem of knowledge not by investigating the form of all possible knowledge but by experimenting with the ability of knowledge. It is not what we can know, nor how we can know, but what knowledge is capable of that is at the heart of Deleuze’s philosophy. What is at stake in thinking immanence is what knowledge is capable of.

We do not know what knowledge is capable of. What we know of knowledge is that there is what we can call the ‘event of knowledge’. This event of knowledge is what

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150 Paul Guyer describes transcendental idealism as the doctrine that ‘space and time represent properties of things as they appear to us but not properties or relations of things as they are in themselves, let alone real entities like Newtonian absolute space; thus his position of 1768 is now revised to mean that space is epistemologically but not ontologically, absolute [A26/B42; A32-3/B49-50; A39-40/B56-7]. Kant’s argument is that ‘determinations’ which belong to things independently of us ‘cannot be intuited prior to the things to which they belong’ and so could not be intuited a priori, while space and time and their properties are intuited a priori. Since they therefore cannot be properties of things in themselves, there is no alternative but that space and time are merely the forms in which objects appear to us’ – Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Deleuze calls knowledge-being. In Chapter 5 I discussed, in relation to Deleuze’s discussion of the work of Foucault, how this knowledge-being is caught within the structures of forces, caught within the structure of the giving of the given. The giving of any given knowledge is a result of this structure of forces. Forces, as the outside, provides the key element for the structure of the transcendent object necessary to establish a transcendental account of thinking that includes the event of thinking the transcendental rather than the mere transcendent, the giving rather than the given. The object is transcendent to the plane of immanence, the field of forces that constitute it. To think the transcendental without botching it is to think the plane of immanence rather than the condition of possibility.

If the ‘object itself is force, the expression of a force’ (NP; 6) then thinking the object involves thinking the expression of the force. In philosophy the concept is the critical event of this thinking. The creation of a concept is an expression of the forces being thought through that concept. The concept is the object of the philosophical work. This is why philosophy is the activity of concept creation.
Chapter 8

Counter-actualisation and learning

‘Is not Humpty Dumpty himself the Stoic master? Is not the disciple’s adventure Alice’s adventure?’ Gilles Deleuze (LOS; 143)

It is difficult, when faced with the work of Deleuze, to get behind the sense of fascinating description. In a sense the texts present us with philosophical fictions and their truth or falsity is elided in favour of something else, some other way of persuading us of their power or force. This, in a sense, is the way readers such as Patton take Deleuze when they suggest he offers us a new language with which we can usefully re-describe the world. The question begging of this argument is obvious and I have already touched upon its difficulties – if the re-description is to work it must, it seems, be somehow better than the previous description. Put simply, the force of Deleuze’s new language relies upon its normative power, its ability to offer new evaluations. The difficulty of this implicit normativity is its reliance on the structure of judgement. To evaluate is to judge and whilst for Kant the capacity to judge is precisely what constitutes the understanding (CPR; A81/B106)\(^1\), for Deleuze the role of judgement (following Nietzsche) is essentially moral or ethical. Judgement is not an inherently rational but rather a moral activity. It is thus not the key feature of what we think of as an ‘understanding’ since this understanding is precisely what we want to use in understanding moral judgement. A normative practice – which is what the understanding becomes when understood as judgement – comes up against the problem of rule-following or of an immanent judgement. How do we judge the judgement? What rules do we use to apply the rules? This is a problem of the legitimacy of application which runs through pure theoretical thought all the way into concrete political problems – think, for example, of the problem of who polices the police? A structure of infinite regress threatens any normative structure and the problem is, as it were, to find a way of dealing with this apparent threat to the legitimacy of the judgement, hence my claim that this is a problem about the legitimacy of application.

If understanding is not an activity of judgement then what else could it be? At its most basic the concept of ‘understanding’ at the heart of Deleuze is a concept of the understanding as a capacity. Obviously this too begs many questions, not least the sense of a capacity as something that seems necessarily to be linked to an intention, a capacity for something. We can, however, change the problem of capacity, rebuild the problem-field and thus create a new Idea of understanding, if we begin to connect capacity to experience via learning. The issue will then not be one of the limits of knowledge or of our capacity but rather techniques of changing the capacity, which we might naturally

\(^1\) Cf. Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the capacity to judge* for a fascinating recent discussion of the role of the faculty of judgement and its relation to the categories and overall structure of Kant’s critical philosophy.
want to use to increase this capacity but which can in principle be used to decrease it if we so wished. The techniques are independent of the ends (increase / decrease) which bring with them the problems of normativity. This is not to say they remove the problem of normativity but they move it aside and make it a separate problem, one that can be fully addressed as an ethical problem.

Deleuze proposes to replace the movement of realisation by the movement of actualisation. Within the structure of realisation the transcendental inquiry investigates the conditions of possibility of the object, which I have argued relies upon the structure of realisation. The reliance on the structure of realisation is necessary to provide the force of these conditions. What can be made of the claim that we need to focus on conditions of real experience if we relate it to the structure of actualisation rather than realisation? Real experience, in Deleuzian terms, undergoes and arises from a process of actualisation, it is enmeshed within such a structure. What sense can we give the concept of experience in this structure?

Instead of attempting to define experience per se, in the Deleuzian structure we should ask instead, what is actualised as experience? The answer to this will depend on the type of experience we are interested in. The experience of swimming, for example, will actualise a relation of water, body, temperature, gravity – a whole plethora of forces forming a particular singular experience. What experience, however, is of most interest philosophically? Is there some sort of experience which can act as a primary or base model? Is there some way of getting at something akin to a concept of experience per se, an experience that, if not universal or a general model of experience, can at least occupy a more pivotal role in philosophical terms? Deleuze does not reduce real experience to a simple, incommunicable notion of an internal subjective state but instead pursues the pre-subjective actualisation of experience. For example, if experience is what constitutes the subject as a subject then it is necessary to get behind the back of subjective states into the process whereby these states come into being, pursuing the general dynamics of such a coming into being. One way in which Deleuze appears to approach this pre-individual sense of real experience is through learning.

Deleuze argues that within the image of thought knowledge is taken as an end or result and subordinates learning to its own formation. The approach to learning that was discussed in Chapter 6 suggested that the Deleuzian approach works from a sense of dimensionality, with the example of learning to swim being given. Plainly this is a sort

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152 This sense of ‘dimensionality’ suggests a notion of what is called ‘embodied cognition’. This model and the problem it arises from – the attempt to analyse concrete structures of representation in a way that can offer solutions and practical strategies for creating such embodied cognition artificially – is highly topical within current cognitive science / philosophy of mind. So far this discipline has begun to draw on Heideggerian concepts of ‘being in the world’ as well as the work of Merleau-Ponty, in order to explore this notion of embodied cognition. Deleuzian concepts have had little direct impact, though it seems likely they would offer numerous resources for further study. Cf; Andy Clark, Being there for a fascinating study of the problems of embodied cognition studies, where Heiddegger’s influence is obvious. The dialogues between Clark, Daniel Dennett, Robert Cummins, John Haugeland and Brian Cantwell Smith, in Philosophy of mental representation, ed. Hugh Clapin, give a fascinating overview of a number of issues in
of practical knowledge that we might put aside as a skill and distinguish from knowledge on that basis. Again, however, we can find in the notion of skill something that might be possessed, something that is fundamentally a result or end. This would forget that the process of learning is introduced by Deleuze as a way of countering the ‘eighth postulate of the image of thought’ (DR; 167), in which knowledge is defined as an end. The Deleuzian concept of learning is thus orientated towards the practical side of a practical / theoretical division in the sense of knowledge and towards an ongoing or open process rather than one which is closed or finished. In this sense learning involves the development of a capacity or ability rather than a skill and is closer to what we might call an art, an open developing skill rather than a closed and possessed or acquired skill. Learning is an open and practical form of knowledge, irreducible to the acquisition of a skill and akin to the activity of the artist. In this connection with an artists’ practice we can see the clue to the connection between the concept of learning and that of expression. The artist is pre-eminently the expresser, the one whose role is, in effect, to express. The open and practical activity that constitutes learning also constitutes the basic activity of the artist and expression is grounded on this type of activity.

Is it necessary to cite examples of artists who speak of their constant process of learning, or of the open-ended never-finished nature of the practice they engage in? It would, in some sense, be of interest in a study of artistic practice to engage in such investigations. In this instance, however, my purpose is simply the connection of the practice of the artist with that of the student, the pupil, the one who learns. What is of interest in this study is this practice of the pupil and the relation this practice has to a notion of experience. This is a conceptual construction or, more cautiously, a relation susceptible to conceptual analysis and as such a philosophical relation.

For example, Blanchot’s description of the master / pupil relation opens up an experiential relation to the infinite. The Socratic relation of master to pupil also involves an experiential structure, this time that of an erotics. These are examples of the way that the relation between master and pupil can be conceptualised other than through the model of imparting knowledge as a product. The relation is experiential and may possibly, as in the case of Blanchot, have directionality as well. In the case of the artist we are able to take this notion of an experiential relation of learning and ask who would best fulfil the role of the master. Another artist or the world itself?

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153 Maurice Blanchot, The infinite conversation, p.5-6
154 Robin Waterfield, introduction to Xenophon’s The dinner party in Xenophon, Conversations of Socrates, p.219-226.
The philosopher who wants to think the object as expression of forces can approach the world as a master in the same way that the artist might do. The creation of concepts as the act of thinking the object would thus derive from an attentive learning of the worlds forces, a diligent pupillage towards the world (apprenticeship). The problems posed by this master are then approached through a symptomatology which presupposes and prioritises the world, through real experience and the sensible. If we ask what knowledge is capable of rather than what it is we can know we can now formulate this more specifically by asking whether knowledge is capable of taking the world as its master.

Doesn’t illusion forbid the world the status of master? The very structure of an appearance / reality divide relies upon this rejection of the world as a master because of its tendency to deceive. Deception, however, can take many forms, not least the deception of the simulacra rather than the liar. The illusions of perception may appear to forbid the philosophical pupil from taking the world as master but their status may have been too hastily assumed to be mere illusion. The full force of illusion is not revealed, of necessity, by the lie or deceit but by the open illusion performed by stage magicians and tricksters and within the theatre. To lie successfully is to appear not to lie. To allow the full force of an illusion is to acknowledge the mask that is being worn and yet to wear it so well that the wearing of the mask is a becoming real because it is a real becoming. Revealing the mechanics of the trick or the tricks of the actor’s trade can in no simple way destroy the force of the techniques. To take the world as ones’ master involves acting the part until the force of the world is unleashed through the act which then becomes a full reality rather than a parasitic covering of illusion.

This notion of acting appears in the opening moves of DR, which as we have indicated may be seen as a polemic against representational models or images of thought. In this it is a polemic against identity and sameness. The polemic itself, as a rhetorical figure, offers us a picture of movement. This movement is the movement of the argument. This movement of the argument is one of opposition, if we understand it in terms of the dialectic, whether taken as Hegel's dialectic or referred back to the Platonic origins of Western thought. The objection from the Hegelian side rests with the argument that although opposition may destroy it also conserves in a movement of sublation. Thought, if it is to think difference, must find the point of irrecuperability where difference can no longer be contained. One possible path is through the deployment of masks and simulacra.

One of the first points of engagement is along the lines of theatre. At first there is, for Deleuze, a unison between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. They are ‘among those who bring to philosophy new means of expression. In relation to them we speak readily of an overcoming of philosophy. Furthermore in all their work movement is at issue. Their objection to Hegel is that he does not go beyond false movement - in other words the abstract logical movement of mediation. They [that is, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard] want to put metaphysics in motion, in action, they want to make it act’ (DR; 8). The act is in this situation a making real and the act of acting makes real the acted. Given this it may
seem that Deleuze is acting in his deployment of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, utilising a partially pre-written script, rehearsing an already staged production. If this were the case Deleuze would simply be doing critical exegesis, which rose no further than basic summation. A re-production of an already produced, a representation of the already given which would form an empty repetition. Yet Deleuze wants to break from the model of representation in all its forms, in its most intimate forms of thought, and so any empty repetition would run counter to the thrust of the argument. There is a question then of how the uniqueness of the acted act can be accounted for, how creation can arise from the already created? If Deleuze does not account for this anomaly he would be led to a place where his own act of philosophy would be empty. The deployment of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is merely a part of Deleuze's movement, these proper names are masks he wears for a moment only retaining their trace within his own act.

Clean black type on sheer white paper, clarity and necessity, law and certitude - these are among the notions that surround the thought of sense or thought's production of sense. Theatre on the other hand provides a pole of chaos and confusion, the cacophony of voices that we may associate with the heated dialogue on stage at the moment of instant dramatic import. Theatre is visceral, thought intellectual; theatre is empirical, whereas thought is rational; theatre is the pole of Dionysus, whilst thought is that of Apollo. Deleuze's argument is that the opposition between thought and theatre is precisely what is destroyed or attacked in the work of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, where they neither set up a philosophical theatre, which remains theatre rather than philosophy, nor establish simply a theatrical philosophy, which again falls back into the merely theatrical - 'they invent an incredible equivalent of theatre within philosophy, thereby founding simultaneously this theatre of the future and a new philosophy' (DR; 8). The work of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, by refusing the boundary between theatre and philosophy, troubles both by the infection of each with the other. Moreover the place of philosophy becomes a place of theatre and the place of theatre that of philosophy. The argument of equivalence here rests on the ambiguity at the heart of the acting that forms the bedrock of theatre - 'when Kierkegaard explains that the Knight of faith so resembles a bourgeois in his Sunday best as to be capable of being mistaken for one, this philosophical instruction must be taken as the remark of a director showing how the knight of faith should be played' (DR; 9). He makes a similar remark in regard to Nietzsche's Zarathustra where he also suggests that these are 'the remarks of a director indicating how the Overman should be played' (DR; 10). The opposition between theatre and thought, however, focuses around the issue of mediation and is meant to illuminate something around this issue. Mediation is the false movement of thought and Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are shown as opposing Hegel and his false movement with a real movement - 'they want to put metaphysics in motion, in action' (DR; 8). They do this by making theatre act and 'make it carry out immediate acts' (ibid).

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155 This involves Lecercle’s notion of a philosophical appropriation of theatre and its forces – cf Chapter 2 above.
Deleuze develops the opposition between thought and theatre on the basis of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche and yet interestingly keeps a slight distance, one that can be seen for example by hisprefacing an exegetical comment with the phrase ‘*this is what we are told*’. This is part of a profound sympathy that may be seen in Deleuze's method, a sympathy with the theatrical as capable of opening up a new thought. Each proper name is a mask, each concept a mask and beneath the masks only further masks - ‘*theatre is real movement*’ and yet paradoxically it is only real movement because it is simultaneously false movement, movement of the actor acting the acted. ‘*Remember the song of Ariadne from the mouth of the sorcerer.*’ Here two masks are superimposed, that of a young woman, almost of a *Kore*, which has just been laid over the mask of a repugnant old man. The actor must play the role of an old man playing the role of the *Kore.* Here too, for Nietzsche, it is a matter of filling the inner emptiness of the mask within a theatrical space, by multiplying the superimposed masks and inscribing the omnipresence of Dionysus in that superimposition, by inserting both the infinity of real movement and the form of the absolute difference given in the repetition of eternal return’ (DR; 9).

The act of acting seems exemplary because it embodies the non-self-identical. The act of acting both is and is not an act\textsuperscript{156}. The act and the ambiguity around the term cannot be resolved into definitions that revolve around the hands with which we grasp the notion - on the one hand this, on the other hand that - but rather plays the role of advocate of a denial of the principle of identity and an example of something that refuses the principle of self-identity. The acts' implications would include troubling – though not denying - the principle of non-contradiction of which the principle of identity forms the basis. Deleuze is here engaging with issues at the heart of metaphysics and not with merely an excursion into a philosophy of the theatre. I would also, crudely, put forward the difference in Deleuze’s approach to concepts at this point. Whilst he articulates a structure that is aporetic, such as the structure of theatre and the act, this aporia is always being pushed away from a structure of lack and absence towards productivity. The aporetic structure is the productive point of departure, the aleatory point through which a new world is opened up. The aporetic is no limit that simply encompasses or forms a work, enclosing and outlining the vague and misty edges of the realms of thought, nor is it a lack - it is instead a moment of creative tension, a point of departure from which it will always be possible to embark on a journey of thought. To embark on such a journey, however, necessitates not a recapitulation of a previous trek but rather the creation of a new route. This involves the philosopher in the practice of creating concepts since it is only through this creation that the philosopher begins to make their thought mobile.

\textsuperscript{156} In this sense the act of acting is an almost paradigm example of the problem of becoming, in a practical sense. For a fascinating discussion of acting cf; Brian Bates, *The way of the actor*, which builds upon his earlier studies of indigenous British shamanist practice explored in *The way of wyrd*. I have discussed the relation of Deleuzian notions of becoming to modern day indigenous shamanistic practices (witchcraft) in an essay entitled ‘*Memories of a sorcerer*’; notes on Gilles Deleuze-Félix Guattari, Austin Osman Spare and Anomalous Sorceries.
The issue of there being an illegitimate or crippling arbitrariness in the creation of concepts still lingers, however, particularly if the argument is put forward from the position of advocating the mask as a strategy of disorganisation\textsuperscript{157}. In this form, as a description of the complexities thrown up by masks, the issue of acting is more like a phenomenological clue than an argument. Indeed, just what sort of arguments a misosopher uses would be difficult to clearly identify in principle since they would, presumably, need to resist an argument that operated solely on the basis of an established structure of validity. Whilst logic may well give us a set of criteria for valid argument forms it does not profess to offer criteria of all forms of argument. The sort of argument a misosopher would give, therefore, may well be of a form the validity of which is either unknown or unknowable. There may just be a certain sort of argument which works but which works almost in spite of its structure. In one sense, of course, this is exactly what phenomenological descriptions offer, a sense of their sense. They give a sense that can be sensed affectively, generating an intuition that something about what they are saying is, if not right, then interesting, curious, perhaps even thought-provoking. The phenomenological insight can be said to open a question, which opens on the basis of the problem it arises from, a problem which is instantiated in the opening of the question but which precedes the question as though it were its ground\textsuperscript{158}.

Again, then, I return to this necessity to create concepts. How are we to begin this process? We can turn, at this point, to the example Deleuze gives of a counter-actualisation to begin to see how the movement engendered through acting can begin to open up a thinking of the giving of the given, the transcendental empiricism that Deleuze advocates.

\textsuperscript{157} This is the danger of a boundless or infinite extension, in semantic terms. It is a reading of Deleuze that is still popular, whereby he is converted into a ‘free-play’ post-modernist. Witness, for example, Roger Dawkins – ‘true thought is awoken by the violence of the senses, and in its capacity to think beyond representation, or what Paul Patton describes as certain ‘timid and conservative presuppositions’, experience becomes a boundless process of meaning creation’ – Thoughts on Deleuze, Spinoza and the cinema (The enigma of Kasper Hauser) in Contretemps, p.68. What are presupposed in these sorts of accounts are exactly the capacity that is being lauded and the claim that this capacity is unbounded renders the account merely question begging by assuming that which it wants to claim.

\textsuperscript{158} The sub-clause ‘as though it were’ may here hedge the concrete change that might better be described as ‘becoming’, though that word too suggests it will, at some point, be the cause, that is, rest in that state. Within a Deleuzian methodology of thought it may not be a matter of deciding what the cause is but of experimenting with the implicitly linear structure of causality itself. The cause that comes after the effect, however, is a peculiar concept, paradoxical in its appearance until the re-working of the temporal structures presupposed by thought has taken place. Within a paradigm a paradox is not apparent but real and the trembling of the paradox through its transformation into an apparitional entity occurs only with the attempt to break from the particular paradigm, a trembling that might be thought to continue until the new paradigm settles and sediments, preventing the original paradox even being seen and causing its own new paradoxes to emerge. This is, however, a model of paradigm shift that suggests a catastrophic model of change, akin to that suggested by Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue. Bas Van Fraasen notes that Paul Feyeraband has hinted at another way of seeing paradigm shift as, to some degree, a developmental process whereby the shift or break is less dramatically posed as a ‘superposition’ of states – cf. Bas Van Fraasen, review of Paul Feyeraband, Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction Versus the Richness of Being. Review published in Times Literary Supplement 5073; 23 June 2000.
In the 21st series of LOS we find Deleuze discussing the nature of ‘the Event’ not in terms of sense but in terms of an ethics of the event. Drawing upon the Nietzschean ideas of ressentiment and the eternal return Deleuze sketches out a passionate plea for us to become worthy of the events that pass through us. We must, following the Nietzschean line, ‘will the event’ in order to become worthy of it and by doing so we will release the ‘eternal truth’ of the event. The way in which this is described points to a peculiar folding in of itself involved in the event, whereby the ‘things that happen’ are, as it were, converted into an event through a movement that Deleuze calls ‘a sort of leaping in place’ (LOS; 149). The specific example of such a leaping in place is drawn from the French writer Joe Bousquet, who writes of an inclination for death (failure of the will) being given over for a longing for death (apotheosis of the will). The difference between the longing and the inclination, though apparently no more than a volitional difference, is capable of making a transformative difference precisely because the longing converts occurrences into events. The affirmation of ‘what is’ must be nothing as simple as a quietist acceptance but an active conversion of the occurrence of life into the event of life.

This process has been noted by James Brusseau, who points to the problems in such an apparently voluntaristic act of ‘changing the will’. He indicates that there are two central difficulties. First, that if the ‘change’ is to accord with the eternal return then it cannot be an imperative, the imposition of a will upon a will, since this leads to a paradox. For example, if the imperative was formulated as ‘be spontaneous’ the paradox becomes more obvious since the very imperative, once issued and heard, presents a fundamental difficulty in then being spontaneous. Second, drawing on a passage from the Gay Science, Brusseau argues that if the affirmative change in the will is to avoid a pre-determination or fatalism then it must not allow this external order of temporality to impose its order on it any more than the externality of an imperative. The paradoxical nature of using the eternal return as a way of avoiding a reduction of the change in will to a subjective voluntarism appears, however, because it is attempting to alter the basic paradigm of a will and as such brings with it a fresh set of conceptual arrangements. Within the paradigm within which the will is individual rather than individuated or individuating a number of presuppositions exist which form the paradox. These presuppositions could probably be pursued in more depth but we can point to three as a basic measure of the situation; that the will is (a) singular (b) ‘belonging’ (mine) and (c) free. Within the problem field which is constituted by the arrangement of these traits as traits of the will, the problem of the event of changing the will makes paradoxical or aporetic the attempt to be somehow both free and determined. What this seems to rule out of court is, for example, a concept of free entry into slavery. More accurately it rules out of court any notion of submission as a positive act. All submission would be explained through self-delusion or some other mechanism since in itself a free submission is an impossible concept. This is also, however, plainly absurd since the free

159 James Brusseau, Isolated Experiences; Gilles Deleuze and the solitudes of reversed Platonism; p.28
160 Brusseau quotes from Nietzsche’s Gay Science; p.273 – ‘every pain and every joy and every thought and every sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence...’
submission to authority can be seen as a central feature of many structures of communal life. The eternal return is paradoxical, after all it posits a kind of slavery, a submission to the necessary return of the event but Brusseau argues that to simply halt at this paradox fails to take account of the transformative structure of the eternal return, what Deleuze might call the folding back or involution of the change in the will.

For Brusseau there are two moments to an affirmation. First there is the affirmation of the eternal return – as phrased in the Gay Science – such that we choose the moment again and forever, which brings up the problems already noted of it being driven by an external source. Second, however, there is the leap into the eternal return, whereby having done the act it is confirmed not caused. The first moment is preceded by the ‘imperative to will an act infinitely’¹⁶¹ and is part of a temporal order where the imperative is a cause, whereas the second moment opens another temporal order of validation and valuation of the ‘effect’ where, Brusseau argues, ‘before you encounter action meriting the second affirmation, you must have already accomplished the act’¹⁶². The two orders of temporality appear to be something like a backward and forward facing will and a tentative suggestion might be that the affirmation creates a new world with its own past and future. The emphasis is on the productive element of the will within the framework of the eternal return, what we might call the creative will. This may well be why Brusseau feels that the reading of the eternal return that he draws from Deleuze is one which is primarily ontological, where the eternal return is the productive nature in act.

‘When Deleuze writes that your nature must change to enter the eternal return, he does not mean you need to select a different one, more outgoing or frivolous or something. He means you need to change what a nature is’¹⁶³. The technique for doing this is still unclear, though it is central to the leaping in place that is at the heart of counter-actualisation. Brusseau begins his elaboration on the technique by using an example from Rousseau’s relation to language. The account he gives is that for Rousseau the loss of the original nature of the noble savage derives from the arrival of property (mine) followed by the acquisition of language¹⁶⁴. The return to the original state, which will be pre-linguistic, must, however, take place through the use of language – ‘language must be used to forget language’¹⁶⁵. The move into the eternal return is then seen as structurally analogous to this attempt to forget language through language in that the will, to be reclaimed from reactive forces, needs to go beyond reacting to reactive forces and enter what might be akin to an original state of creativity. This forgetting or leap is, for Brusseau, structurally similar within Deleuze (as the moment of the 2nd affirmation of the eternal return) to the moment of divine madness within Plato¹⁶⁶.

¹⁶¹ Brusseau, Op.cit, p.29
¹⁶² ibid.
¹⁶³ ibid, p.32
¹⁶⁴ ibid, p.33
¹⁶⁵ ibid, p.34
¹⁶⁶ cf. Plato, The Phaedrus, 244, 265. There are four types of divine madness – Dionysian (mystical), Apollonian (prophetic) the Muse-ical or that of the Muses (poetic) and the Aphroditean or Erotic, that of
The structure of counter-actualisation rests upon this moment of divine madness, the leaping in place, but what distinguishes it is the relation it opens to the temporal order that Brusseau touches on but only partially develops. The temporal order as Deleuze conceives it is neither one of Heideggerian ecstases nor one of Aristotelian linearity but derives from a peculiar combination of Bergson and Nietzsche. For the purposes of this essay the most important word within the Deleuzian concept of time I want to focus on is Aion. The Aion is, as it were, the reconfigured notion of the more commonly understood instant of the Present. We can find a formulation of the Aion in its relation to counter-actualisation at the end of the 23rd series of LOS. ‘This present of the Aion representing the instant is not at all like the vast and deep present of Chronos; it is the present without thickness, the present of the actor, dancer or mime – the pure perverse `moment’. It is the present of the pure operation, not of the incorporation. It is not the present of subversion or actualisation, but that of counter-actualisation, which keeps the former from overturning the latter, and the latter from being confused with the former, and which comes to duplicate the living’ (LOS; 168).

The distinction between Chronos and Aion derives from Deleuze’s reading of the Stoics and connects to the three syntheses of time that form a central aspect of his philosophy. The Stoics construed the world as continuous rather than made of discrete atoms whilst simultaneously seeing this continua as a material rather than ideal ontology. Philip Turetzky describes this view as in contrast to an Epicurean materialism founded on an atomism and points out that it involves an ontology of

\[ \text{Aion} \]

\[ \text{Chronos} \]

\[ \text{time, duration; period, term} \] for Chronos (Ξρονοσ) and \[ \text{space of time, duration, period; age, lifetime; eternity; one’s destiny} \] for Aion (Αιϖν). Chronos is one of the protogenitors in the Greek cosmogony, linked to Ananke (necessity, compulsion) – ‘KHRONOS was the PROTOGONOS of time who emerged self-formed at the very beginning of time. He was an incorporeal being, serpentine in form with three heads - that of a man, a bull, and a lion. He and his mate, the serpentine Ananke (Inevitability), entwined the world-egg in their coils and split it apart, forming the ordered universe of earth, sea and sky’ – cf. www.theoi.com
interpenetration without giving up specific identity. The example given contrasts an Epicurean model of mixture which would take the mixing of grains or beans as its basis – discrete bodies within a whole – with a Stoic model of mixture such as the mixture of sounds within the air.\textsuperscript{169} What I have pointed to as an oceanic ontology central to Deleuzian thought is clearly closer to this notion of Stoic mixtures. Within this framework of an essential continuity the Stoics conceived time as having essentially two forms, that of Chronos and that of Aion.

Chronos is the time of bodies whereas Aion is the time of the incorporeal. The reason for this distinction rests in the Stoic ontology. Within the Stoic ontology only bodies, material corporeal bodies, exist. Brad Inwood suggests that this derives from Plato’s \textit{Sophist} and that the underlying reason for this claim is the belief that ‘\textit{the only realities are things which can act and be acted upon, and that these are bodies}’\textsuperscript{170}. These bodies are constantly mixed, interpenetrating as states of affairs and alongside the corporeal bodies the Stoics recognise another layer of existence, the incorporeal\textsuperscript{171}. The incorporeal \textit{subsists} rather than exists and the example given by Turetzky, which plays a key role in the LOS, is the notion of the surface. The bodies cannot have clear and distinct surfaces since this would necessitate discrete existence and hence discontinuity. The reality of surfaces cannot simply be thrown away however and so the Stoics see surfaces as limits towards which bodies tend but which they never reach. Surfaces are thus \textit{asymptotic limits}, singular points which determine tendencies. As Turetzky says, ‘\textit{Chrysippus was the first to understand the concept of a limit to which an infinite series converges}’\textsuperscript{172}. The limit does not exist but it is also not nothing, a non-existent. It is thus given the status of a subsistent, an incorporeal.

\textsuperscript{169} I am using the term ‘Stoic’ very broadly, although within common usage, and the distinctions between Stoic philosophers are not taken up. In particular I am drawing on Philip Turetzky’s discussion of Stoic theories of time which rely upon their physics. Stoic philosophy consisted of the three elements of logic, ethics and physics and varying emphases exist. Epictetus, for example, may be seen to have a greater emphasis on ethics, with a view that the problems of physics are of less concern than the problems of good and evil – cf, Epictetus, \textit{The discourse, the handbook, fragments}, p.307. Fragment 1, where this opinion of Epictetus can be found, is drawn from Stobaeus’ anthology and as Gill notes, ‘\textit{this apparent rejection of physics in place of ethics goes beyond what we find in The Discourse; but we would expect to find Epictetus insisting in the case of physics ... as well as logic, that this must go hand in hand with ethical development}’ – ibid, p.333, fn1.

\textsuperscript{170} Philip Turetzky, \textit{Time}; p.38

\textsuperscript{171} Inwood lists ‘\textit{void, place, time and lekta}’ as incorporeals – ibid, p.236, fn25. ‘Lekta’ is the Stoic term for meanings, understood as the informational content of presentations – ibid, p.233. This is perhaps more commonly understood as the ‘thing said’ Cf Diogenes Laertius, \textit{Hellenistic philosophy; introductory readings}, trans. Brad Inwood and L.P.Gerson, (henceforth HP); p.98 and Sextus (HP; 120). The incorporeal is also to be understood as bodies without form. Diogenes Laertius states that ‘\textit{the principles are bodies and without form, while the elements are endowed with form}’ – (HP; 96). Seneca points out that the Stoics have the category ‘something’ within which are both corporeal and incorporeal, although he also indicates a conflict between the ‘highest genus’ as ‘that which is’ and the ‘something’; (HP; 119-120).

\textsuperscript{172} Turetzky, Op.cit, p.39.
The present is also, like the surface, a limit point but unlike surfaces it is also fully real. Time is, literally, to be take ‘in two senses…namely in the sense of the whole and its parts’ Chrysippus declares\textsuperscript{173}. The reasons for this derive from the impossibility of reducing the now to a point or measurable and fixed instant. The Stoics agree with Aristotle that the now is not a part of time if conceived as a mathematical point but Aristotle relied on the necessary time of thought to make his point. That is, that the mind would need to pause to think the now as the end of the past and the now as the beginning of the future. The two determinations cannot be thought simultaneously\textsuperscript{174}. The reason of the Stoics, however, is not reliant upon any time of thought but rather on the idea of the limit point towards which the past and future converge without ever meeting. Just as the surface is only an incorporeal subsisting entity if the world is a continuous mixture of bodies, so the ‘now’ must be a fluid and dynamic abstraction if it is not to fix the past, present and future as discrete discontinuous moments. The now thus cannot serve as a reference point since it cannot be assumed to be a fixed and discrete ‘length’ and thus cannot form the ground of measuring motion as movement in time from one place to another.

The Stoics, however, develop their thought in paradoxical terms since they simultaneously claim that the now is not entirely present whilst also claiming that the present is the only real time. Time is not present because it is an infinitely divisible continuum, where infinite divisibility is not understood as terminable but as a process\textsuperscript{175}. ‘Consequently no time is present in the strictest sense, but only loosely speaking’ (HP; 120). At the same time it is claimed that the past and future subsist and only the present exists (ibid). The apparent contradiction only exists, however, if the time under discussion is singular whereas the doubled understanding of time as having two senses, that of Chronos and that of Aion, attempts to account for both the living bodily present (Chronos) as well as the infinite divisibility of the continua of which Chronos is an aspect (Aion).

Deleuze, drawing heavily on Bergson, has developed this doubled aspect of time in his three syntheses. The first synthesis is that of the living present, the synthesis of habit or organic contractile time. The second synthesis is that of the pure past, the synthesis of memory. The third synthesis is that of the eternal return, the synthesis of the pure Event or Aion. These syntheses provide Deleuze with the grounds for an account of the Event, an account that will underpin the understanding of sense as an event. Bergson plays a vital role not only in terms of providing Deleuze with an account of memory which inspires his 2nd synthesis of time but also in terms of further support for the idea, found in the Stoics, that time is real. Kolakowski, for example, describes a remark from Bergson where he claims that ‘each great philosopher has only one thing to say’ and how this

\textsuperscript{173} ibid, p.40, fn24. Turetsky cites Stobaeus’ Eclogae or ‘anthology’. This is a view also ascribed to Chrysippus by Arius Didymus in fragment 26 (HP; 120).


\textsuperscript{175} This infinite divisibility applies to both time and matter as continua. Diogenes Laertius – ‘[matter] can be divided to infinity. Chrysippus says that this division is infinite, <but not to infinity>; for there is no infinity for the division to reach; rather, the division is unceasing’ (HP; 100).
forms a ‘core’ to their work. He then asks what this idea would be if the maxim were applied to Bergson himself and claims that ‘we may sum up his philosophy in a single idea; time is real’. Moreover, this apparently simple and perhaps even trivial seeming idea is in fact ‘a kernel from which an entire new world picture might be developed’.  

Turetzky notes that Deleuze’s account of time does not fit into the more classical ‘analytical’ framework of such discussions, notably centred on McTaggart’s distinction between an ‘A’ series and a ‘B’ series of times. In McTaggart the ‘A’ series refers to dynamic time, where each moment slides through being a future, present or past moment. The ‘B’ series, in contrast, is a static series in which each moment is earlier or later than another, a determination that will not change. Deleuze, in contrast, conceives the future, present and past as terms relating to *syntheses* and not as ‘moments, or even designations of moments’. Next Turetzky notes the relation of Deleuzian concepts of time to those of Husserl. Deleuze disagree with Husserl that the transcendental field constituting temporality is subjective but he does follow Husserl’s line of thought in conceiving of a necessary passive synthesis of time. In other words, he conceives of a transcendental field as being necessary but this transcendental field does not have ‘the form of a subject’. Turetzky argues that Deleuze ‘renounces grounding time in subjectivity, in any of its guises, transcendental or immanent’.  

The problem of time is not that of correct designation of the meaning of a ‘moment’, either ontologically or epistemologically, but is rather focussed on the nature of the ‘event’. The problem of time is the problem of the event, that in which the new is produced, ‘prior to all subjectivity and in which the subject is produced as well’. This problem is addressed through the conception of the three syntheses.  

The first synthesis is described as the connective synthesis and constitutes the ‘living present’. The instant cannot be the basis of a temporal order since the discrete moment would only ever offer moments without time. The moment, as a moment of time, relies upon a connective synthesis that produces the continuum in which the moments are placed. This is produced through ‘extracting the difference’ in the moments’ past and future. The difference between the repetitions of the instant is, as it were, the condition of real experience of past, present and future. There must be a difference in the moment for it to be a moment of time and not an abstract ‘point’ bearing no relation to time. This first synthesis is passive and constitutive. ‘It is not carried out by the mind, but occurs in the mind which contemplates, prior to all memory and all reflection’ Deleuze argues (DR; 71). Perception of time and repetition refer back to this passive synthesis, ‘to a primary sensibility that we are’ (DR; 73). This is not a sensation but what is prior to the sensation ‘being sensed’ (DR, ibid).

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178 ibid, p.212  
179 ibid.  
180 ibid, p.213
The past, in this synthesis, occurs as the sedimented real experience of existence, for example in terms of cellular heredity. The future occurs as a need, where need is not taken to be a sign of lack but a question-problem field constituting the ‘urgency of life’ (DR; 78). The first synthesis is thus an organic synthesis and most clearly understood through an almost biological model of understanding. The thought is close to an idea of the role of gene structures as laying down a gradually accumulated past that we inherit and with which we confront an open environment of challenges to survival, although this is to over-simplify perhaps the temporal synthesis by assimilating it to a biological model which itself presupposes implicit temporal structures. The organic structure of the 1st synthesis, for example, combines with a perceptual synthesis, constituting layers or ‘levels of passive synthesis’ which form ‘a rich domain of signs which always envelop heterogeneous elements and animate behaviour’ (DR; 73).

It is important to note the way in which the passive synthesis is a multiplicity, conceived by Deleuze as a constant process of producing passive syntheses which constitute the open multiplicity of a basic temporal nature. We are composed of thousands of habits and the passive synthesis is not simply a receptive structure (DR; 78) because of the perceptual syntheses that form around the urgency of life. This combination of the past and the future within the 1st synthesis is one reason that Deleuze characterises it as contemplation. Contraction of the passive synthesis is our ‘habit of living’ and in this sense is habitual, enabling the 1st synthesis to be described as the synthesis of habit.

Whilst the language Deleuze uses may appear strange it is not that unusual in its content. The notion of a contraction as the basis of the 1st synthesis might be described as a kind of gathering together, whereby the individual organism (human, animal, plant) is the locus of a gathering together of the forces of life, the biological and organic structures that we easily recognise, that form the basis of a simple pragmatics of existence. The organism is not a static object. It grows, takes on and takes in the world as it grows, prior to anything else, including any sense of self, individual or being. Turetzky argues that ‘the first synthesis makes every present possible’ and it does so not by being a condition of possibility but by being the condition of real existence.

Allowing Deleuze, for the moment, the notion of a passive synthesis as relatively unproblematic, the conception of this synthesis as a temporal structure does appear more difficult. The problem is addressed in the move to the 2nd synthesis via the production of paradoxes that arise in an understanding of the 1st synthesis as a temporal structure. If the 1st synthesis constitutes time as a present, it is a present that is dynamic, a structure of combination of the past (heredity) and future (need, urgency of life). The problem is that if the present is dynamic, if it passes, then the 1st synthesis appears to ‘constitute time while passing in the time constituted’ which produces the problem of ‘what is this other time in which the first synthesis can occur’ (DR; 79). This is the problem of an intratemporal time and Deleuze distinguishes between the 1st synthesis of habit as the ‘foundation’ of time in terms of it being the soil from which time arises (DR; ibid) and

\[181\] ibid.
another ‘foundation’ of time as a ground of time. The soil and the ground are different. The ground ‘is what causes the present to pass, that to which the present and habit belong’ (DR; ibid). This ground is the 2nd synthesis of memory.

‘Memory is the fundamental synthesis of time which constitutes the being of the past (that which causes the present to pass)’ Deleuze declares (DR; 80). This is a conjunctive synthesis, drawn directly from the Bergsonian ‘memory cone’ in which the past is always past, never having been present. It runs alongside the present, underlying it as it were, enveloping the present in a space of being that is the past in itself\textsuperscript{182}. If the living present is the soil of time then the pure past, the 2nd synthesis of memory, provides the foundation. This Bergsonian style synthesis of memory clearly plays an important role in the Deleuzian scheme of temporal syntheses, but I am going to move rapidly past it in this account since I want to focus on the 1st and 3rd syntheses as part of understanding a notion of counter-actualisation. Before moving to the 3rd synthesis however I want to take a closer look at the notion of a passive synthesis.

At the heart of the discussion of the first two temporal syntheses is a problem of continuance. When introducing the first synthesis I touched upon the argument that the moment, as a moment of time, relies upon a connective synthesis that produces the continuum in which the moments are placed. Following Turetzky this is described as being produced through ‘extracting the difference’ in the moments’ past and future. The question at the heart of this is quite how such an extraction can take place and why. It strongly suggests a sense of a subjective, active construction of time which at its heart is a subjective construction of the continua itself. The problem is one of how discrete instances can be represented as continuous without the continuity deriving from somewhere. There is a paradox of repetition at the heart of concepts of time and it is this paradox that Deleuze is both addressing and utilising as a spur to re-think difference and repetition, alongside which he constructs his temporal syntheses.

At the start of Chapter 2 of DR, Repetition for Itself, Deleuze begins his entrance into the synthesis of habit through the activity of memory. ‘Repetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change something in the mind which contemplates it’. This stands almost like a motto at the head of the chapter but is a thesis that Deleuze derives from Hume. This epigram points to the paradox of repetition. To repeat; each instant of the repetition is discrete from each other so what is it that links the discrete instances together such that they form a repetition rather than discrete and unconnected instances? It might seem that the answer is that the mind recognises the instances as instances of the same and thus brings the discrete instances together as instances of a repetition of that same. Hence the idea that repetition changes nothing in the object but only in the mind, which prompts Deleuze to ask whether ‘originary subjectivity’ has to enter into the very constitution of repetition (DR; 70).

\textsuperscript{182} According to Turetzky the pure past ‘is a transcendental synthesis, operating through constitutive paradoxes that show why the pure past must have its own being contemporary and coexistent with the present even thought it never was present’ – ibid, p.214
The relation of subjectivity to temporal syntheses is reconfigured by the passive synthesis of habit. That is, in essence, the structure of the opening moves Deleuze makes. This is made clear when he claims that indeed ‘time is subjective, but in relation to the subjectivity of a passive subject’ (DR; 71). Everything changes, Deleuze thinks, with this passive subjectivity. The way in which Deleuze motivates the temporal syntheses relies on two different moves. There is both an empirical, concrete, almost phenomenological or biological move of the 1st synthesis and then there is a conceptual, abstract and almost transcendental move of the 2nd synthesis.

A key concept Deleuze wants to use in the notion of a passive synthesis is a concept of levels. There is a constant refrain of reference to levels within the discussion of repetition and the passive synthesis. I have already touched on Deleuze’s claim that the structure of multiple levels opens a ‘rich domain of signs’ and I now want to attempt a more schematic outline of the basic structures underlying the temporal syntheses.

This concept of levels tends to imply a perceptive prejudice, that is, that we can perceive varying levels of structure depending upon the perspective we adopt. This, however, would reduce the passive synthesis to something subjectively dependent and in that situation it would be unclear how the notion of passive synthesis could be held to reconfigure the notion of a subject. The levels of passive synthesis instead refer to an ontological thesis. Deleuze posits these levels as a model of the facts which, as such, forms a description of the real nature of time. This, of course, then has an effect on the perceptibility of the passively synthesised levels or layers of the real.

For example, the Leibnizian concept of minute perceptions is something Deleuze draws on in a discussion of the relation of clarity to obscurity (I will discuss this more in Chapter 9). This concept of minute perceptibility, which draws on a calculus-inspired interest in the infinitesimal, posits a layering of the real such that beneath each perceptible level there lays another level less perceptible. The tendency of perception is thus established as a tendency which at its limits ploughs into the imperceptible. The imperceptible, understood not as what cannot in principle be perceived but as what in fact always goes unperceived, operates as an intensive depth surrounding the level of the perceptible.

The imperceptible is not just a limit point to which perception tends, however, since there is also a distinction between conscious and unconscious perceptions, used by Leibniz as a contrast to Locke. Specifically Leibniz claims that ‘acquired habits and the contents of our memory are not always consciously perceived’\textsuperscript{183}. More generally Leibniz’s claim is that ‘at every moment there is an infinity of perceptions in us, but without apperception and without reflection – that is, changes in the soul itself, which we do not consciously perceive because these impressions are either too small or too numerous, or too homogeneous, in the sense that they have nothing sufficiently distinct in themselves; but

\textsuperscript{183} G.W.Leibniz, Preface to the New Essays in Discourse on metaphysics and other essays; p.53
combined with others they do have their effect and make themselves felt in the assemblage, at least confusedly. The example that Leibniz says he ‘usually uses’ to illustrate this idea is that of the ocean’s roar, where the parts (waves) must be heard, even though only confusedly. These tiny perceptions form the flavours of the world, that sense of the quality of the ‘thiness’ (haeccticity) of things. To further confirm the relation of these ‘petites perceptions’ to the 1st synthesis of Habit that Deleuze outlines it is striking to note that Leibniz says that ‘it can even be said that as a result of these tiny perceptions, the present is filled with the future and laden with the past’. The contraction of the 1st synthesis is precisely this ‘filled and laden-ness’ Leibniz refers to.

These tiny perceptions are defined by Leibniz as ‘insensible perceptions’, forming part of his law of continuity. Leibniz argues that the notion of insensible perceptions is conceptually useful and they cannot be simply rejected because they cannot be sensed consciously as they are necessary for the philosophy of mind as much as ‘corpuscles’ are necessary in physics. This usefulness derives from (a) a rejection of leaps in nature and its corollary (b) the law of continuity, which entails no absolute points of rest but only movement of degree. The concept of insensible perceptions implies a notion of insensible variation which itself implies that no two things can be perfectly alike ‘and must always differ in something over and above number’ which provides Leibniz with the principle that the difference between to individuals is always more than numerical (the principle of indiscernibles).

The 1st temporal synthesis of Deleuze’s thus rests heavily upon Leibnizian concepts and is intimately connected with the oceanic ontology that I noted was itself reminiscent of a Leibnizian concept of matter (chapter 5). It also enables us to see how the presentation of the 1st synthesis of time in DR is not the presentation of a psychological or subjective theory but rests instead on a Leibnizian-style ontology of continuity. This suggests that it would be an error to suggest, as De Landa does at one point, that Deleuze presents his 1st synthesis of time as a psychological theory. De Landa defends this psychologistic reading as simply a matter of convenience of presentation and not central to the account but in fact we can go further ad suggest that to read the account of the 1st synthesis psychologically (as subjective) fails to grasp the underlying structures of continuity, derived from Leibniz, that Deleuze is relying upon.

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184 ibid, p.54
185 ibid, p.54-55
186 ibid, p.55
187 ibid
188 ibid, p.56
189 ibid.
190 ‘It is remarkable how thoroughly the principle of continuity is diffused throughout the philosophy of Leibniz, … Indeed, it provides … one of the fundamental bases for Leibniz’ entire theory of space and time, and moreover is … the foundation of his psychological theory’ – Nicholas Rescher, The philosophy of Leibniz; p.54
191 Leibniz, Op.cit, p.57
192 ibid, p.58; Rescher, Op.cit, p.47.
193 Manuel De Landa, Intensive science and virtual philosophy, p.88-89
Passive synthesis thus appears to rest upon a Leibnizian-style ontological continuum that posits a sort of intimate universe rather than a universe of distances. Of course this is still a philosophical hypothesis, a sort of working model or map that has particular uses and produces particular effects. In particular it enables the problem of the contractile power of the 1st synthesis to be modelled as a form of passive synthesis, thus enabling a concept of the repetition of instants to be established without an immediate descent into an aporetic blockage. Importantly, we do not have to worry immediately about the correctness of such an intimate or oceanic ontology but rather note the way in which it works with the concept of repetition to form a particular conceptual assemblage. This assemblage has its own problem field such that it produces its own questions, making certain other questions less useful (DR; 85). For example, it makes little sense to ask; what is it that links the discrete instances of repetition together such that they form a repetition and not simply discrete instances? This question is immediately answered, as it were, by the fluidic or oceanic ontology and it is instead other questions that are now of interest. The problem is in some sense reversed with the positing of an oceanic ontology and so we can now ask; how can the new, the different, arise from the intimacy of the passive synthesis? In particular we can ask; how can we come upon this passive synthesis if it is composed of the imperceptible, how can we make what we are, which is formed by the passive synthesis, into something for us?

To begin with it is necessary to reconsider the 2nd synthesis of memory that I passed over quickly in the pages above. This itself also operates primarily as a passive synthesis. The pure past as a cone contracted to the present, each present conceived as this contraction of the Bergsonian memory cone, relies upon the same structure of levels posited in the Leibnizian-inspired concept of minute perceptions. The cone is a model of a continuous series of nested and fluid levels. Thus for Deleuze ‘what we live empirically as a succession of different presents from the point of view of active synthesis is also the ever-increasing coexistence of levels of the past within passive synthesis’ (DR; 83). What this provides is a second form of repetition, this time of the Whole (coexistence), whereas the passive repetition of Habit provides the repetition of the parts (instants).

Deleuze divides these two repetitions up in a number of ways so that we get the following table of comparisons;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Habit (1st synthesis)</th>
<th>Memory (2nd synthesis)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bare</td>
<td>Clothed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts</td>
<td>Whole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Succession</td>
<td>Coexistence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table of comparisons for the repetitions of Habit and Memory
(Drawn from DR; 84)
Thus we have a model of two passive syntheses which interlock to provide the varying aspects of the continuous real. Memory, of course, also has an active synthesis which is the representation of the past, as a present now past, that forms a notion of memory closer to our common sense version. Memory as we commonly refer to it is only the active synthesis in Deleuze’s account, which rests upon the passive synthesis. Both passive syntheses are, then, sub-representative (DR; 84) forming the ground, soil and thus foundation of our temporality. This sub-representative nature of the passive syntheses poses a problem, however, of gaining access to the realm pointed to by these philosophically constructed concepts. Without this access these passive syntheses remain inactive concepts, they can do nothing, they can do little real work. The attempt to represent the sub-representative merely catches in aspic that which always exceeds and precedes any act itself so what route does Deleuze offer instead?

It is at this point in DR, as Deleuze asks of the pure past ‘how can we save it for ourselves?’ (ibid), that he moves from Bergson to Proust. It is, he suggests, reminiscence that provides the clue, in particular via the difference of reminiscence with memory, such that reminiscence does not make of the past simply a past present (something gone and now reproduced) nor a mode of the present (something experienced, nostalgic). Instead reminiscence forms itself as another passive synthesis, ‘an involuntary memory which differs in kind from any active synthesis associated with voluntary memory’ (DR; 85).

The key to the Deleuzian temporal structure is in understanding the necessity of the passive syntheses and the associated problem of the agents’ position. The passive synthesis of present and past (Habit and Memory) provides a structure that captures and captivates the subject. Just as Deleuze suggests that the passive synthesis of Habit provides us with the primary sensibility that we are, so the passive synthesis of Memory provides us with the primary sensibility that we have been. These two forms provide us with a complex form of within-ness or an always-already. It is the 3rd synthesis that will take us into the Aion and complete the complex temporal picture Deleuze posits. It is in this 3rd synthesis that we will find the resources to save ourselves for ourselves. It is the synthesis of transformation.

The argument in DR is roughly as follows. Beginning from the difference between the Cartesian cogito and the Kantian, Deleuze proposes to read it as the introduction of a third logical value. In Descartes the ‘I think’ and the ‘I am’ form a 2-valued logic of determination and the undetermined such that the ‘I think’ (the achieved determination) can provide us with the ‘I am’ (as an undetermined product). Kant, however, introduces the value ‘determinability’ and thus a 3rd logical value that encompasses the 2 Cartesian terms. The determinable is established as the form in which the determination produces
the undetermined and thus provides us with an internal difference between the
determination and that which is determined. This is the root of the power in the
transcendental philosophy since this new form of determinability is not transcendent but
immanent to the relation of determination and it simultaneously produces the limits of
such determination through its establishment of the transcendental conditions of
determinability (DR; 85-86).

Having set up the structure of a 3-valued logic of determinability – determination –
determined the next step is to note that Kant gives the form of determinability the form of
time. Specifically this posits that the Cartesian relation of determination must necessarily
occur in time and that this takes the form of a self-affection. The self is reconfigured
from a spontaneous active structure into a passive receptive one, which then uses
representation to recapture the self-affection. This recapturing forms the basis of the
active synthesis at the heart of the subject which Kant then develops. Deleuze, however,
wants to go with Kant only part of the way. To him the form of time introduced as the
form of determinability is better understood as a pure and empty form of time. This pure
form of time then fractures the I, bringing with it the basis for saving ourselves for
ourselves or of accessing the passive self (DR; 86-87).

A crucial difference between Kant and Deleuze lays in the notion of a passive synthesis.
For Kant synthesis is an activity so the passivity must be nothing more than receptivity
without synthesis. The Deleuzian passive syntheses are thus structured to reconfigure the
self away from the Cartesian and Kantian constructions whilst maintaining the
transcendental in terms of the form of determinability. This form of determinability as a
pure and empty form of time is not essentially structured around a before / after relation
but around the ‘purely formal distribution of the unequal in the function of a caesura’
(DR; 89). The caesura, that which produces the ordering of time, constitutes this pure
form of time as ordinal rather than cardinal and as the pure form of change; ‘time is the
most radical form of change, but the form of change does not change’ (ibid). Most
importantly for me, the caesura constitutes the ‘act which is adequate to time as a whole’
(ibid). It is this act which lies at the centre of the process of counter-actualisation.

The process of counter-actualisation rests upon the already existing ‘that we are’ of the
given formed in the passive synthesis. In one sense of course this structure suggests a
mode of alienation as the norm but this sits uneasily with Deleuze. Peter Hallward,
reading Deleuze in terms of this structure of an alienation that has to be overcome, reads
counter-actualisation as a process of redemptive fusion with the creation process which
has produced us as alienated creatures194, implying that counter-actualisation is some sort
of spiritual exercise. Todd May, whilst also suggesting that there is a strong sense of
’spiritual exercise’ in the work of Deleuze195, views this as an ethical or practical
emphasis rather than as presupposing some originary creation to which we are
supposedly exhorted to return. There is undoubtedly a debate to be had over the relation

194 Peter Hallward, The limits of individuation, or how to distinguish Deleuze and Foucault; p.97
195 Todd May, Philosophy as spiritual exercise
to the spiritual or mystical in Deleuze’s work. Michael Goddard, for example, indicates that underlying attempts by writers such as Philip Goodchild to purge a Bergsonian spiritual ‘elan vital’ from the thought of Deleuze there is a monistic conception of spirit. For Goddard, ‘the spiritual is entirely excluded from Deleuze’s work in the name of difference and multiplicity because it is conventionally understood in terms of unity and transcendence’. The conception of the spiritual as plural opens up a space of compatibility with Deleuzian thought but also pushes forward the question of what a ‘spiritual’ exercise would be, if spirit were now plural, contingent and immanent?

Counter-actualisation is in some sense best conceptualised as a form of spiritual activity within this reconfigured concept of spirit as plural, contingent and immanent. Note for example, the fact that it would be, as it were, the route backwards from actualisation towards the virtual and that in the table of comparison given above between the 1st and 2nd synthesis of time the virtual and the spiritual fall on the same side, that of the 2nd synthesis. The spiritual, the virtual, that which underlies the actual, is, however, not a destination and this is what speaks so strongly against Hallward’s characterisation of Deleuze as ‘redemptive’. Counter-actualisation is instead a constructivism. Most interestingly perhaps is that Deleuze seems to characterise his discussions of counter-actualisation in terms of acting and theatre, a much more productive, constructivist activity than one associated with spiritual redemption.

One clear example of this connection of acting and counter-actualisation can be found in the 21st series of LOS. The critical concept is that of becoming ‘the quasi-cause of what is produced’ when faced with the event, of becoming what is called ‘the Operator’ (LOS; 148). The quasi-cause is a doubling of the actualisation of the event that opens up the character of the event, gives it the past and future it brings with it. ‘The actor occupies the instant, while the character portrayed hopes or fears in the future and remembers or repents in the past; it is in this sense that the actor ‘represents’ ’ (LOS; 147). Deleuze contrasts the actor with God, describing the actor as a kind of anti-God (LOS; 150). The contrast depends upon their relations to time, where God, as Chronos, lives the eternity of past and future as an eternal present. God spreads itself across our time, homogenising reality in its image. The actor, however, breaks open time through their intense and narrow instant, the Aion that is the 3rd synthesis, the ordinal moment of caesura, the opening rupture of time. The relation of the actor to their role presents us with the same relation that Aion holds to the past and future, whence their paradigmatic role for Deleuze.

196 Cf. Deleuze and religion, ed.M.Dryden, for a recent collection that focuses on this theme. In her introduction to the volume Dryden suggests that the connectionist ethos of Deleuze’s work allows a connection with religion, or at least doesn’t prevent one, despite some apparent inconsistencies with the received appearance of Deleuze as a materialist. She also, however, suggests a positive reason, albeit a vague one, which she describes as ‘pulses within Deleuze’s own writing’ that prompt such a conjunction.

197 Michael Goddard, The scattering of time crystals; p.62

198 For a useful discussion of the constructivism of Deleuzian philosophy Cf. Iain McKenzie, Creativity as criticism – the philosophical constructivism of Deleuze and Guattari
The actor present us with a case of counter-actualisation, one way in which a learning can occur that isn’t subject centred but created through the moment of transformation that converts the actual into a doubled movement, in the process both activating the subject and removing them. Counter-actualisation thus takes the form of a learning process that opens a space of process that is a form of understanding but one radically distinct from the subject centred model. It is closer to a notion of a skill or art that can never be held but only ever practised. This implies that, fundamentally, the process of learning, through the activity of counter-actualisation, is an ethical practice. To learn a philosophy would thus be a practice that was only ever capable of being brought to any form of fruition when we could begin to address the question of what has the philosophy done to us.
Chapter 9

The counter-actualisation of thought and the case of the Tractatus

It might perhaps be almost easy to understand a notion of counter-actualisation when faced with practical techniques that need to be learnt, such as crafts which might range from carpentry to acting, and there is no doubt that there is an interesting difference in the mode of learning active within the field of practical techniques. Protevi and Massumi have both pointed to the role of this sort of artisanal consciousness in their work. One way of understanding the difference that this artisanal consciousness points to is through the distinction between knowing how and knowing that. A strategic thought such as Deleuze’s that focuses not on what something is but on how it works is, as it were, in the same ball park when it comes to questions of know how and knowing how as that described, in different terms, by Protevi and Massumi. The nagging question that is left over is what we do with the other side of the distinction, what do we do with knowing that? Even if we weren’t to uphold unquestioningly a distinction between, say, embodied knowledge as a know how and propositional knowledge as a know that, there does seem to be something different in what we might think of as philosophical knowledge from any notion of know how.

Let me try and clarify the problem a little. There is a distinction posed between different sorts of knowledge such that one form, which can be called embodied, is in fact closer to what we might think of as skill whereas the other form is closer to what we might call ‘knowing that’ or propositional knowledge. It is possible to try and rework this latter form such that it is no longer dependent on the propositional form. This could be done, perhaps, through thinking of the use of a quotation or epigram, such that the ‘proposition’ would become ‘I know that X’ but X would be a particular quotation or epigram that is not capable of substitution but acts like a poem with all its attendant translation and substitution difficulties. The knowledge that the epigram expresses something is a knowledge that it is the right phrase, the only phrase and so the knowing that would then be tied to the particular concrete expression not a general form reducible to propositional form. Of course that is only a suggestion of a possible route via which we might dissociate the idea of knowing that from a reduction to mere propositional form. Even if this were done, which may or may not be possible, there would still, however, be this

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199 ‘to paraphrase a well-known Deleuzian comparison, a cabinet-maker has to become sensitive to the signs of the wood in order to know how to work with them’ – Andre-Pierre Colombat, Deleuze and the three powers of literature and philosophy; to demystify, to experiment, to create – in Deleuze and Guattari – critical assessments of leading philosophers, Gary Genosko, ed.; p.212
201 Gilbert Ryle, The concept of mind. Chapter 2 passim and in particular section 3, pp.28-32. The distinction is motivated on p.29. It is worth noting that there is also a corollary in a further distinction between a learning-how and a learning-that.
lingering sense of distinction that is in a sense *practical*. The methodology of ordinary language philosophy often rests, as it happens, on precisely this sort of attention to language practices as practices, as acts and activities. The distinction, however, is itself expressed in language, in that difference between the that and the how. It must be expressed through language, landing us in the laughable aporia of a practical distinction of language grounding an argument that a distinction in language cannot rest on language. I do not want to dwell too much on the aporetic of language, in particular not on semantic aporia, since I want to try and focus more on what might be called the structural aporia at the heart of the Tractatus. The idea I want to put forward is simply this sense of the difficulty in reliance on a priority of the practical, that is, on a reliance that simply reworking a knowing or understanding practice as a *practical* knowing adequately addresses the problem of philosophy as a practice. The Deleuzian method, which has been the subject of this thesis, is after all a method of thought, a method of philosophy and puts forward the claim that philosophy is the practice of creating concepts and so it is necessary to address the problem of philosophy if we are to explore the practice of concept creation as Deleuze understands it.

Philosophy is in one quite clear sense a practical knowledge, in that it is a skill in creating connections between things that can be thought. It is also an idiosyncratic practice which depends on the philosopher, according to the Deleuzian notion of conceptual personae. It has a tendency to arrogate to itself both the world and the thought of the world. It also has a certain style which is almost wholly pervasive and which perhaps only Nietzsche has ever really threatened and that is the style of reasonable argument, shared by philosophy with all rational practices but also seen too commonly as the principal method of philosophy. This is of course the distinction between opinion and argument, the idea that the philosopher who slipped into simply saying ‘this is what I think’ would somehow slip out of the game, described as saying nothing or at least nothing interesting. Nietzsche of course exemplifies the paradox of someone who somehow does manage to enact this sort of ‘opinionated argument’ that is filled with the very blood of the philosopher rather than sterilised and cleaned of all human remains. Deleuze, however, might appear to verge perilously close to the role of opinion giver when he says that the task of philosophical resistance is ‘a question of someone - if only one - with the necessary modesty, not managing to know what everybody knows, and modestly denying what everyone is supposed to recognise. Someone who neither allows himself to be represented nor wishes to represent anything.’ (DR; 130) The crucial distinction in the Deleuze-Nietzschean resistance to argument, however, is not captured by any opinion/reason distinction grounded on evidence or argument but on this notion of not speaking for the other and not knowing what everyone claims to know. This is best understood, as I hope to have suggested, through a notion of cases and as an empiricism.

The general thrust of Deleuze’s thought is given very clearly in the notion of a transcendental empiricism. If the transcendental were absent or irrelevant then the empiricism of Deleuze would constitute little more than descriptions of the world and the thought of the world, as well as the recursive thinking of this thought. Empiricism,
however, is better understood not as a name for a descriptive practice but for an epistemology of the origins of knowledge. It names an account of how we know and describes or outlines the processes of such knowing. As such it is already and always a kind of implicit transcendental approach since it necessarily poses itself, even in its many guises, as an account of the giving of the given. Wilfrid Sellars critique of the ‘myth of the given’ hinges on an attack on the presupposed given-ness of empiricism that in effect says that without an account of the giving of the given a myth that cannot be taken as simply given. The implication is that any account of the given depends upon a transcendental structure of the giving of the given, such that an ‘empiricism’ that fails to make this transcendental structure explicit in effect smuggles conceptual contraband into its argument and one that does make it explicit in effect stops being an empiricism and becomes a transcendental philosophy. What is perhaps brought together in the Deleuzian transcendental empiricism, then, is a way of thinking that short-circuits or avoids what is likely to descend into a constitutive paradox.

Bas Van Fraasen also points to the constitutive problem at the heart of empiricism in his work *The empirical stance*. He points out that in the early development of empiricism there is a move from one early form where ‘the empiricist tradition consists of a loosely associated series of recurrent rebellions’ to a more modern form of empiricist critique of empiricism characterised in particular by the attack on the demand for explanations and ‘the idea of ‘foundations of knowledge’’. He argues that there is a basic form of what he calls Naïve Empiricism (NE) which is characterised by the following formula;

‘(NE) To be an empiricist = to believe that $E+$ (the empiricist dogma).’

The empiricist dogma, E+, is the formulated position that articulates what I have described as the implicit transcendental structure of the giving of the given within an empiricism. Van Fraasen goes on to argue that E+ must be a factual statement if it is to be an empiricists dogma and that as such it must admit disagreement. The problem comes with what he calls a corollary to NE which is such that empiricism, as a critique of metaphysics, must argue against metaphysical doctrines on the basis of the correctness of E+. It argues that what is contrary to E+ is metaphysical and as such is disallowed and yet empiricism must also admit such contraries to E+ on the basis that E+ must be a factual principle (empirical) admissible of disagreement. This reductio renders NE, as Van Fraasen describes it, a paradoxical doctrine.

Van Fraasen’s alternative to NE is the employment of a ‘stance’, described as a cluster of attitudes, commitments, values, goals and approaches that may or may not include some propositional attitudes (beliefs). ‘Such a stance can of course be expressed, and may well involve or presuppose some beliefs as well, but cannot simply be equated with

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202 Cf Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the philosophy of mind*.
203 Bas Van Fraasen, *The empirical stance*, p.38
204 ibid.
205 ibid, p.42
206 ibid, p.43
207 ibid, p.47-48
having beliefs or making assertions about what there is\textsuperscript{208}. This notion of a stance gives up the simple expressibility of naïve empiricism without giving up expressibility itself. It instead makes the expressibility of the stance one that is complex and possibly self-correctable as varying expressions of varying elements are expressed and debated. This picture gives us a pragmatic empiricism capable of adjustment and change and aware of the role of normative criteria (values, goals) in its underlying structure. In response to the criticism that the idea of a philosophy as consisting of ‘stances’ reduces it to opinion Van Fraasen argues that in fact the recognition of these stances promotes contact with our ‘values, attitudes and commitments’. This is something to be welcomed, part of the ‘highly politicised open society in which ethical and ideological differences are precisely what are most up for debate’\textsuperscript{209}. Van Fraasen urges his critics to ‘look around you, take part, welcome to the real world!’\textsuperscript{210}.

In effect the shift to a stance brings to the fore the normative criteria at the heart of philosophical dispute. The role of the transcendental argument is inextricably bound up with this normativity but in a complex way that is best approached through the issue of constitutive problematics. What I mean by this is that the problem of how a practice is constituted, what constitutes a practice and the performativity of constitution is unavoidable both for a transcendental and a normative philosophical argument and as such it provides a complex conjunction in which a form of joint problematic informs both distinct areas of thought. For Deleuze this problem of the constitutive underpins the account of concept creation, which is not to say that it is explicitly expressed in this form but that it forms what he would call a problem field in the sense discussed in chapter 5. The problem field of the constitutive provides the field or plane of immanence for the concept of concept creation.

Something like the following would be the claim; philosophy contains at its heart the problem of its own constitution which it will inevitably come up against as in the case described by Van Fraasen of the empiricist critique of empiricism. The reason for this is that the constitutive aporia is at the heart of the virtual Idea of philosophy as a knowing of itself. A particular problem field produced by this plane of immanence of the virtual Idea of philosophy is the constitutive problematic, which might be posed in the Beckettian sense; can’t start, must start; can’t go on, must go on. Concept creation then appears to arise as a ‘must’, the necessity to continue. That is, if all philosophy is in some sense necessarily paradoxical or aporetic via the constitutive problematic then to continue the aporia must be made productive One route is to pursue the aporia as an aporia, to as it were ‘endure’ it. The other option is to affirm the continuance of philosophical thought, the difference that will always be made by philosophy. This necessitates that difference being conceptualised in terms of its role as a repetition – which brings us to the question of the new, of concept creation. If philosophy is to

\textsuperscript{208} ibid, p.48
\textsuperscript{209} ibid, p.62
\textsuperscript{210} ibid
continue it must both repeat and renew – it must create concepts and be a concept creation. The necessity to continue is the necessity to create concepts.211.

This necessity to continue is expressed perhaps more directly by Badiou in his idea that the ethic of truth involves a perseverance212 which he later formulates as ‘Keep Going’213, a view which derives from the importance of the subject within Badiou’s work and which connects truth with a subject and an ethics with a compulsion for the subject to continue as a subject of truth214. In Deleuze this connection with the human subject is not of such priority; the new, the future, the necessity of invention, all these are more structurally understood, seen through the perspectives of biology and of the abstracted impersonal ‘life’ named as ‘a life’ rather than determined as ‘the life’. This is part of Deleuze’s emphasis on understanding pre-subjective structures, which necessarily means not presupposing the subject in his arguments. In terms of the activity of philosophy, however, the act of concept creation seems more intimately bound into an already existing subject and it does seem that the role of the subject as what Badiou calls the subject of truth is more important for an understanding of why we need to pursue concept creation. This why would be almost a motivation or imperative derived from the problem of the undecidable which enables the subject of truth to pursue truth in the face of aporia.

Whilst this formulation of Badiou’s may enable us to understand, in one sense, the need to create concepts it also relies upon a sense of creation as an act and misses the forcing aspect of creation, the fact that in creation we do not produce an object from a creator but rather that creation is the only way of regaining a belief in the world, becoming part of the process of a life that flows through the world. For Peter Hallward who follows more closely the line of Alain Badiou, this means that Deleuze ends up in a position of redemption, whereby creation acts as the moment of regaining the giving of the world215. What Hallward points to is the way in which the Deleuzian philosophy of creation is not about somehow empowering a subject with the requisite understanding of the difficulties ahead in a pursuit of truth but instead of constructing a philosophical understanding of the world whereby creation is an act of conjunction with the world. ‘For Deleuze, thought creates what it thinks, as perception creates what it perceives (and therefore does not

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211 For a fascinating discussion of the role of aporias in metaphysical thought, in particular in relation to the need to continue, it is worth considering the discussion in Stephen David Ross, Metaphysical aporia and philosophical heresy. I would share much with Ross in terms of his general approach to philosophical aporia but his discussion focuses on Heidegger, Hegel and Derrida and Deleuze only merits a couple of footnote mentions in his text. To engage with Ross would have thus taken the thesis in a radically different direction, one that could and can only happen after the work with Deleuze has crystallised. Ross’s book does stand, however, like a figure waiting in the wings, keen to enter the play and perhaps already implicit in the next acts.

212 Alain Badiou, Ethics, p.47

213 ibid, p.53

214 ibid, p.56 – ‘every subject must in some sense continue under his own steam’; p.84 – ‘every truth presumes, in fact, in the composition of the subjects it induces, the preservation of ‘some-one’, the always two-sided activity of the human animal caught up in truth’.

215 Peter Hallward, Gilles Deleuze and the redemption from interest
Thought is a pre- or impersonal power which we have to participate in rather than apply and as such ‘thought in itself dissolves the thinker as subject’\textsuperscript{217}. This implies for Hallward that ‘thought coincides with its own constitution as thought’\textsuperscript{218} which is then taken to imply a necessary connection between thinking and the choice to think, a choice that for Hallward implies a refusal of the world which, as the Given, is refused in favour of the Real. In this Hallward reads the technique of counter-actualisation as a choice of moving from the empirical Given to an abstract and aristocratic Real whereas Deleuze has always emphasised the reality of both the Virtual and the Actual. The pre-subjective movement of actualisation of thought is what Deleuze posits and it is this that is always creative and which impels us to take creation as the fundamental activity of thought, not in the sense of a subjective creative activity but rather in the sense of the basic tendency of thought itself. Hallward thus reads the connection with the impersonal or pre-subjective actualisation of thought as occurring through a lack of resistance to the impersonal movement of thought\textsuperscript{219}, allowing a sort of free-flowing and mystical connection to take the place of truth, rather than as a resistance to the personal power of thought.

Despite a basically hostile reading of Deleuze which confuses the concept of multiplicity with the multiple and makes the Virtual a singular realm atop a hierarchy of reality, in direct opposition to Deleuze’s own arguments, Hallward points convincingly to the role of the constitutive in his discussion of Deleuze’s concept of choice. Choice, as he points out, is not something done by an agent but is a point of conjunction between the forcing to choose and the actualisation of the choice. The becoming of choice involves for Deleuze a conjunction of the chooser, the choice and the chosen which Hallward picks out well\textsuperscript{220} but which he reads as an equation of terms rather than as a distinction within a multiplicity. Hallward reads the variations as constituting a One which is then ‘read’ differently – as chooser, choice or chosen – but which is essentially the Same. Deleuze, however, would always pose the matter as the variations being of a multiplicity that is constituted precisely by those variations. The multiplicity is constituted by the variations that make it up. The variations are not variations of the One but constitute the Multiplicity. Concept creation is thus to be understood not as an isolated and originary moment in the formation of a concept but as a necessary component of the process of philosophical thought, part of the variations that constitute philosophy as a multiplicity and without which philosophy deconstitutes. Thinking this multiplicity that is philosophical thought thus necessarily involves thinking the constitutive dynamics of the becoming of thought, hence the claim that the constitutive problematic underlies the Deleuzian claim that philosophy involves concept creation.

How do we go about exploring this field of the constitutive problematic and what are we looking for? We are looking at a case of philosophy. In effect this is a form of case

\textsuperscript{216} ibid, p.16
\textsuperscript{217} ibid
\textsuperscript{218} ibid
\textsuperscript{219} ibid
\textsuperscript{220} ibid, p.17
study, a kind of data acquisition exercise or ethology of the philosophical case. More usefully it is part of the ongoing process central to philosophical thought to learn a philosophical problem, a process that involves the structures of counter-actualisation discussed in chapter 8.

The case in question is that of the Tractatus (TLP). Wittgenstein’s short and beautiful text from 1921 is a case of aporia and tautology colliding in an argument that grapples with the problem of thinking sense. Now, there is much in Wittgenstein’s little book that lends itself to prolonged discussion, not least because the book poses itself as the correct theory of sense, as opposed to a discussion of sense theories or even just of sense itself. It has thus promoted much discussion of the details of the theory as well as of the possible correctness of such a resulting theory. This is not, however, the discussion that interests me, rather I want to explore the case of the Tractatus as a case of resistant thought.

In chapter 1 I discussed how the resistant thought is resistant to thought itself. Above, in a discussion of Hallward’s criticisms of Deleuze, I suggested that this second thought to which resistant thought is resistant might be described as personal thought so the distinction is between ‘thinking’ or personal thought, one that is actual, and the process of the actualisation of thought from the virtual, or the impersonal thought. The resistant thought, as resistant to thought itself, in particular distrusts any innate capacity to think, and this move underlies the naming of the misosopher, the resister who feels almost sullied by a persuasive thought or a little piece of wisdom. The watchword here is, perhaps, caution. This is not so much a caution in our proceedings as a caution in regard to results, to what we gain. The misosopher distrusts a notion of wisdom as the greatest lie. Of course, the structure of this resistance of the misosopher, is itself paradoxical. If it is taken as a piece of wisdom it betrays itself. The betrayal comes, though, if we think we know what resistance is, if we construct an image of it as something self-similar; that is to crush thought under the image of the same. What this implies is something like an imperative to think the resistance without at any point identifying a particular thought as resistant in terms of its content or method. Hence the role of cases. Put simply, it will always be a matter of cases, the case will provide the way to think the resistance in that case. We might, however, employ something like a rule of thumb as part of something akin to a ‘method’, something that would be more like Van Fraasen’s ‘stance’, to indicate this resistance; whenever we feel like we’ve understood, at that point we must be more cautious than ever.

So I therefore describe the Tractatus as a resistant thought because it precisely resists itself and in the most peculiarly self-destructive self-productivity. This resistance is located primarily around the problem of the showing/saying distinction and the 7th proposition. I am not claiming therefore that the main theories of the TLP - the account of truth-functions, negation or the picture theory of meaning – are resistant thoughts but that the resistance lies at the heart of the showing/saying distinction which Wittgenstein claims as the main point of his work, even if he also thinks he has given a theory of such
a distinction\textsuperscript{221}. The first thing I want to do then is to give an account of the showing/saying distinction.

To begin with, the TLP is an account of sense and its structures. Sense is something that can be said because for Wittgenstein sense is determinate (TLP 3.25, 3.251). This determinate sense is what constitutes saying something. Determinate sense is the ability to have a truth value, to agree or disagree with states of affairs. A proposition says what a state of affair is or is not and is true if the state of affairs is the way the proposition says and false if it isn’t that way (TLP; 4.2). The limits of what can be said, what has determinate sense, are given by tautologies and contradictions which have no sense (TLP; 4.461, 4.466). The limits of what can be said, given by tautologies and contradictions, cannot themselves be said but only shown because tautologies and contradictions can admit of no alternatives between true or false (TLP; 4.46, 4.461, 4.462). Propositions thus do not just say something (truth value) but also show something (form).

The reason for this notion of showing derives from the structures that Wittgenstein establishes in order to gain the determinate sense he requires of saying something. This structure is based on a relation of names to objects in the world, such for each object there is a name (TLP; 3.21, 3.22, 3.221). These names are the simple signs or elementary propositions of the Tractarian world view and are not posited out of hand but their necessity is derived from the necessity for determinate sense (TLP; 3.23). So this requirement for determinate sense produces the necessity for simple signs or names but it does this because the meaning of a name is the object in the world. This direct meaning structure thus underpins the whole structural world of Tractarian sense.

\textbf{Fig. 2}

The background to this account is of course Russell and Frege and the problem of objects as meanings. If the object of a name doesn’t exist then it would appear that the name has no meaning, which prompts numerous difficulties, not least in dealing with fictional names where the object doesn’t exist and yet we appear to have meaning. In \textit{Sense and Meaning} Frege sketches out his distinction between \textit{Sinn} and \textit{Bedeutung} with the help of

\textsuperscript{221 ‘The main point is the theory of what can be expressed (gesagt) by propositions – ie; by language (and, what comes to the same, what can be thought) and what cannot be expressed by propositions, but only shown (gezeigt); which I believe is the cardinal problem of philosophy’ – Wittgenstein, quoted in G.E.M. Anscombe, \textit{An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus}; p.161
the image of a triangle intersected at a central point by three lines extending from the vertices to the middle of the opposite sides (as is illustrated in Figure 2). Sinn is ‘the mode of presentation of the sign’ whilst Bedeutung is ‘that which the sign designates’. The split between the two can arise ‘only if the difference between the signs corresponds to a difference in the mode of presentation of the thing designated’ which in the case of the triangle can be seen as using either lines ‘a and b’ or lines ‘b and c’ to describe or present the mid-point of intersection which is the thing designated in both descriptions. This essay also contains a number of other distinctions worth reminding ourselves of. There is 'Thought' and 'Idea', the former objective the latter subjective, where 'Idea' plays the role of the interior equivalent of the object, which is the meaning of a proper name, that is, what the sign designates. Thus Frege splits the object from its presentation in the Bedeutung and Sinn distinction and then adds a third area of interiority in which the Sinn corresponds to an Idea. Here the example of the telescope used to view the moon comes in, with the moon as Object, the lens as the mediation of Sense and the visual experience in the observer as the Idea. If the Idea is ‘wholly subjective’ the Thought is its ‘objective content’ which is the same as the Sense of the sentence. Thought and Sense here play a similar role to the public connection between interior Ideas and exterior Objects, though they do not presuppose the existence of the Objects.

![Diagram](image)

What this extremely condensed summary of part of Frege's thought is intended to do is to establish the structure that forms the background against which Wittgenstein worked in the 'Tractatus. What can be seen in Frege's account is a clear 'layering' of the distinctions (as illustrated in Figure 3) to describe the operation of language through the axis of the problematic of connecting an interiority with an exteriority. In terms of the base models Wittgenstein will shift emphasis, attempting to work with the analogy of a mirror rather than the telescope. The comparison between the telescope which passes an image through itself to a viewer and the mirror which reflects reality in itself is perhaps worth bearing in mind even with many reservations as to its extent of validity as an illuminating analogy. After all, the mirror itself needs a viewer and the third position still seems to come back in despite the immediate connection the image suggests. Even so, the structural difference between two primary analogies is worth noting.

Whilst I do not want to dwell on Frege for too long and even this short sketch is extremely limited in offering anything more than a bare contextualisation of some of the terms in Wittgenstein's' work, I do want to follow through one other connection Frege makes in his work which connects the Sinn and Bedeutung distinction with the notion of

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223 ibid, p 30.
224 ibid, p 32, footnote 7.
truth. Frege argues that a thought has a lack in terms of its value for us ‘as soon as we recognise that the meaning (Bedeutung) of one of its parts is missing’ and thus places the role of the object, the referent, in a place of privilege. He does not deny that such a value, placed upon the truth of a thought, does not need to be held to in terms of artistic work, indeed that to do so would ‘cause us to abandon aesthetic delight’, but he does mark what could be understood as a hierarchy or, if not a hierarchy, then a separation of domains that tends to beg such a question of relative importance. This is perhaps increased by the way in which the term 'judgement' is used, that is, as equivalent to the acceptance of the truth-value of a sentence. The dominance of this notion of judging, shifted towards a role centred on judging truth-values, allows a passivity into the notion of sense that will, I believe, be altered in Wittgenstein's account in the Tractatus where the active moment seems to shift position from the 'judgement of being true' towards the 'picturing of sense', the showing and seeing that come to predominate in importance.

The introduction of ‘showing’ in the Tractatus gives a power to the thing that is showing that is not reducible to ‘being judged’ in the same way that we judge the truth and falsity of a proposition. It is, in this sense, an active power. When judging a proposition the active power lies in the capacity to judge whereas in the situation where a proposition shows something the active power is not in judging whether it shows but lies in the showing itself, which is then recognised or responded to. This recognition is a form of passivity or passive synthesis in the sense in which that term was used in chapter 8 with regard to temporal syntheses.

The showing/saying distinction can be seen to be introduced at 4.022, quite late in the TLP. Wittgenstein claims that ‘A proposition shows its sense. A Proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And it says that they do so stand.’ This is quite often cited as the central proposition for discussions around the showing/saying distinction. The first clause connects showing to sense. Whatever sense might be classed as, it is shown and this showing is what brings sense out of the proposition for us. This is no more than a structural suggestion that attempts to name the process of activity of the

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225 Ibid, p 33.
226 Ibid, p 34. There is a peculiar shift in the way the term judgement is used that I would want to explore further elsewhere and at another time. The term arrives in terms of the phrase ‘these two objects (the True or False poles of truth-value) are recognised, if only implicitly, by everybody who judges something to be true - and so even by a sceptic’. The role of the argument in terms of refuting or immobilising the sceptic is here reminiscent perhaps of Anselm's proof of God based around the concept of a knowledge that must be had even in the denial of the knowledge. A few sentences later however the 'judging', which is here connected with 'judging something to be true' is defined in more absolute terms in the footnote and this in the sentence ‘in every judgement (fn), no matter how trivial, the step from the level of thoughts to the level of meaning (Bedeutung) (the objective) has already been taken’. The footnote states ‘a judgement (note; in general, the specification of its mode is now dropped) for me (a curious subjectivisation of the process that is the movement towards objectivity) is not the mere grasping of a thought, but the admission of its truth.’ (my emphases). In the shift from grasping to admission a whole causality problem might be suggested to appear, a question of where is the force of meaning to be located?
227 Max Black, A companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, says that this point ‘is notable for its introduction of the crucial notion of showing, which will become increasingly important as Wittgenstein’s exposition develops’ - p 164
proposition. That is, if a proposition is something that has sense, showing is the way we receive that sense, the way we see what it means. The second clause claims that the proposition shows prior to the truth or falsity of what it shows and thus the showing cannot be dependent upon truth-functionality. The proposition shows, for example, how things stand. It does not, however, make any claims as to the status of this showing - things could stand as the proposition shows but only if it is true, truth being taking along correspondence lines as is clearly suggested by TLP 2.21, 2.222, 2.223. The third clause and the introduction of the term saying I believe clarifies precisely the meaning being read into this proposition. ‘And it (the proposition) says that they (the way things stand if the proposition is true) do so stand.’ That is, if it is true that things stand in such-and-such a way as is shown in the proposition then it says that they stand that way as well as showing it, whereas if things don't stand in the way shown then the proposition does not say they do, merely shows a possibility that they could so stand. The success of the showing proposition in showing something possible establishes it as a saying proposition; it converts its status within Wittgenstein’s schema. We are then faced with a technical use of the terms showing and saying established in such a way that we can suggest that the set of the showing propositions contains as a subset the set of saying propositions in a non-reciprocal relation. The term showing has a scope that goes beyond that of the term saying in determining the set of propositions that have sense provided we accept the existence or possibility of propositions that show but do not say. It is to this that I will now turn.

Let us ask, for example, what does the proposition show if it is not true. The answer, presumably, might be that it does not show how things stand. What does the proposition then show? It shows its sense, but what is sense as something shown? The difference between a random concatenation of words and a proposition would entail that the proposition show a possibility of sense and thus, that in the very act of showing possibility would be shown. Or, as Wittgenstein says, ‘If a sign is possible then it is also capable of signifying’ (TLP; 5.473). It would be impossible therefore to show the impossible sign. Here, for example, would be a way of understanding Wittgenstein’s statement that ‘We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either’ (TLP; 5.61). Thus anything that can show sense shows its own possibility.

The proposition does not show how things stand but rather the possibility of things standing in a particular way. If it is true, then things stand in a particular way and if it is false it shows that things do not stand in this way. The proposition therefore operates as a showing proposition not by telling us of the truth of anything but rather of the possibility of the truth of something. The showing, then, is not something that is either true or false, as showing, but rather which precedes the truth or falsity of the proposition as its

228 Black, ibid, puts forward this view.
229 Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914 - 16, Appendix II, p 111. Here he says ‘That a proposition has a relation (in a wide sense) to Reality, other than that of Bedeutung, is shewn by the fact that you can understand it when you don't know the Bedeutung; i.e. don't know whether it is true or false. Let us express this by saying ‘It has sense (Sinn)’ (emphasis added).
possibility of being true or false. It is, as Wittgenstein says in the Notebooks, ‘clear that we understand propositions without knowing whether they are true or false’\textsuperscript{230}. In some ways this is obvious. For a proposition to have truth-values it must have the possibility of being either true or false and thus must itself, as a proposition, be neither true nor false but bi-polar\textsuperscript{231}. The crucial difference for the TLP however is not that it has to have the possibility of a T/F (true/false) value to have sense but that the having of the T/F value is what constitutes having sense. For the TLP, having a T/F value is thus both necessary and sufficient. Of course, what having a T/F value entails is still up for discussion at that point.

The concept or word 'shows' thus operates in proposition 4.022 as the giving of possibility, that possibility being that things so stand as the proposition says. \textit{Veritas es adequantio intellectus et rei} thus operates as the principle upon which possibility is converted to actuality within the Tractatus, which can be seen as a move from having \textit{Sinn} but not \textit{Bedeutung} to one where both features obtain. Prior to the judgement of adequation which confers truth and thus \textit{Bedeutung} there is however the movement of showing that confers possibility. What is shown can be understood as a depiction and thus the movement of showing which confers possibility is a depictive movement.

Whilst it may be that it is the judgement of adequation which converts the proposition from the shown to the said, the possibility of saying must allow in the possibility of failure, falsity and lying. Any notion of meaning that rests upon the adequation principle as the basis of sense, via resting on a notion of truth as the basis of sense or through an implicit and mediating presupposition of this principle, fails to account for those fundamental features of our language such as failure, falsity and lying. It is the problematic of the false, failed or lying proposition - the sense of the false, if you will - that breaks a reading of the Tractatus that renders it simply another proponent of an extensional theory of meaning\textsuperscript{232}. The possibility of sense is a possibility that is shown and that brings with it its impossibility, constituted in the proposition that does not show anything.

In order to understand the role and structure of the possibility of sense it is necessary to contextualise the showing/saying distinction. The Tractatus develops rapidly from an account of a basic ontology (the atomism) through an outline of the structure of depiction that underlies language (picture theory of meaning). The picture theory is deployed to enable Wittgenstein to get a 'hook onto reality'\textsuperscript{233}. It enables him to establish a connection

\textsuperscript{230} Wittgenstein, ibid; Appendix I, p 94.
\textsuperscript{231} ibid., also p 97.
\textsuperscript{232} David Favrholdt, for example, holds the view that the TLP is putting forward an extensional theory of meaning as its prime theoretical goal – see his \textit{An Interpretation and Critique of Wittgenstein's Tractatus}, p. 11 and passim. ‘The fundamental thesis of the Tractatus is the thesis of extensionality, i.e. the thesis that all sentences are truth-functions of elementary propositions and that these in turn are truth functions of themselves’.
\textsuperscript{233} For this specific phrase, which I thought originated from Wittgenstein, I have yet to trace the citation and thus may be mistaken in its origin. But the idea of a connection is clear, as well as the need for a connection, and pictures provide this in the Tractatus - cf. TLP 2.151-2.1511 and the phrase, with reference
between a true proposition or fact (TLP; 3.14) and a situation or state of affairs. A picture, according to Wittgenstein, presents a situation to us (TLP; 2.11) - and 'situation' is already determined as an interchangeable term with 'states of affairs'. This presented situation is a 'model of reality' (TLP; 2.12) in which objects correspond to elements of the picture (TLP; 2.13) and where this structure is explicitly stated to be representational (TLP; 2.131).

A proposition is a picture of reality - that is, stands in a ‘projective relation to the world’ (TLP; 3.12) - with which it can agree or fail to agree (TLP; 2.21). The proposition stands in a relation to the world that is analogous to that which Wittgenstein describes as occurring in the relation of a picture to the world. This is a basic outline and with it we can see a certain structural model that involves the prior separation from the world and the need to then establish the mechanism of relation between at least two different 'domains' within reality, which consists of all possible entities, both existing and those therefore determined as not existing (TLP; 2.04, 2.05). In particular this schema clearly derives from a representational model in which reality is represented to us via a medium of some sort, be it painting or picturing or language and texts. It is this representational structure that is clearly marked by the use of the 'mirror' analogy - language 'mirrors' reality for the Tractarian Wittgenstein through logical form (TLP; 5.511, 6.13).

Taking a more broadly focussed look at the Tractatus for a moment we can see that up to and including proposition 2.063 Wittgenstein is outlining his ontology, the structure of the atomism that informs his work, with the only reference to 'picture' - a term that has been at times translated from Bild as 'image' - at 2.0212. From 2.1 up to and including 2.225 Wittgenstein outlines the core of the picture theory. Then from proposition 3 the interlacing begins to happen between the picture theory and language, via the manoeuvre of a connection of the picture with thought. This manoeuvre via the notion of thought leads up to proposition 3.1 where Wittgenstein declares ‘In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses’ and proposition 3.11 where ‘the method of projection’ is declared to be the thinking of the sense of the proposition.

The propositions following 3.1 then delve deeper and deeper into the structure of the propositional signs Wittgenstein is analysing and the explicit presentation of the showing/saying distinction occurs sometime later at 4.022 as the transitional conclusion that culminates a discussion of the problems surrounding expression. This placing is important in that it is introduced as a move precisely in order to overcome the problems that are gone over in the discussion of expression. It thus operates at what could be described as an axis point between the first, broader, discussion of expression and the second discussion - to use a crude and schematic separation - which focuses more explicitly on propositions. This latter section also discusses problems of expression to the picture, that because of its form it ‘is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it’ (TLP; 2.1511) as well as ‘... the feelers of the picture's elements, with which the picture touches reality’ (TLP; 2.1515).

234 Plochman & Lawson, Terms in their propositional contexts in Wittgenstein's Tractatus - an index, p. 81.

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though here in more technical terms and with the logical issues of naming, description and general propositional form to the fore.

This broad account of the structural or narrative movement of the TLP now needs to be supplemented by focussing on the means used by Wittgenstein to enact the movement. During the account of what a picture is Wittgenstein turns to ‘what constitutes a picture’ (TLP; 2.14) and here the argument shifts from 'what it is' to 'how it is', to a discussion of the possibility for a picture. At this point the notion of a distinction between structure and form is put forward (TLP; 2.15). This distinction is a peculiar one and it is not immediately apparent what the term 'form' is doing here, particularly since it is placed alongside 'structure' rather than 'content', as is more common. Fogelin suggests that ‘the idea of a pictorial form will serve at least two main purposes (i) it allows Wittgenstein to generalise the notion of a picture beyond its primitive base. It allows him to get from pictures (as ordinarily understood) to language (as ordinarily understood) (ii) the form-structure distinction allows Wittgenstein to separate the conditions of meaning from the conditions of truth and thereby provide a solution to the ancient puzzle of the possibility of false judgments’ (emphasis added)235.

Form, for Wittgenstein, is the possibility of structure (TLP; 2.033). Alongside 'proposition' and 'picture' or its various conjugations (Bild, bilden, abbilden, abgebildet, Bildhaftigkeit, Abbildung, Urbild) 'form' is perhaps one of the most heavily present terms within the Tractatus. Aside from its role in terms of the possibility of structure, form is also described as substance (TLP; 2.024) and objects (TLP; 2.023), a situation further complicated by the assertion that ‘objects contain the possibility of all situations’ (TLP; 2.014). Form is at once both the connecting basis upon which representation is established (TLP; 2.022) and something that cannot be represented (TLP; 4.121). Parallel structures are set up in language and reality in which there are complex structures consisting of elements. The parallelism is said to be possible or to exist because both language and reality share ‘something - a form’ (TLP; 2.022), which is defined further as 'pictorial form' (Form der Abbildung) in 2.17 and then as logical form which is explicitly stated to be ‘the form of reality’ (TLP; 2.18). Even though there could be a parallel form in both language and reality, as Wittgenstein suggests, there would still be the issue of the connection of the two realms, which he has established from the first as distinct. This connection appears to operate upon the basis on the projective relationship and what Wittgenstein calls 'thinking the sense of a proposition'.

From proposition 3 to 3.05 Wittgenstein speaks of thought. He limits thought to logical reality - ‘thought can never be of anything illogical’ he says (TLP; 3.03). ‘It used to be said’ Wittgenstein asserts ‘that God could create anything except what would be contrary to the laws of logic. The reason being that we could not say what an 'illogical' world would look like.’ (TLP; 3.031) Whether this claim can be disputed is not the issue here. What is my concern is the way that both form and thought are operating as some sort of base upon which reality and language then operate and that they are intimately

connected with the limits of thought set by logic - although in this situation it would also be fair to say that thought sets the limits of logic. Wittgenstein says that a thought ‘contains the possibility of the situation of which it is a thought. What is thinkable is possible too’ (TLP; 3.02) and here the concomitant limits can be seen to be paired, although not in a way in which one could be said to be determining the other.

Thinking the sense of a proposition is what Wittgenstein calls the method of projection in virtue of which a propositional sign is a proposition (TLP; 3.11, 3.12). The projective relationship that is established between a proposition and the world extends the very concept of relation from the strict representationalism of the notion of meaning Wittgenstein uses, where the object simply is the meaning of the name or simple sign. That is, the projective relationship extends the relation of language to the world so that the sense of the structure in which the nominal elements occur can be said to be the representation of the possibility or otherwise of a state of affairs existing and moreover sense is this possibility (TLP; 4.2)\textsuperscript{236}. This projective relationship, based upon the conception of the picture theory as a fundamental metaphor, enables the proposition to have sense. It is what takes the proposition from a mere listing or random arrangement of names to being a structure with a force. This formal structure of the proposition, in virtue of the notion of sense conceived around the picture metaphor, reflects a structure of reality and enables the move from naming to sense to be established. Without this move to establish sense the notion of meaning would not be possible since simple sign or names only have meaning within a proposition, that is, within an arrangement that has sense (TLP; 3.3, 4.026).

Put simply, on Wittgensteins account there has to be more to the relation of language to reality than mere naming and this additional relation upon which we establish sense is itself established on the basis of an understanding of language which posits, in the metaphor of the picture relationship, a relation of forms. Language is a picture in the sense that there is a process of picturing that occurs - and here it is worth noting that the multiple uses of conjugations deriving from Bild includes the active verbal mode establishing an activity rather than an object (TLP; 2.1, 2.17, 2.171\textsuperscript{237}), a mode translated as ‘depicting’ (TLP; 4.041) in Pears and McGuinness, hence the use of the phrase ‘the logic of depiction’ (TLP; 4.015). This process of picturing is what establishes a relation of not just element to element but form to form, through the fact that propositions, pictures and states of affairs share a form since all pictures must contain logical form on Wittgenstein’s account, as well as secondary forms such as the spatial (TLP; 2.182), and that logical form is, as said, the form of reality.

Form, however, is the basis not of the possibility of the picture itself, even as a fact, but rather of the ability to relate things and facts, the relationship or activity of depiction. In

\textsuperscript{236} Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary, p237 for a similar view.

\textsuperscript{237} See the listing for Image (picture) as bilden and abbilden, Imaged (pictured) abgebildet and Imaging (picturing) Abbilden, Abbildung in Plochman and Lawson, Terms in their propositional contexts in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: an Index, p84 - 85 for a fuller listing. The term seems most often translated as depicting/depicted within Pears and McGuinness.
2.172 the concept of depiction is restricted, ‘a picture cannot however depict its pictorial form’ and simultaneously extended ‘it displays it’ or ‘it shows it’\textsuperscript{238}. The restriction on the concept of depiction forces the activity of depiction or picturing, the activity that is going on in and as the Tractatus itself, into an area inaccessible to the picture, inaccessible as a fact. This restriction is based on the split between the represented and the representation, a split encapsulated by the claim that ‘a picture represents its subject from a position outside it’ (TLP; 2.173) but which must operate alongside a unity within form since the ability to overcome the 'outsideness' of the picture is generated by the shared existence or operation within a form that can be common to the represented and the representation.

What is actually going on here is an attempt to extend the basic model of representation into the realm of what appears to be the unrepresentable, with representation here understood, albeit crudely, as a type of standing for or going proxy (TLP; 4.0311). The proposition does not stand for reality in the way the name does, but rather represents it. What this does of course is to shift the problem of representation or picturing/depicting back a stage onto the very process of representation, a process that will also and in exchange be described by the term showing. The meaning of representation employed in Wittgenstein's Tractatus seems to stretch from that in which it is understood as somehow showing a situation in which language is 'a representative for' the world to that in which language 'represents the world', a stretching that appears to slide from a nominal to verbal mode as is needed within the text. Moreover my claim would be that without this active process of picturing or showing the ability to move from names - which have no sense individually - to propositions - in which sense and meaning occurs - would be impossible. What this does, however, is to place this process of showing in a fundamental role in the understanding of sense - establishing what I would call the priority of showing - but in such a way that although its work can be seen, the 'how' of its work is not any clearer. In other words, we have to rely on a claim that the proposition shows in order to establish a knowledge that it says.

The principal idea in this reading is thus that the Tractatus offers an active account of sense and the relation to language that does not depend on an act of judgment but on the showing of the form that connects language and the world, this being the form of logic which mirrors the world. In doing this the meaning of representation is extended or stretched beyond anything a basic theory of meaning itself could offer and into the realm of the activity of representation. The Tractatus thus offers us a theory of sense but does so by offering an account of representation. This is how representation works (form), it says, and thus meaning must be like this (naming). The crucial work, however, is done in the account of how representation works, where the cue is taken from the picture theory. Meaning itself is also determined by the criteria of a determinate sense and so the picture theory and determinate sense act as the basic features of the stance which then constitutes the argument of the Tractatus even though these arguments are not identical to the stance. The stance, as it were, produces the arguments.

\textsuperscript{238} The German reads 'es weise sie auf'.

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This account, so far, doesn’t really touch the final self-resistant move of the work. If we stopped at this point, with an account of representation via the connection of logical form as the mirror of the world, then we would be left with a positive theoretical account. The problem, however, is that this positive theoretical account of representation cannot be said, it cannot be given a determinate sense. The account can only ever be shown, never said and moreover it cannot be shown in the same way that showing originates within the Tractatus since within the Tractatus showing shows the logical form, in particular through the limit cases of tautology and contradiction. Showing is not said to show an account of something, that is, show something with a positive content, but only the lack of content and the remainder that is the form.

This lack of content occurs because of the way in which sense is entwined within the account of representation with the presupposition of determinate sense that produces the naming relation. To have sense the proposition must name the objects. If the objects do not exist, as in logical constants exemplified by tautologies and contradictions, then the proposition shows something, namely the logical form, but has no sense. This type of proposition is nonsense. There is, however, that type of proposition which neither shows the logical form nor names the objects that constitute its meaning and these last type of proposition, neither naming nor showing, form the senseless. Sense thus has limits which are shown by nonsense and an outside in which the senseless exists.

In Deleuzian terms the Tractatus operates as a conceptual assemblage that constitutes a plane of immanence from which a theory of sense is produced. Moreover this theory of sense itself operates as a plane of immanence which produces the idea of an outside of sense or the senseless. The idea here is one using the notion of levels, where the varying conceptual assemblages produce planes of immanence as part a process of concept creation. There is, in this reading, a notion of a nested hierarchy which is one way of describing the process whereby the stance that involves the account of representation and the need for determinate sense produces the plane of immanence for the concept of sense at work in the Tractatus which itself then forms the plane of immanence for the concept of the senseless. This process is one of immanent production which then provides us with a model of the concepts produced as transcendent relative to this plane (relative transcendence). The kickback comes because the produced concept of senseless propositions then envelopes the propositions that produced it. This produces a kind of baroque structure of foldings such that the Tractatus folds in over itself presenting an account but an account incapable of presentation on the basis of that account. It might be thought that this produces a kind of self-enclosed account which we can take or leave as we wish, except for the fact that the account of representation is drawn into an account of the method of philosophy and the self-resistant self-productivity of the Tractatus makes the strong claim that in enacting its self-enclosure it simultaneously encloses all philosophy, indeed all thought. It is in this way that it comes to its most challenging claim, which is that philosophy cannot take place at all except as an elucidation and that it consists of a failure to understand language rather than a positive practice with a
positive content. It is this claim that would challenge someone like Deleuze quite directly, since plainly the idea of concept creation is difficult to understand if those concepts can have no content. They are dismissed out of hand by the Tractarian account as senseless metaphysics, something we should stop doing as it is a futile practice. The retort from a Deleuzian perspective is that the Tractatus can only begin to say what it wants to say if it presupposes the creation of concepts since it forms a created concept itself. In this the idea of the constitutive problematic comes back into play.

What is it that is constituted by the Tractatus and how is it constituted? If the Tractatus constitutes a concept of sense as saying and sayability this concept is self-destructive of the means by which the concept is created. The propositions of the Tractatus say nothing so the concept of saying cannot be created through saying. This shows us the priority of the idea of showing since it is only the showing that can create the concept of saying. In so doing, of course, the Tractatus also constitutes a concept of showing. Whilst the attempt is made to restrict showing to the showing of logical form this logical form does not constitute the basis for the concept of showing and so this concept of showing forms an excess that cannot be accounted for by the Tractatus itself unless we include in the notion of the Tractatus the process which it forms. As soon as we take into account the process the Tractatus forms we are close to the idea of it being a conceptual assemblage, a machine that produces and in particular which produces affects of sense, that is, produces a character of thought and thinking. In particular the Tractatus produces a character that intimately involves the notion of determinate sense, moreover a character that admonishes any discourse other than science to be silent in any claims to say anything.

As Fogelin suggests, a problem with the Tractarian notion of determinate sense occurs in that it is extended from a natural use. He argues that ‘when determinacy is used in a perfectly natural way, there seem to be no difficulty in thinking of instances of determinacy where a system of irreducible entities is missing’ but that ‘when determinacy is used in some extended and sublime way, then it is difficult to know what to think at all’\(^{239}\). This extended way of using determinacy rests of a double move of both an insistence on determinacy and an equation of determinacy with the existence of simples or names as I have been calling them. This is a ‘brute commitment to the determinacy of the world’ that ‘can only be founded on a system of determinate entities’\(^{240}\). Fogelins’ argument rests in the use of an ordinary language distinction and assumes that this distinction is transparent but it is not clear exactly what could be meant by a determinate system with missing entities that are irreducible to the system. The only form of determinacy that seems to fit this description is the determinacy of a postulated system, such as the idea of a game, which then pushes the sense of determinacy dangerously close to a simple conventionalism which itself tends to mitigate against what we would want to mean by a determinate system. This can be seen quite clearly if we pursue the conventionalist approach and apply it to analytical statement, which appear perfectly

\(^{239}\) Fogelin, Op.cit; p.16-17
\(^{240}\) ibid, p.15
determined. Either the analytical statements are perfectly determined or they are so only within a conventional system which itself is not perfectly determined. If the latter is the case then these perfectly determined analytical statements appear to be little more than the well entrenched beliefs attributed to Quine’s attack on analyticity\textsuperscript{241}.

We can bring Deleuze in here in terms of the notion of determinacy through looking at the way he approaches the idea of clarity. Full determinacy would be capable of a full clarity, would indeed appear to be the ground for such clarity. However the concept of clarity undergoes a restructuring within DR that goes some way to help us understand the difference in Deleuzian philosophy with regard to analytical statements, from the basic model shared by both those who want to retain them as well as those like Quine who want to discard them.

Perhaps the most difficult aspect of Deleuze’s philosophy is his lack of universal and a priori arguments. It is difficult to easily understand a transcendental philosophy which doesn’t utilise strategies of universalism. At its most basic this difficulty stems from the attitude to truth within the Deleuzian philosophy. Just as a vital part of Heidegger’s \textit{Being and Time} is the reworking of the notion of truth as a concealing un concealing\textsuperscript{242}, so the implicit dropping of a particular attitude to truth takes place within Deleuze that derives from Nietzsche. This is the shift from an attitude towards truth which sees it as objective and determinable to one which sees it as bound up with structures of valuation, perspective and morality. This shift is not from the objective to the subjective. It is not a replacement of a ‘personal’ truth for a ‘real’ truth – this naïve relativism does no justice to Nietzsche or Deleuze and betrays an inability to go beyond rather crude philosophic categories. It is instead the shift from a universal and transcendent truth to an immanent and non-universal concept. Critically this means a shift in terms of the criteria of truth, what makes something true. The real immanence is in the concept of truth itself. That is, the criteria of what is true and what false does not arrive from anywhere other than from within the concept of truth – there are no external transcendent criteria which then need to be truthfully applied, prompting logical regress. The idea is that truth, as a concept, constructs and produces its own criteria through the immanent relations with the other concepts it is in relation with in any particular assemblage. In particular the concept of truth brings out the play between the active and passive forces within any conceptual assemblage.

What is a conceptual assemblage? The tightly woven inter-relations between specifiable concepts, such as the assemblage ‘government’, composed of concepts of power, responsibility, rights, nation and many others. Another example might be the concept of

\textsuperscript{241} Cf. Glock, op.cit, p.134. It is also worth considering the article by Glock, \textit{Necessity and normativity} where he argues that a major difference lies between Quine and Wittgenstein on the issue of normativity and conventionalism. ‘Quine’s ‘norm-free’ view of language reduces itself to absurdity’ for Glock (p.222) and Wittgenstein ‘not only stressed the normative aspects of language but showed, against empiricist reductionism, that they are crucial to the very possibility of meaningful language’ (p.223).

\textsuperscript{242} Cf. Ernst Tugendhat, \textit{Heidegger’s idea of truth}, where he focuses on the role of section 44 of \textit{Being and Time}. 

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language, composed of accents, speech, grammar, meaning, syntax and many others, such that the naive assumption of a ‘natural language’ is merely the deliberate isolation and abstraction of one or more elements of one assemblage to form another assemblage. The other aspect of an assemblage is that it is not in principle determinable as a limited set. It is always an open set and thus extends, in principle, into every concept. There is in Deleuze a deliberate sense of an intimately connected whole, such that any part can enable access to any other. The discrete objects and entities we see, feel and think are nothing more than particular assemblages, where some things are clear and some obscure. As we saw in Chapter 4, ‘the object itself is force, the expression of a force’ (NP; 6) and what we can suggest now is that the various assemblages are thus not constructed by us, though they can be, but are as much constructed by the flow of life through the world, by the flow of forces, of which the two primary forces are the active and the passive. Thus the constructivism of Deleuze is not a subjectivism but a pre-subjective constructivism, one which constructs the subject as much as any other object. Deleuzian constructivism is another name for the immanent forces of life self-organising the world and reality into the actuality we then live within and try to understand.

The flow of life, the immanent and vital movement that is undoubtedly presupposed within Deleuzian philosophy, produces this model of an oceanic being, where there are, in principle, routes from any one point to another, from the subjective I into the heart of the lion. One way Deleuze accounts for the difficult and counter-intuitive notion of an intimate and ongoing connectionism within reality is via this notion, just touched upon, of the clear and the obscure. Deleuze argues that in Descartes the principle of representation is underpinned by good sense and common sense. In particular this is expressed through the idea of the ‘clear and distinct’. With this idea of the ‘clear and distinct’ there comes the associated principle of proportionality such that the more clear, the more distinct. Of course, this suggests that if we pursue an increasing amount of clarity we will gain an increasing distinctness, as though it were a simple linear progression onward and upward to a better view of things.

Even a moment’s thought shows how plainly ridiculous this notion is. What, after all, is meant by clarity? Do we, for example, mean increased resolving power if we are talking about our vision? If we did mean this then the telescopes and microscopes that have been developed would make things much more distinct. Yet it is obvious that these technologies do not simply make things more distinct but instead alter the very structure of seeing itself, such that new things might be seen. There is no more distinctness in the microscopes vision of the cellular level of an onion than there is in the artists’ depiction of the vegetable in a still life. It would be an obvious category error to suggest this is a singular vision, the distinctness of which is increased with increased clarity (resolving power). The same changes would occur in sound, touch and any other sensory domain. Does this mean that increased clarity of understanding leads to increased distinctness in the what of the world and our lives that we profess to understand? Against this notion we only have to consider the problems of expertise and specialisation and the arguments or rather the problem that motivates discussion and pursuit of inter-disciplinary practices
within modern Universities. This notion of a proportionality of clarity and distinctness is simply unsustainable and thus the arguments of numerous philosophers who might oppose thinkers such as Deleuze on the basis of a lack of clarity betray a simplistic sense of what exactly ‘clarity’ is in the first place. The rather fashionable denouncement of ‘bad academic writing’ which more often than not betrays a sort of inbuilt prejudice to a particular strain of thought also relies upon this rather simplistic notion of clarity and is a rather poor example of the sort of common sense notions that can too often prevail within the academy and which then constrict its ability to develop and open itself to new ideas.

There are, obviously, issues of obscurantism that need to be addressed at times but these relate, I would argue, more to the holding on of power than to a particular style of writing of expression. It is not acceptable to simply reject out of hand the complex and unclear. It is not certain that clarity itself is a virtue at all times. Given this it might be easier to understand why Deleuze, rather provocatively no doubt, claims that ‘a clear idea is in itself confused; it is confused in so far as it is clear’, a claim directly derived from Leibniz. On the one hand, of course, we can metaphorically understand this statement by thinking of an increasingly clear sheet of glass. The less it obscures, the more it is clear and transparent, the less we can actually see of the glass, to the point perhaps where it becomes a dangerous liability to have very clear glass since we may well walk into it, shattering it and causing injury to ourselves or others. This is still metaphorical but Deleuze intended more than that, as did Leibniz. The idea behind the claim is that there are two radically different ways of understanding clarity, which I have hinted at in the preceding paragraph. The first, the Cartesian option, is to see clarity as composed of clear parts of the whole. As the clarity of the parts increases, so does the distinctness of the whole. The Leibnizian-Deleuzian options, however, is to posit a difference in kind and not in degree between the clear and the distinct, such that (i) the clear in itself is confused and (ii) the distinct in itself is obscure. This then complicates the original idea of clear and distinct and gives us instead a doubled notion of the distinct-obscure and the clear-confused.

The argument that there is a difference in kind not degree between the clear-confused and the distinct-obscure implies that the variations of more or less apply differently when considering clarity or distinctness. At a critical point the increase in clarity tends towards a confusion and similarly with the distinct and obscure. This implies further that there is no end point of clarity and distinctness but rather a variable relation between clarity and confusion and distinctness and obscurity. It is not simply as a block to an end goal of some perfected knowledge, however, that the distinction between the clear-confused and distinct-obscure is mobilised. The original notion of clarity that inspires Deleuze is

243 This claim is in opposition to the claim made by James Williams in his otherwise excellent introduction to Difference and Repetition, where the clear and obscure is said to be ‘the main metaphor, perhaps the only important metaphor in Difference and Repetition’ – James Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: a critical introduction and guide, p.151. Williams, it seems, reads the clear and obscure on a sort of gestalists model, indicated by the fact that he claims ‘clarity only appears because of obscurity’, as though clarity arises against a backdrop of obscurity when in fact the Deleuzian claim is centred in the difference in kind between the clear-confused and the distinct-obscure.
derived from Leibniz’s *Monadology* and can be traced to sections 60 and 69\textsuperscript{244}. Within the *Monadology* the notion of infinite perceptibility is central and for Deleuze this opens up a way in which the univocal structure of the actual as an intimately connected (oceanic) whole can be conceived, as I noted in Chapter 8 in relation to passive synthesis. Rescher notes, for example, that for Leibniz ‘*every perception in our ordinary sense of the term is composed of infinite insensible perceptions*’\textsuperscript{245} which are called the minute perceptions (*petites perceptions*). These are, as it were, subliminal or sub-conscious or perhaps pre-conscious, forming the perceptions of the world as aggregates. Rescher refers to the ocean when he describes these minute perceptions as ‘*like the individual impact of waves*’ which ‘*are lost as individual phenomena when we hear the pounding of the surf*’\textsuperscript{246}. The only reason for maintaining that these minute perceptions are still perceptions is because they exist as monad-of-monad perceptions, part of the intricate interconnection to infinity that forms Leibniz’s ontology\textsuperscript{247}. In effect the perception of ‘monadic aggregates’ involves a confused perception of the individual monads of the aggregate in the distinct perception of the aggregate itself. The ‘parts’ are as it were ‘blurred’ into one another in the perception, always perspectival, of the whole\textsuperscript{248}.

Deleuze wants to pursue this line of thought through introducing the difference in kind, arguing that Leibniz tended towards reducing the difference to one of degree (DR; 213). In doing so, Deleuze argues, ‘*the problem is then no longer posed in terms of whole-parts (from the point of view of logical possibility) but in terms of virtual-actual (actualisation of differential relations, incarnation of singular points)*’ (DR; 213-214). The Deleuzian Idea is then associated with the ‘minute perceptions’ which, as different in kind from the ‘major perceptions’, are always distinct-obscure. The Idea is in this sense the sound of each droplet of water within the oceans’ movements, the echo or pre-conscious life of the sound of the crashing waves. This level of perception is the level of the Idea. In changing the conceptual structure of possibility into that of actualisation a single continuum is given up in favour of a disjunctive synthesis involving a difference in kind. There is a ‘break’ between a ‘human’ level of perception and the minute level, a break that is now characterised as that of actualisation itself. Thus the Idea is ‘*real without being actual, differentiated without being differenciated and complete without being entire*’ (DR; 214). The murmuring of the ocean, the hum of existence underneath the world of sound, is the level of Dionysian becoming although Deleuze notes that the Dionysian level of the distinct-obscure may perhaps only be capable of being thought via the Apollonian level of clarity-confusion. The strategy that suggests itself is perhaps to let a little Dionysian blood flow into the veins of Apollo (DR; 262). Even if the Apollonian is needed in order to think the Dionysian, however, ‘*they compose two

\textsuperscript{244} Cf. Rescher, *The philosophy of Leibniz*; p.61 fn5
\textsuperscript{245} ibid, p.120
\textsuperscript{246} ibid.
\textsuperscript{247} The issue is more complicated than this brief account can do justice to, as Rescher himself indicates when he outlines 4 ‘levels’ of perception. Whilst he argues that ‘*monadic perception in its generic sense, based on the fact that the monads, though windowless, accord with one another in this best of possible worlds, applies throughout the monadic realm*’ – ibid, p.125
\textsuperscript{248} ibid, p.126
languages which are encoded in the language of philosophy’ constituting ‘the disparity of style’ (DR; 214).

This disparity of style can of course be easily reduced to the style of particular philosophers but more interestingly it may be read as a way of understanding the tension on the TLP\textsuperscript{249}. The disparity of style between showing and saying may well rest on precisely the sort of difference in the relation each concept has to a notion of clarity and distinctness. In a sense, then, a Deleuzian reading of the TLP might suggest that the paradox of that text arises from an attempt by Wittgenstein to let a little Dionysian blood flow into Apollo’s veins.

\textsuperscript{249}It would be necessary and useful to pursue this further at this point by considering the recent development in studies of the Tractatus that has been named ‘The new reading’ by Ian Proops in his essay The new Wittgenstein: a critique but that task will have to be taken up outside pages of this text.
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